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RHETORICAL EDUCATION FROM GREECE TO ROME:
THE CASE OF CICERO’S DE INVENTIONE

1. General issues

The case of the rhetorical work written by the young Cicero and known in antiquity as *rhetorici libri* and today as *de inventione* is interesting from the point of view of cultural memory for many reasons. First, the work is an early example of the construction of cultural memory in the field of Roman rhetoric. Second, this work shows a strong connection between rhetorical theory, the Ciceronian interest in other disciplines (especially philosophy) and the oratorical formation of a young Roman in the person of its author. Third, in the *de inventione*, through the organisation of rhetoric, Cicero collects a significant amount of information about history, literature and law, and, in this way, he preserves these notions for the following decades. Finally, although Cicero rejected the work later in his life, the *de inventione* was an important moment for the dissemination of rhetoric in Rome and has been remembered as a fundamental work for the study of this discipline in Latin. In order to develop these topics, I intend to investigate how Cicero uses the examples derived from myth, history and legal practice, and how philosophy fits for his explanation of rhetoric. Furthermore, it is interesting to analyse how Cicero’s *de inventione* influenced the following Roman rhetorical works on these particular issues. Later authors often reused Cicero’s passages with or without modifications, and we can find these ex-

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1 I presented the first results of this research at the Conference *Cultural Memory in the Roman Republic* (London, 3-4 November 2016), organised by M. Dinter, Ch. Guérin and M. Martinho. I thank the participants in the colloquium and the anonymous reviewers of «COL» for their comments.
2 Concerning cultural memory from a theoretical and methodological point of view, see Assmann 1995; Erll and Nünning 2010; Assmann 2011; Galinski 2016. For a general overview on Cicero’s *de inventione*, see Achard 1994, 5-44; Greco 1998, 5-53.
3 For Quintilian see Raschieri 2016a, for Marius Victorinus and Grillius see Raschieri 2015a.
amples in the work of Quintilian or the *rhetores latini minores*⁴. So it is possible to understand not only that Cicero’s work was an archive that collected, sorted and organised the previous rhetorical teachings, but also that the *de inventione* was essential for the following rhetorical education, as it becomes a reservoir of knowledge to the school from the imperial age to the middle ages.

Cicero shows great awareness of the problems related to teaching rhetoric in his time. As he will later say in the *de oratore*, already in the *de inventione* Cicero argues that speaking abilities may originate from man’s natural aptitude, from training – what we can conceive as the traditional apprenticeship of young pupils with the guidance of already established orators – or from the careful study of the rhetorical *artes*⁵. In the *rhetorici libri*, Cicero intends to adopt this last strategy by drawing a comprehensive method that includes not only the *inventio* but also the other parts of the *ars rhetorica* (*dispositio, elocutio, memoria, actio*). This goal comes from the fact that, in young Cicero’s time, the Roman education system had no stable institutions for teaching rhetoric like the Greek schools of rhetoric. Especially after the closure of Plotius Gallus’ school, the possibility of such an institution appeared very unlikely⁶. For these reasons, the rhetorical school as a place of cultural memory did not exist at that time, neither as a place of learning and transmission of knowledge, nor as a place of apprenticeship and training for young Romans. The situation changed with the dissemination of declamatory practice in the second half of the century⁷.

In the *de inventione*, we can see how the construction of knowledge goes hand in hand with the formation of a young orator⁸. Cicero first systematises the rhetorical knowledge for himself, and then he plans a comprehensive rhetorical method that can guide the oratorical activity. He becomes a teacher and a student at the same time, both the creator and recipient of a major cultural memory at a time when the political struggle through the trials was becoming increasingly important in Rome. In this perspective, he shows a dynamic relationship with the

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⁴ The *rhetores latini minores* were edited by Halm 1863.
⁵ On rhetorical training in Cicero’s *de oratore* see Fantham 2004, 78-101.
⁶ About Plotius Gallus and the *rhetores latini* see Luzzatto 2002.
⁷ On Roman school see Bloomer 2011; Wolff 2015.
⁸ See Caparrotta 2008.
Greek tradition, especially Aristotle, Isocrates and Hermagoras. By a process of selecting and structuring knowledge, and often through strong disagreements with his predecessors, Cicero wants to create a compendium of rhetorical knowledge with a focus on its gradual transfer and adaptation from Greece to Rome. In this way, he uses a mechanism that is useful not only from an educational point of view, but also for the enrichment of cultural memory: each rhetorical item is accompanied by practical examples. These examples are taken from literary works (especially from the theatre), from famous historical events and famous court cases. In this way, Cicero gives a new function to these examples, noting their importance from a cultural point of view, while at the same time foreshadowing some mechanisms of the declamation.

We can say that this work of Cicero, together with other contemporary ones, demonstrates, in the field of rhetoric and the Roman milieu, the attempt to move from the transmission of knowledge based on oral practices and apprenticeships to the creation of cultural memory based on writing. Therefore, in this perspective, we must imagine a double influence acts on these works: the traditional oratorical apprenticeship, with its distinctive relationship that links the expert orator with the young man in training, and the Greek rhetorical handbooks, which already had a long tradition and were widely circulated in Rome. The consequences of these two influences can be seen in the careful structuring of the *de inventione*. This occurs not only in the systematic nature of the work, via its internal cross-references and in the connection between definitional precision and careful exemplification, but also in Cicero’s self-presentation as a teacher of rhetoric, in the implicit creation of an ideal recipient, of an ideal student and in the attention to the problem of *praecpeta* that is present in the entire work.

Another important aspect related to the construction of a cultural memory in the *de inventione* is the fact that Cicero framed the work with a mythic-historical and methodological background that we can read in the *proemia* of the two books. The first preface contains a mythic-historical reconstruction of the birth of rhetoric by a generic *vir sapiens* and an account about the decadence of this art. In doing this, Cicero re-

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9 See Raschieri 2014. On Isocrates in Roman culture, in addition to the studies cited in Raschieri 2014, see Pinto 2002.
10 See Raschieri 2016b.
11 See giuffrida 1963; Staffhorst 1992; Lévy 1995; Schwameis 2014.
covers an element of the Platonic philosophical tradition, but interprets it in a new way and proposes a story that, at least to our knowledge, we do not find in other authors’ work. By contrast, in the preface to the second book, the author uses a story that was widely circulated in the ancient world, that of the painter Zeuxis who was commissioned by the people of Croton to paint a portrait of Helen. In this case, Cicero gives a new function to the traditional anecdote: he is not interested in the problem of ideal beauty, but he uses the anecdote to prove the need to choose and select the best doctrines in the field of rhetoric and then present them in a better form than the original one.

One last interesting aspect related to the construction of cultural memory is that the persistence and the importance of the *de inventione* in the years following its writing exceeded the will of the author. In fact, it is well known Cicero himself gave up efforts to complete a comprehensive rhetorical discussion, as demonstrated by the fact that the work was left unfinished. In addition, Cicero rejected it in later years and devalued the *de inventione* for three aspects: the fact that he wrote it when he was young (*adulescentulus*), he argued that the literary genre was not worthy of the subject (*commentarioli*) and he rejected it for stylistic and formal reasons (*inchoata ac rudia*). This public disavowal testifies to the fact that the *de inventione* spread rapidly among Cicero’s contemporaries and was impossible to stop. Quintilian, for example, reports on the process; he knew Cicero’s opinion of the work, but, in any case, considered it an authoritative source of rhetorical knowledge.

### 2. Selecting and using examples

As previously mentioned, the structuring of cultural memory in the *de inventione* is a constant process through the use of examples that go with the technical explanation of rhetoric. Cicero implements this process in a conscious way when he says (1, 6): *argumentandi ratio dilucidor erit, cum et ad genus et ad exemplum causae statim poterit accommodari*. From our point of view, this procedure is not only important for the

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12 Cic. *de orat.* 1, 5: *quae pueros aut adulescentulis nobis ex commentariolis nostris incohorta ac rudia exciderunt, vix <sunt> hac aetate digna et hoc usu.*

13 Quint. *inst.* 2, 15, 6: Cicero pluribus locis scripsit officium oratoris esse dicere adposite ad persuadendum, in rhetoricis etiam, quos sine dubio ipse non probat, finem facit persuadere.
learning process, but also for the formation of a shared cultural memory. In fact, Cicero chooses examples that are relevant for his audience and allows us to have a clear idea about the cultural material on which they could build rhetorical education. In the first book, in particular, Cicero’s focus is on two famous cases (those of Orestes and Epaminondas) and on numerous quotations from dramatic works. In the second book, however, we can highlight some cases relating to inheritance issues and many examples with Greek settings, which the author himself points out as particularly significant.

Cicero often cites the story of Orestes (1, 18-19; 1, 31; 1, 92) and, in particular, is interested in the moment of the young matricide trial\textsuperscript{14}. He states that this example is «easy and well known» (1, 18, \textit{docendi causa in facili et pervulgato exemplo consistamus})\textsuperscript{15} and uses the story to illustrate some features of the case that we must examine after identifying the \textit{status quaestionis}, and, in particular, «what the question in the case is (\textit{quaestio}), and the excuse or reason (\textit{ratio}), the point for the judge’s decision (\textit{iudicatio}) and the foundation or supporting argument (\textit{firmamentum})»\textsuperscript{16}. For every point, Cicero imagines a debate between Orestes and his hypothetical prosecutor and then analyses all the elements to define the case of matricide. Moreover, the same example recurs in relation to the section of the speech, called \textit{partitio} (1, 31) and, at the end of the book, about the argumentation theory (1, 92).

Another example Cicero returns to many times is the case of the Theban Epaminondas who was tried because, for several days, he did not hand over the army to the man who had succeeded him as general, despite the fact that, during this same period, he defeated the Spartans (1, 55-56; 1, 69-70; 1, 73). In the case of Orestes, Cicero says that the example was well known, and we can imagine that Romans knew it through the theatre. In the example of Epaminondas, however, the author states that it was «well known among the Greeks»\textsuperscript{17}. Therefore, Cicero introduces here a new element to the Romans’ cultural memory, one he considers significant to rhetorical education. In particular, the example is widely used to exemplify both inductive reasoning (1, 55-56) and the deductive approach (1, 69-70; 1, 73). In all cases, Cicero reconstructs the

\textsuperscript{14} For Orestes at Rome between theatre and rhetoric, see Casamento 2015.  
\textsuperscript{15} Translations of Cicero’s \textit{de inventione} are by Hubbell 1949.  
\textsuperscript{16} Cic. \textit{inv.} 1, 18: \textit{quae quaestio, quae ratio, quae iudicatio, quod firmamentum causae sit}.  
\textsuperscript{17} Cic. \textit{inv.} 1, 55: \textit{in hac causa, quae apud Graecos est pervagata}. 
words that the prosecutor or the Epaminondas’ lawyer might have said, if they had used particular logical patterns.\footnote{For Epaminondas as a rhetorical and philosophical example in Latin works, see Cic. \textit{de orat.} 1, 210; \textit{fin.} 2, 62; Val. Max. 3, 2 ext 5.}

We find the examples of Orestes and Epaminondas in other Roman authors who often depend on the \textit{de inventione}. At Cicero’s time, we also read the example of Orestes in the \textit{rhetorica ad Herennium} (1, 17 and 1, 25-26)\footnote{In \textit{rhet. Her.} 2, 37 Orestes is mentioned in a quotation from Pacuvius.}. During the imperial period, Quintilian uses this example in an independent way (\textit{inst.} 3, 5, 11 e 7, 4, 8) or he cites Cicero’s \textit{de inventione} (1, 18-19) with further developments. We find many citational procedures in the following Latin rhetoricians: Augustinus (\textit{rhet.} 5 p. 140 Halm) derives from Quintilian; Marius Victorinus cites both the \textit{de inventione} and the \textit{rhetorica ad Herennium}\footnote{Cic. \textit{inv.} 18-19 in Mar. Victorin. \textit{rhet.} 1, 13-14 p. 194 Halm; \textit{rhet. Her.} 1.26 in Mar. Victorin. \textit{rhet.} 15 p. 196 Halm; Cic. \textit{inv.} 31 in Mar. Victorin. \textit{rhet.} 22 p. 210 Halm.}; Iulius Victor quotes from Quintilian and Cicero’s \textit{de inventione}\footnote{Quint. \textit{inst.} 7.4.8 in Iul. Vict. \textit{rhet.} 3, 8 p. 381 Halm; Cic. \textit{inv.} 31 in Iul. Vict. \textit{rhet.} 14, 14 p. 419 Halm.}; Grillius (\textit{rhet.} 1, 18-19 p. 83 Jakobi) and Albinus (\textit{rhet.} 10 p. 529 Halm) only derive from Cicero’s \textit{de inventione} (1, 18-19). Therefore, we can conclude that the discussion of the \textit{de inventione} on the example of Orestes is important for the Latin rhetorical tradition with or without the mediation of Quintilian. We find Epaminondas as a rhetorical and philosophical example in other Cicero’s works and in Valerius Maximus\footnote{Cic. \textit{de orat.} 1, 210; \textit{fin.} 2, 62; Val. Max. 3, 2 ext 5.}, but we read the only two mentions of Epaminondas in the corpus of \textit{rhetores latini minores} in two passages by Marius Victorinus, where the late antique rhetorician analyses the related passages of the \textit{de inventione}\footnote{Mar. Victorin. \textit{rhet.} 1, 33 p. 242 Halm and 1, 37 p. 245 Halm.}.

Another interesting set of examples is taken from literary works. In these cases, Cicero uses a rhetorical point of view to reconsider famous passages that were derived, in general, from dramatic works. This process is notable for many reasons: on the one hand, he recognises the rhetorical structure of the theatrical dialogues and takes advantage of the Romans’ familiarity with these texts to facilitate the understanding of the rhetorical technical aspects; on the other hand, we can see, in a preliminary stage, the pervasive presence of cultural memory derived from literary material, which is typical of Cicero’s more mature philosophical, rhetorical and oratorical works. The examples are taken mostly from the
works of Latin authors: Terence (1, 27), Pacuvius (1, 27; 1, 90), Ennius (1, 27; 1, 91) and Plautus (1, 95). Moreover, about the inductive argumentative process, Cicero uses a wide passage from the dialogue *Aspasia* by Aeschines of Sphettus in Latin translation\(^{24}\). Here, he takes advantage of the translation to include in the Roman cultural memory not only a procedure that is useful from a rhetorical point of view but also the philosophical method of Socratic questioning, the basis of the Academic method that was already well established in Cicero’s intellectual horizon. We also read the fragment of Aeschines Socraticus (Cic. *inv*. 1, 51-52) in Quintilian, Marius Victorinus, Iulius Victor and Albinus, but all the Latin quotes of Aspasia’s example come from Cicero’s *de inventione*\(^{25}\). In particular, the selection by Quintilian is useful to focus the attention on the rhetorical danger of Aspasia’s questioning, and on the negative judgement – from a rhetorical point of view – about the answers of Xenophon’s wife. On the other hand, Marius Victorinus expands the Ciceronian passage in many ways even though he keeps the theoretical framework of his source, and Iulius Victor presents the Quintilian’s selection without changes. Finally, although Albinus quotes the Ciceronian text in a precise way, he does not assign the questioning to Aspasia but to an anonymous *philosophus quidam*.

Cicero himself, at the beginning of the second book, summarises the contents of the work:

igitur primus liber, exposito genere huius artis et officio et fine et materia et partibus, genera controversiarum et inventiones et constitutiones [et iudicationes] continebat, deinde partes orationis et in eas omnes omnia praecepta. Quare cum in eo ceteris de rebus distinctius dictum sit, disperse autem de confirmatione et de reprehensione, nunc certos confermandi et reprehendendi in singula causarum genera locos tradendos arbitramur (Cic. *inv*. 2, 11)\(^{26}\).

\(^{24}\) See Raschieri 2013.
\(^{26}\) «The first book, after discussing the nature of this art, its function, end, materials and divisions, took up the kinds of controversies, the methods of invention and the determination of the issue, and finally the division of a speech and all the rules for all of them. Since the first book then treated all topics definitely and clearly except confirmation and refutation, of which the treatment was in somewhat general terms, now I think I ought to give concrete examples of arguments to be used in confirmation or refutation in each kind of case». 
Among these examples of confirmation and refutation, Cicero relies on four legal cases related to inheritance issues (2, 62-64; 2, 116; 2, 122-123; 2, 148)\(^{27}\). In two passages (2, 62-64; 2, 122-123), he uses an argumentative point of view to cite and analyse a famous trial of his day, the so-called *causa Curiana*, which was held in 93 BC\(^{28}\). In that trial, the centumviral court (competent at that time in cases of ownership, slavery and inheritance) was asked to judge the legality of a will wherein the father, a certain Coponius, had appointed as heir either his son, whom he anticipated would be born to his wrongly believed pregnant wife, or, in the case that his son died before reaching the age of majority, a man named Manlius Curio. No son was born, and another descendant through Coponius’s male line, Marcus Coponius, demanded by a formal act, the inheritance. Curio disputed the claim. In this case, the main problem was the conflict between the *voluntas* of the *testator* and the validity of the will (*scriptum*). Cicero not only explains in detail the legal issues of this case, but also goes into a detailed analysis of the law in general and the difference between natural law and common law, specifically (2, 65-67).

In a later passage (2, 116), after having listed the different types of *controversiae in scripto* and defined the *ex ambiguo* type, Cicero presents the related example with a brief description of the case and the direct quotation of the testamentary provision that was contested\(^{29}\). The will included the bequest to the wife of the *paterfamilias* of the amount of 100 pounds of silver in the form of vases: "HERES MEVS VXORI MEAE VASORVM ARGENTEORVM PONDO CENTVM, QVAE VOLET, DATO."

However, the formulation is ambiguous because it does not specify the subject of the relative clause *quae volet*, which could be both the son and the wife. Because of this ambiguity, the wife, after her husband’s death, claimed for herself «some magnificent examples of plate with costly chasing» (*vasa magnifica et pretiose caelata*), while the son interprets in his favour the testamentary formulation (*quae ipse vellet*). Again, Cicero is concerned with the legal aspects of the case, and especially with its rhetorical and argumentative issues.

\(^{27}\) See Raschieri 2015b, with further bibliography.

\(^{28}\) I analysed this problem from the legal and rhetorical point of view in Raschieri 2015b, 139-143, 146-148. Cicero also mentioned this trial in *de or*. 1, 180; 1, 242-244; 2, 140; *Caec.* 18; *Brut.* 194-198; *top.* 44.

\(^{29}\) See Raschieri 2015b, 143-146.
In the last example (2, 148), Cicero recalls a case questioning the will of a man condemned to death for patricide\textsuperscript{30}. A man was found guilty of murdering his father and, since he could not use exile as an alternative penalty, before being executed, was imprisoned with the typical clothes of the condemned to \textit{poena cullei}; wooden sandals and a leather hood. From the \textit{rhetorica ad Herennium} (1, 23), we know that Cicero implicitly refers to the history of Publicius Malleolus, who was executed in 101 BC for killing his mother. In the account of the \textit{de inventione}, some friends allow the convicted to make a will in prison according to all the custom requirements: writing the name of the heirs on wax tablets, the presence of witnesses and sealing the will. After the execution, however, a dispute arose between the designated heirs and the \textit{adgnati}, who denied that the condemned man had the legal capacity to make a will.

In each of these examples, the knowledge of law enters strongly in the rhetorical explanation. In this way, Cicero underlines another important element in the oratorical education of young Romans and inserts it into the cultural memory about rhetoric. At the same time, the combination of rhetoric and law creates an ideal bridge to the last period of Cicero’s literary activity, when he devoted an entire work, the \textit{topica}, to this subject. In the following centuries, some rhetoricians referred to these cases related to inheritance issues. For example, the \textit{causa Curiana} was mentioned by Quintilian, Marius Victorinus commented the related passages of the \textit{de inventione}, and this example also arrived to Albinus, who closely followed the text of Cicero\textsuperscript{31}. Furthermore, Quintilian briefly discusses the case of the testamentary provision that was differently interpreted by the wife and the son of the testator\textsuperscript{32}. We can also mention that Marius Victorinus commented not only this passage of the \textit{de inventione} but also the case questioning the will of the man condemned to death for patricide\textsuperscript{33}.

Cicero also identified another compact group of examples:

tum remotio criminis, ut in eo, qui, cum lex, quibus diebus in legationem proficisceretur, praestituerat, quia sumptum quaestor non dedit, profectus

\textsuperscript{30}See Raschieri 2015b, 148-151.
\textsuperscript{32}Quint. \textit{inst.} 7, 9, 9: \textit{heres meus uxori meae dare damnas esto argenti quod elegerit pondo centum; uter eligat quaeritur.}
non est; tum concessio per purgationem et per inprudentiam, ut in vituli immolatione, et per vim, ut in nave rostrata, et per casum, ut in Eurotae magnitudine (Cic. *inv*. 2, 124)\textsuperscript{34}.

These cases, which Cicero showed and discussed in the previous sections, share some characteristics. First, they all refer to a Greek background: Rhodes ambassadors who were supposed to go to Athens; sailors who escaped a shipwreck and, as a sign of gratitude to the gods, sacrifice a calf in the temple of Diana, not knowing that it was forbidden to sacrifice this kind of animal there; a contractor at Sparta who was unable to lead the sacrificial victims across the river Eurotas because of a flood; a beaked warship pushed to the Port of Rhodes against the mariners’ will. Second, these examples already belonged to the didactic tradition that was the basis of Cicero’s discourse. The evidence for this statement may be, in addition to the Greek background, their brevity and the fact that they appear to form a compact series along with the explanation. Therefore, we see once again the process that shapes a cultural memory. However, we can also highlight here the stronger influence of the earlier Greek tradition and how Cicero brings it to the Roman audience with no particular mediation, except the translation to Latin. The *de inventione* was also important because it transmitted this exemplary material to the following rhetorical tradition. In the *rhetores latini minores*, we find a peculiar interest in the case of the Rhodes ambassadors: Fortunatianus and Martianus Capella briefly mention the Ciceronian example (*inv*. 2, 87); Iulius Victor analyses and expands this passage from a rhetorical point of view, and Marius Victorinus briefly comments it\textsuperscript{35}. Furthermore, the example of the Spartan contractor was briefly summarized by Martianus Capella, and all these Cicero’s passages were literally quoted by Albinus\textsuperscript{36}.

\textsuperscript{34} «Again *remotio criminis* (shifting of the charge) may be used; an instance is the case of the ambassador who although the law set a certain date for him to proceed on his embassy did not set out because the Treasurer did not supply funds (2, 87). Again one may use *concessio* (confession and avoidance) in the form of *purgatio*, by a plea of ignorance as in the case of the sacrifice of the bull-calf (2, 95), or of force majeure, as in the case of the warship (2, 98), or of accident, as in the case of the flood of the Eurotas (2, 96)».


\textsuperscript{36} Mart. Cap. 5, 458 (*casus vero culpam eventus exonerat, ut qui cum victimis ad diem sacrum non occurrerit fluminis incrementis*); Albinus *rhet*. 15 pp. 531-533 Halm.
3. Rhetoric and philosophy

Another important point about the theme of cultural memory is the relationship between rhetoric and philosophy. In particular, in the *de inventione*, Cicero uses rhetoric as a tool to spread philosophy in the contemporary cultural debate. From the beginning of the first book, he shows a keen interest in the problem of the relationship between wisdom and eloquence, that is, between philosophy and rhetoric 37. This comparison, as we saw above, is developed through a mythical-historical reconstruction that depends on the Platonic tradition. The conclusion is an agreement between the two disciplines with a slight dominance of rhetoric (Cic. *inv*. 1, 5):

hoc sit unum, quod ad omnes res et privatatas et publicas maxime pertineat, hoc tuta, hoc honesta, hoc ilustris, hoc eodem vita iucunda fiat. Nam hinc ad rem publicam plurima commoda veniunt, si moderatrix omnium rerum praesto est sapientia 38.

Cicero is also aware that, for some issues, philosophy has more teachings than those offered by rhetoric. In these cases, his task is to select knowledge based on the criterion of usefulness for the training of the orator (Cic. *inv*. 1, 33):

ac sunt alia quoque praecepta partitionum, quae ad hunc usum oratorium non tanto opere pertineant, quae versantur in philosophia, ex quibus haec ipsa transtulimus, quae convenire viderentur, quorum nihil in ceteris artibus inveniebamus 39.

Moreover, Cicero pays considerable attention to the definitions of concepts that are employed both by rhetoricians and philosophers. Sig-

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37 We read a similar idea in Cic. *orat*. 24 (*semper oratorum eloquentiae moderatrix fuit auditorum prudentia*). In this case, Cicero adds the relationship between orator and listener to the connection between rhetoric and wisdom. About the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric, see Luzzatto 2008 (in Hellenistic and Roman world) and Michel 1982 (in Cicero’s rhetorical works).

38 «This is the only thing which has a very close relation to both private and public affairs, this renders life safe, honourable, glorious and even agreeable. For from eloquence the state receives many benefits, provided only it is accompanied by wisdom, the guide of all human affairs».

39 «There are other rules for the partition not so closely connected with oratorical practice; they are used in philosophy, and from them we have chosen the particular rules which seemed to apply and which we did not find in the other textbooks».
significant examples are those that concern the definitions of nomen, natura, victus, fortuna, habitus, affectio, studia, consilia, facta, casus and orationes (1, 34-36). Here, the definitions are based on a process of classification and partition, along with a great tendency to list individual characteristics. Another notable example is the definition of the various forms of argumentation (1, 44 ff.): complexio, enumeratio, simplex conclusio, similitudo, signum, credibile, iudicatum, commune and comparabile (divided into imago, conlatio and exemplum). In general, these examples are good illustrations of the level of complexity and technicality of Cicero’s discussion. The rich material offered by the philosophical and rhetorical tradition is systematically structured and transmitted in a stable form. Therefore, the knowledge can settle in a fixed way into the Roman cultural memory.

As previously mentioned, Cicero explains in detail the problem of argumentation and, in particular, the distinction between inductive and deductive reasoning in the first book (1, 51 ff.). The first type is explicitly attributed to Socrates’ teaching (Cic. inv. 1, 53):

hoc modo sermonis plurimum Socrates usus est, propterea quod nihil ipse afferre ad persuasendum volebat, sed ex eo, quod sibi ille dederat, quicum disputabat, aliquid conficere malebat, quod ille ex eo, quod iam concessisset, necessario adprobare debet 40.

The second type, however, is ascribed to Aristotle and Theophrastus (Cic. inv. 1, 61):

quemadmodum illud superius genus argumentandi, quod per inductio-nem sumitur, maxime Socrates et Socratici tractarunt, sic hoc, quod per ra-tiocinationem expolitur, summe est ab Aristotele atque a Peripateticis et Theophrasto frequentatum, deinde a rhetoribus iis, qui elegantissimi atque artificiosissimi putati sunt 41.

40 «Socrates used this conversational method a good deal, because he wished to present no arguments himself, but preferred to get a result from the material which the interlocutor had given him—a result which the interlocutor was bound to approve as following necessarily from what he had already granted».

41 «For just as that earlier form of argument which proceeds by induction was practised particularly by Socrates and the Socratics, so this which is elaborated in the form of a syllogism, was most largely used by Aristotle and by the Peripatetics and Theophrastus, and then was taken up by the teachers of rhetoric who have been regarded as most precise and accomplished in their art».
It seems clear that, through these observations, the rhetorical explanation becomes a way to educate his readers, even in philosophy.

Similarly, in addition to the broad discussion on the number of parts of the syllogism (1, 65 ff.), we are surprised by the extent of the argumentation that Cicero uses to exemplify deductive reasoning (1, 58-59). To show that «things that are done by design are managed better than those which are governed without design» 42, Cicero first underlines the similarities with the domestic administration, the command of an army, and the government of a ship, and then he expands his explanation to the cosmic order that we can perceive in the movement of the stars, in the seasons and in the alternation of night and day. It is easy to see that this type of reasoning is far from the immediate interest of an orator, and shows that, at this stage, Cicero wants to inject particular attention to philosophical practice into the cultural memory.

This issue becomes even more explicit in another exemplification about the claim that «a minor premise which contains a truth plain to all does not need proof» 43. In this case, the subject of the reasoning is precisely the connection between wisdom and philosophy: «If one ought to desire wisdom, it is proper to study philosophy» 44, in which the minor premise (that men must aspire to wisdom) should not be proven, but we have to prove the claim that men must devote themselves to the study of philosophy, because, as Cicero says, «many think that philosophy is no help and not a few think it is a positive disadvantage» 45. However, the author is aware that the fields of rhetoric and philosophy do not overlap:

42 Cic. inv. 1, 58: melius accurantur, quae consilio geruntur, quam quae sine consilio administrantur.
43 Cic. inv. 1, 65: quae perspicuam omnibus veritatem continet assumptio, nihil indiget approbationis.
44 Cic. inv. 1, 65: si oportet velle sapere, dare operam philosophiae convent.
45 Cic. inv. 1, 65: multi nihil prodesse philosophiam, plerique etiam obesse arbitrantur.
46 «I should, however, like it to be understood that I am well aware that, in philosophy, deductive reasoning is treated in many other forms, too; in fact, they are intricate and involved, and a precise system has been formulated. But they seem to me to be quite unfit for oratorical practice. But as for the principles which are pertinent to speech, I would not
Here, Cicero speaks directly to his readers and seems to accept an objection that they could move to the philosophical discussion of these topics, specifically that they are obscure and difficult to understand. With these words, he reassures his audience while also justifying the transfer of knowledge from philosophy to rhetoric and allowing the conscious construction of a new cultural memory that is characterised by clarity and usefulness. In a similar way, Cicero proceeds at the end of the second book, when he inserts within the discussion on the deliberative speeches (2, 157 ff.) the concepts of honesty (*honestum*) and usefulness (*utile*) that will form the basis of his philosophical works on ethical issues. A little later, we can also read an explanation of the four parts of honesty (2, 160 ff.): prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance.

4. Conclusion

In conclusion, let us once more recall the conceptual categories of cultural memory. In the *de inventione*, the theme of «concretion of identity» is mainly realised through the dynamic relationship between Greeks and Romans. In addition to reaffirming the opportunity to teach rhetoric in Latin, Cicero restates that the peculiarity of Roman identity is its ability to accept innovations from Greece and to integrate them into the Roman cultural horizon. Furthermore, young Cicero’s enthusiasm for the technical aspects of rhetoric is comparable with other similar projects, such as the school of Plotius Gallus or the *rhetorica ad Herennium*. Concerning the capacity to reconstruct, first, we can highlight that the *de inventione* is a reconstruction and an adaptation of Hermagoras’ doctrine (and Cicero is our oldest source on this rhetorician). Second, Cicero pays a great deal of attention to the history of rhetoric, and especially to the dynamic relationship between the Aristotelian line and the Isocratean one. Finally, through the collection and the selection of previous teaching traditions, he makes it clear that he can overcome and replace his predecessors.

The issue of training is central to the project of Cicero’s *rhetorici libri*. However, we can imagine that the work’s incompleteness demonstrates claim that I have studied them more completely than all others, but I do assert that I have written with greater care and accuracy».

47 See Assmann 2015.
the irrelevance of this attempt, the lack of a proper audience for it, or simply the urgency of other problems in young Cicero’s life. In any case, there is no doubt that the teaching intention is very strong, as underlined by the work’s structure and its discursive strategies. Although, in Cicero’s time, Roman society had not yet provided an institutionalised place for the transmission of rhetorical knowledge, the author of the *de inventione* imagines his work as the activity of a veritable teacher and, in this way, forecasts the professionalisation of the rhetoric that will come later in Roman world, especially in Latin. However, the survival of the *de inventione* and many quotations by Quintilian and the *rhetores latini minores* show that this work enjoyed great success in the ancient schools.

Despite the problems outlined above, the cultural memory crystallised in the *de inventione* shows a high degree of normativity, as it always happens with every systematic organisation of knowledge. However, the peculiarity of the procedure Cicero adopted is rooted in the fact that, for each problem, he most often proposes solutions and alternatives that allow for an adaptation of the rules to the individual case within the concreteness of each trial or public discussion. Finally, reflexivity is shown on several levels. On a personal level, Cicero builds his knowledge through his reflection on previous rhetorical traditions and on the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric; more generally, in the *de inventione* we can recognise a process by which Roman society reflects on the myth of their innate oratorical ability in comparison with the Greek theories and, on these foundations, builds a new cultural memory.

**Bibliography**


