Medieval commentators' views of Cicero remain strikingly different from how Cicero and his rhetoric is studied today. Now we encourage students to read his speeches and put him in a correct historical setting and study the mature, rhetorical treatises as, e.g. the De oratore, Brutus and Orator. In the twelfth century, however, Brutus was not mentioned, the Orator known second-hand from St. Augustine's De Doctrina Christiana and the late classical rhetoricians C. Iulius Victor and Martianus Capella(1), and the De oratore was only rarely called upon. But first and foremost, Cicero was such a different figure from «our Cicero» in that this doctor eloquentiae was in a course of rhetoric utilized strictly as a theorist and an author assumed to have fathered both the De inventione and the Rhetorica ad Herennium, – two books which incidentally are among the five most popular, Latin classical authors in all our extant eighth to twelfth century manuscripts, right after Horace, Lucan and Virgil(2). Cicero's speeches, on the other hand, were not subject to commentary and were in fact quite outside a twelfth century course in rhetoric, where indeed these speeches are often quoted second-hand(3).


When I today have chosen to talk about Thierry of Chartres as an innovator or traditionalist, it is not because he does quote the *De oratore* (4) nor because he deviates much from the pre-Renaissance tradition in the above respects, but because, within the ambitus of medieval rhetoric, more precisely the generation before Thierry of Chartres, master Anselm, Manegold and William of Champeaux treated the text of the *De inventione* and *Rhetorica ad Herennium* in a manner not unlike medieval commentators dealt with Horace and Virgil. This we can see from their introductions, *accessus*, and general format of commentary. However, with Thierry, writing his rhetorical commentaries in the 1130es, *ars rhetorica* comes to the fore, reflecting a new ambition and also the manner of teaching of the *artes* at the cathedral schools in Northern France (5).

Since only Thierry’s commentaries have been fully edited, allow me to quote both his unprinted predecessors as well as Thierry himself. Let me start with illustrating the point of format and quote Thierry, not as is usually done from his new *accessus*, but from the body of the commentary and his comments on the definition of *ratiocinatio*,

inv. 1, 34, 57: *Deductive reasoning* etc. He (Cicero) is here dealing with deductive reasoning, that is with the syllogism, by first showing what that is, next how many parts it consists of, according to his own opinion. *Deductive reasoning* then, he says, is a form of argument which draws that is puts forward a *probable* argument from the *fact under consideration itself*, that is from what has been accepted as true, *which argument, when it has been set forth* or explicated and known by itself, by which he understands that it is not built upon some use of similarity as the inductive argument, *proves itself by its own import* etc., that is it holds in itself a necessity of reasoning which is self-evident. Where he wrote *set forth* he has distinguished it from the exemplum and the enthymeme, which do not show an argument in its integrity; where he wrote *recognized by itself etc.* he has distinguished it from inductive reasoning.

1, 34, 57: *Ratiocinatio*, etc. De ratiocinatione, id est de syllogismo, sic agit ostendendo in primis quid sit ratiocinatio, deinde ex quot partibus, ut sibi videtur, constet. *Ratiocinatio* igitur, inquit, est *oratio eliciens*, id est explicans, *argumentum probabile, ex ipsa re* id est ex vero concesso, *quod argumentum expositum* id est explicatum, *et per se cognitum* id est non ex

---

(4) Thierry, *Rhetorical Commentaries*, 72, 64.

aliqua similitudine factum, sicut argumentum inductionis, confirmat se sua vi, etc. id est habet in se necessitudinem rationabilem, id est evidentem. Ubi dixit expositionem removit exemplum et enthymema, quae non exponunt, id est integre ostendunt, argumentum; ubi vero dixit per se cognitum et cetera sequentia removit inductionem(6).

Here, we are introduced magisterially and deftly to the difference between the four main types of rhetorical / dialectical arguments, the syllogismus and enthymema, inducito and exemplum, their respective forms and truth-values(7) evaluated as if the students knew by heart Boethius' discussion of these four types of argument. At the same time, the neat language of the De inventione is translated into the Boethian and Aristotelian technical terminology. And, Cicero's understanding of the syllogism ends up by being criticized thus:

inv. 1, 35, 61: But in our view. Cicero agrees with the former and he brings forward his witnesses and arguments. Therefore however etc. After the witnesses he brings in arguments not that prove his own point, but that falsify the opinion of the others, as if Cicero was certain that his own view would hold good, if he had falsified the other one. But in my opinion both views are wrong: the corroboration of a premiss is not a part proper of the syllogism, nor does the first premiss in the syllogism invariably need corroboration.

1, 35, 61: Nobis autem, etc. Priori parti consentit Tullius inducens testes et argumenta. Quare autem, etc. Post testes ponit argumenta non quae suam sententiam probent, sed quae sententiam aliorum falsificent, quasi Tullio constaret quod, illa falsificata, staret illa qui favebat. Mihi autem videtur quod utraque sententia falsa sit – nam neque probatio pars est syllogismi nec semper propositio syllogismi probatone indiget.

As is clear from the last section(8), Thierry felt free even to criticise Cicero on terminological grounds, here discussing the right number of parts in the syllogism, since to Thierry a(n) (Aristotelian) syllogismus has only three parts, and neither the first or the second of the premisses need (rhetorical) corroboration – even if, in fact, the young Cicero is here talking not about the syllogismus at all, but about the epicheirema.

In the generation before Thierry, the tone was more reverent and the format of discussion was rather different since the dialectical terminology is not a presupposed standard, and the individual words in Cicero's definition are translated into everyday language.

inv. 1, 34, 57: Deductive reasoning is a string of words eliciting some

(6) Thierry, Rhetorical Commentaries, 156, 9-18.
(7) As Thierry, ibid., 154, 33 found them discussed in Boethius, diff. iop. in PL LXIV, 1184D, 1206 Nigne, and Marius Victorinus, rhet. 240.
(8) Thierry, Rhetorical Commentaries, 157, 40-45.
probable fact, that is a conclusion from the fact under consideration that is from the very argument which is set forth in the first and second premiss, that something probable is set forth, which conclusion is put outside and elsewhere, whether it is put forward to prove something else or put forward by itself, that is before it has been proven and corroborated, and it is now known by itself because now it need not be proven as before, but it proves itself by its own important reason, that is by its own compelling reason. Thus it is unlike inductive reasoning, which does not have any compelling reason, since it sometimes fails. It is also different from the enthymeme where there is not compelling reason, since it does not have a fully developed argument and a sufficiently strong one, but is put forth only in naked words.

1, 34, 57: Ratiocinatio est oratio eliciens aliquod factum probabile id est conclusionem ex ipsa re id est ex ipso argumento quod habetur ex propositione et assumptione quod aliquid probabile expositum quae conclusio extra posita et alibi, sive proponatur ad aliud probandum sive proponatur per se tantum, priusquam scilicet probata fuerit et certificata, et iam cognitum per se quod iam non eget probari sicut prius sed confirmet se sua vi et ratione id est sua ingenti ratione. Per hoc differt ab inductione, quae non habet ingentem rationem, quia aliquando fallit. Differt etiam ab enthymemate ubi non est ingens ratio, quia non habet expolitum argumentum et satis firmum sed solis nudis verbis expositum(9).

In William of Champeaux’s commentary, the word probabile is meaning nothing terminologically exact and technically known, and the number of premisses in an argument are not confined to syllogismus, but explicated in simple words as the master went along giving his exposition of the Cicero text.

Formally, Thierry was an innovator, and the earlier commentaries are certainly rambling and uneven in places. However, now and again, they have very shrewd observations to offer. I shall here only mention two instances.

The first is from the appendix to William of Champeaux’s rhetorical commentaries (from roughly 1095), where William(10) tries to describe a rhetorical case, as first a rough material for the speaker, ‘causa simplex’, which he then can dress up as a lawsuit, political speech or deliberative speech, in which process it gets ‘informed’ by a genus, and when he assigns it to its proper status it gets further ‘informed’ by its species. Thus, the much heated debate over rhetoricians dealing with general (and hence supposedly philosophical) topics allowed by Boethius(11) and forbidden

(10) William of Champeaux, ibid., 33; 36.
(11) Boeth. diff. top. in PL LXXIV, 1207C Migne.
by the young Cicero in the *De inventione* (1, 5, 7), is resolved in favour of Boethius’ broader scope.

(William of Champeaux *Appendix ad Com. in De inventione*): Please note that Boethius and Cicero disagree on the orator’s subjectmatter. Boethius says in *diff. top.* 4 that the orator’s subjectmatter is whatever he intends to deal with, which then is ‘informed’ by the demonstrative genus or it falls under the deliberative or judicial genus. For it is necessary that he wants the same simple theme, when it is as yet unformed, to be the subjectmatter and this subjectmatter he then divides by the demonstrative or deliberative or judicial genus.

Cicero, on the other hand, believes that nothing can be called his subjectmatter as long as it is considered ‘unformed’ by some of the properties we find in the demonstrative and deliberative and judicial genera....

For instance, Somebody wants to speak about Verres’ theft in order to praise or censure him; this makes the speech belong to the demonstrative genus. Furthermore, as if it was yet ‘unformed’ and it becomes further shaped by the property when the counsel for prosecution affirms the fact, while the counsel for defence denies the fact, then it becomes a subspecies and is called a demonstrative, coniectural case.

But if the counsel for defence does not deny the fact, but says that he will not respond to the charges of that particular barrister or in that particular mode or at that particular time, the case becomes informed by another quality and becomes a demonstrative case under the issue of translation.

However, if the controversy is not about all these things, but how the crime should be named, be it theft or sacriledge, it will be called a demonstrative case under the definitive issue.

Or if the discussion is about the immensity or quality of the crime, it will be under the general issue.

(Ms. York Minster XVI. M. 7, ff. 68vb, 69rb): *Nota etiam quod in materia oratoris diversi sunt Boethius et Tullius. Dicit enim Boethius in quarto libro Topicorum quodlibet negotium de quo intendit agere orator ipsius oratoris esse materiam, quae postea sub demonstrativo fornatur vel sub deliberativo vel iudiciali cadat. Necesse est idem thema simplex nondum demonstrativo vel ceteris <informatum> vult esse materiam eamque deinde dividit per demonstrativum vel deliberativum vel iudiciale.

Tullius vero nullam rem iudicat debere oratoris materiam appellari quamdiu consideratur non informatum aliqua illarum proprietatum quae per demonstrativum et deliberativum et iudiciale signifi Cantur....

Verbi gratia: intendit aliquis de furto Verris ad laudem vel vituperium quod facit id demonstrativum. Ecce quasi informe quod si et formetur huiusmodi proprietate quod fit <si> quando accusator affirmet factum, defensor vero neget, iam fit species quodammodo et dicitur demonstrativum coniecturale.

Quod si non neget defensor factum, sed dicit se non responsurum illi accusatori vel non illo modo vel illo tempore, alia qualitate informatum fit demonstrativum translativum.

Quod si in omnibus <illis> non est controversia, sed quo nomine id
appellari debeat scilicet sive furum sive sacrilegium, demonstrativum definitivum dicetur.
Quod si de quantitate vel qualitate, generale.

Two features in William’s contribution here are interesting. First of all, that the highly theoretical nature of the issues or constitutiones are acknowledged – William is quite uninterested in the legal aspects involved in choosing a particular issue – and, secondly, that William proceeds from purely dialectical considerations in his discussion of this ‘information-process’.

My other example is from the so-called ‘Durham Notes’, presumably written by a student of William of Champeaux(12). He comments upon the discontinuation between the De inventione and the Rhetorica ad Herennium thus:

In the other manual on rhetoric, which he (Cicero) made for Herennius, he deals with the other aspects of rhetoric. But that manual does not appear to be a continuation of these two books (inv.). Rather, the books which he mentions in the end of the inv. (2, 59, 178) ... de reliquis, where he were to deal with the four parts of rhetoric (apart from invention)... these books, it seems, we do not have or he never managed to write, since first of all we do only have Victorinus’ commentary to the two books of the De inventione.

Victorinus says nothing on the Rhetorica ad Herennium, which he would most certainly have done, if it had followed the De inventione immediately.

Secondly, the books to Herennius are a separate work, to the extent that there is no mention of the other books (viz. inv.); he also gives an independent treatment of invention and other matters, as if there had been nothing said on that in the other books (viz. inv)... Therefore, to use a tag from Ovid: «On no way can these two meet».

(Ms Durham, Cath. Lib. C. IV. 29, ff. 201vb-202ra): In alio autem quem facit ad Herennium(13) de ceteris agit, sed non videtur esse continuum opus his duobus libris (viz. inv.); immo videntur deesse libri illi, de quibus in fine secundi horum duorum dicit (inv. 2, 59, 178) expeditum esse de inventione tantum in his duobus libris, in sequentibus autem de reliquis, id est quattuor partibus rhetoricalae, quae adhuc restabant, esse expediendum.

Quibus libris nos carere aut ipsum non fecisse indicio potest esse vel quod expositionem Victorini non habemus nisi super praeclutos libros –

(13) Lac. 7 fere litt.
What we find here are a number of first class historical-philological considerations, the most important probably being that Victorinus did not think that the Rhetorica ad Herennium was a 'second rhetoric' of Cicero's. We are still, however, in a very medieval context, and far from, for instance, the analysis of stylistic features that later in the Renaissance made Raffaele Regio in 1491 dissociate the Rhetorica ad Herennium from Cicero (15).

Compared with the 'Durham Notes', Thierry worked very differently, as he simply provided himself the missing cross-references between the terminology and doctrines in the De inventione and the Rhetorica ad Herennium (16).

Did Thierry himself know the difference between the approach of his predecessors and himself? I believe so, since in his two more personal comments found in his De Inventione commentary he also comments upon his style, which his opponents or emulators found suitable only for the older students, the proveci and full of longas interpositiones (17) — such sections, as I believe, we today may identify in his accessus, his discussion of the status system and of the complexities of rhetorical argumentation.

What modern critics have found new in Thierry of Chartres' Rhetorical commentaries.

When the edition of Thierry's rhetorical commentaries came out in 1988 — and I assume that it is because of that edition that I am today here with this distinguished company in Montecassino and Cassino, a town and monastery with very important links to medieval rhetoric, since Lawrence of Amalfi taught rhetoric here in the beginning of the 11th century and Alberic of Montecassino taught dictamen in the end of that century — then Alfonso Maierû in his review of the Thierry edition (18) picked out

(14) de[1] in ms.
(18) A. Maierû, reviewing Thierry, Rhetorical Commentaries, in «Medioevo Latino» II,
Thierry’s method and spoke favourably of his subtle and exhaustive care for terminology, while other reviewers fastened upon Thierry’s aims and saw his originality in the care for the concept of *ars rhetorica* and the exact definitions of rhetorical concepts (rhetorische Begriffe)(19).

What led Thierry, around the 1130es, to this new approach? We do not know much about the man himself: teacher in Northern France, chancellor at the cathedral school of Chartres, profusely admired, clever, with a cutting tongue, donator of *inter alia* an impressive collection of classical text books for all the liberal arts, including the first copies of the New Aristotle (*Top.*, *An. Pr.*, *Soph. El.*), a renowned Platonist – but with no extant commentary on e.g. the *Timaeus* or on Macrobius to bear his name – and a harsh critic of the great theologian Gilbert de la Porée. Apart from his Ciceronian commentaries, he is an author of a justly admired commentary on the *Genesis* and a set of commentaries on Boethius’ trinitarian opuscula (20). Perhaps he not only taught, but also wrote about grammar and dialectic as well (21), but whole texts have, I fear, not survived.

In the early history of reception of his rhetorical commentaries, Thierry is called the *commentator* ca. 1213 by Ralph of Longchamp (22). In the rhetoric section Ralph’s commentary on Alain de Lille’s *Anticlaudianus* relies heavily on Thierry, and in the second half of the twelfth century, Thierry is furthermore quoted by name in the *Alanus-
commentary' (23), echoed in his student, Petrus Helias' commentary on the \textit{De inventione} (24) and is having had his \emph{accessus} to the \textit{De inventione} commentary exploited by Dominicus Gundissalinus (25).

Furthermore, his commentary on the \textit{De inventione} is found in no less than eight manuscripts (five from the twelfth century, three from the fifteenth), the one on the \textit{Rhetorica ad Herennium} in one twelfth century manuscript. One reviewer, Sten Ebbesen (26), found this an impressive number of copies, as compared with extant manuscripts to dialectical treatises from the twelfth century, e.g. Abelard's (27). This is a very important comparison, since it sheds much light on the relative impact and durability of texts to dialectic and rhetoric: first of all, other rhetorical commentaries, e.g. Petrus Helias' on the \textit{De inventione} run up to eight copies as well, those on \textit{De inventione} and \textit{Rhetorica ad Herennium} by William of Champeaux are found in six and four copies respectively (28), not to mention the wide popularity of non-curricular texts as the \textit{Philosophia Mundi} and \textit{Dragneticon} by Thierry's contemporary, William of Conches (29). But, as is well known, dialectic developed faster both doctrinally and formally in the twelfth century than the other arts of the Trivium, thus leaving older patterns obsolete – and the number of individual, dialectical texts (mostly anonymous) is very big. Not so with rhetoric, for which we have fewer texts and which for instance never developed formally into university question-commentaries (30).

However, somehow, I find it less important that Thierry survives in eight manuscripts than his \textit{De inventione} commentary was copied in the fifteenth century in the beautifully executed Munich ms. (cIm 3565), an

(26) S. Ebbesen, reviewing \textit{The Latin Rhetorical Commentaries} in «Speculum» 65, April 1990, 503 [502-04].
impressive volume on late classical and medieval rhetorical commentaries holding (in that order):

Giles of Rome’s (very popular) commentary on Arist. *Rhet.*,
Grillius on Cicero’s *De inventione*,
Thierry on the *De inventione*,
Victorinus’ commentary on the *De inventione* (31).
Thierry is here in very fine company, indeed.

**Scope of commentary:**

John Ward (32) has, in his very excellent outline of the development of the Ciceronian commentary genre, noted that Thierry and his immediate successors introduce five novel features in twelfth-century Ciceronian rhetoric:

1. A new *accessus* form, dividing the more general extrinsic features of an *ars* from intrinsic matters dealt with by Cicero.
2. New terminology, introducing order into the art itself.
3. Major contradictions between *De inventione* and *Rhetorica ad Herennium* were worked out.
4. Verbosity was controlled, and a canon of set illustrations from poets as Vergil, Statius, Terence (and Horace) and prosewriters (Sallustiarius) was settled upon.
5. The *Rhetorica ad Herennium* emerged as the basic school text.

I would subscribe to all these points, but modify the last one a little. This, I believe, is more speculative point, since it hinges on that the two extant commentaries by ‘Alanus’ and the ‘Ut ait Quintilianus’ both on the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (the last one only covers book I and I (f)) belonging to the end of the twelfth century unequivocally represent all the rhetorical teaching that could have been given then. As far as I can make out, the heavy reliance on the topical system of the *De Inventione* also in the *Artes Poetriae* and dictaminial treatises and the many manuscripts of the *De Inventione* itself indicate that it did not go out of fashion in the end of the twelfth century. On the other hand, it is certainly significant and true of the University of Paris in the thirteenth century and the Italian commentaries from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries that the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* became the basic text (33).

As an outcome of the more consensus-orientated and orderly, precise body of rhetorical teaching, the status system of the Rhetorica ad Herennium is adopted as the principal doctrine, but otherwise De inventione with its far more detailed discussions of argumentation, counter arguments, topics for arguments sets the standard. So, starting with Thierry’s commentaries, the precepts of the De inventione and Rhetorica ad Herennium are amalgamated and turned into a rather sophisticated and orderly body of learning, covering all types of speech composition and their individual elements.

This earned Thierry the handsome praise from the English reviewer P. G. Walsh «Anyone who doubts the literary sophistication of the best twelfth-century scholars should turn to this edition to grasp the range of Latin learning lightly borne, and the depth of knowledge of the rhetorical theory lastingly transmitted by the author of the Ad Herennium, by Cicero and by Quintilian»(34).

Is Thierry then a humanist as well as an orderly scholastic scholar? Yes, but only in the sense that he believes that the Artes prepare the students for further study of philosophy proper, as he himself elegantly exemplifies it in his Genesis commentary(35) and eagerly recommends in his prologue to the Heptateuchon(36).

In Thierry’s own view, rhetoric deals with much simpler subject matter that does philosophy, and he wholeheartedly agrees with the De inventione that rhetoric is confined to a particular case, with a particular person involved(37).

inv. 1, 6, 8: It is of the greatest importance to find out whether a rhetorical case can exist without the circumstance of persona. Boethius, in diff. top. 4(38) says that some cases are special, others individual, and this division he makes use of for all genera. Grillius(39) on the other hand, in his Commentary on Cicero’s Rhetoric confirms that a demonstrative case cannot exist without a definite persona. If not, he calls it not a demonstrative case, but an appellative one, which he takes to be a common topic. Also Quintilian(40) in inst. III says that, in his opinion, it cannot be called a rhetorical case, if the case is not linked to an individual person. So

(34) «Classical Review» n. s. 39, 1989, 423; cf. Ward, The Date of the Commentary, cit., 249: «Human knowledge as an entire, integrated corpus».
(37) Thierry, Rhetorical Commentaries, 75, 36-47; 75, 62-66.
(38) Boeth. diff. top. in Pl. LXIV, 1207B Migne.
(40) Quint. inst. 3, 5, 7 (cf. inst. 3, 5, 15).
we must say that Boethius used the word ‘case’ wrongly when talking about special cases. The other authors have used the word correctly and have denied that there exist cases unless they are linked to an individual person. 

What Cicero says in this passage, is that many people, in order to brag about their own knowledge, have got used to assign to their art something of their own skill, not what belongs properly to the art itself. Just as if somebody, who is himself broadly founded in many disciplines, would assign to the act of rhetoric to prove physical and ethical matter, even though that is not possible for the art of rhetoric.

1, 6, 8: Sed diligerenter quaerendum est utrum causa esse possit sine ea circumstantia, quae dicitur persona. Et Boethius quidem in quarto *Topicorum* dicit causarum alias esse speciales, alias individuales et hanc divisionem in omnibus generibus causarum ponit. Grillius vero in *Commentario super Rhetoricam* affirmat demonstrativam causam esse non posse sine certa persona. Si vero certa persona non insit, non demonstrativum vocat, sed appellativum, quod ipse communem locum esse dicit(41). Quintilianus quoque in tertio *Institutionum oratoriarum* dicit non sibi videri vocari proprie causam quae a propria persona remota sit. Hoc ergo dicendum est quod Boethius improprie causas appellavit illa specialia. Alii vero auctores proprie vocabulo usi sunt et extra certam personam causas esse negaverunt...

Sensus autem litterae talis est: multi, ut magnitudinem suae scientiae ostentent, solent ex eo, quod ipsi possint, non ex eo, quod ars possit, arti aliquid assignare. Veluti si quis potens in omnibus scientiis assignaret arti rhetoricae comprobare physicas et ethicas quaestiones, cum istud non sit arti rhetoricae possibile.

Here, he supports his view by precise references to Quintilian and Grillius, and with his usual terminological concern, he censures Boethius for using the ‘causa’ in a non-technical meaning, transgressing the bounds of a rhetorical case. If somebody with a rhetorical training deals with ethics or physical philosophy, they should not assign their success to rhetoric but to philosophy.

However, perhaps as a teacher with his orderly mind and subtle terminology, Thierry can best be said to come out as a humanist, at least when he talks of the rhetoric teacher who must be a *magister doctus* and *benivolus*(42). And this, I suppose, is a suitable parting cue for this brief outline of Thierry as a teacher of Ciceronian rhetoric in the Middle Ages.

---