Fear in international relations and in European integration

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The papers collected in this special issue retrace the path that the concept of fear has taken during Europe’s process of regional integration over the last century, as viewed from the broader perspective of international relations and globalization. In particular, the authors focus on a number of cultural, political, social and economic aspects whereby we can see that fear, over time, has shaped how Europeans move on the international scene, and has transformed their own perception of Europe as well as outside observers’ ideas of the Old Continent’s historical role. From a number of angles, the papers in this issue explore fear in Western and European political thought and in the actions of political parties, movements or factions from the end of World War I to the present day, illustrating the ways in which such feelings have tinged much of the political thinking about the future of Europe and a new international order rooted in peace and the law. The authors offer many penetrating insights into how fear — together and concomitantly with the crisis of the nation state and growing economic interdependence (Morelli 2011: 21-29) — has marked many stages of European history, playing a prominent part in connection with the idea of the Continent’s unification after World War II and with the political-institutional model that the process of integration proposed. Arising from these premises in the 1950s, this process resulted in a solution to the Franco-German question, as Altiero Spinelli noted at the time:

The fear factor, always present in political situations, played a very important role in the development of the European idea after the Second World War. Men and political forces who might have been hostile or indifferent to the idea of European unity understood clearly that this was the only way of giving Europe the necessary strength to preserve its independence. The traditional rivalries among European states, and especially between France and Germany, seemed now anachronistic (Spinelli 1957: 47).

The papers will thus provide a grasp of the extent to which fear has played an active, and often decisive, role in recent European history, where it continues in both the long and the short term to exert a two-fold and conflicting influence: as a force that unites and as a force that divides. At times, the fears arriving from outside or those generated within Europe, alone or in combination, have sparked closer cooperation between the member states, opening routes to economic and political unification and integration; in other instances, they have encouraged more conservative strategies.
that, retreating within the confines of the nation state, block any and all progress towards regional integration and trigger processes of disruption or even situations of tense conflict between the European nations.

The fact remains that fear is a state of mind that does not act exclusively on the single individual’s consciousness: in the broader social and political setting, it can become a matter of crowd psychology, associated with ideologies that can sway the behavior of whole populations. Political movements, factions and parties have often played on fear and continue to do so today, often aided by contingent circumstances, to assist or resist political processes, not least that of European integration. Fear, however, has also been the subject of interesting political reflections by a number of thinkers and well-positioned observers whose ideas exerted a major influence on the political culture of the twentieth century.

Against this backdrop, the paper by Patricia Chiantera-Stutte examines the concept of crisis and fear in the European geopolitical discourse at the end of the Second World War. Chiantera-Stutte addresses the period between the two world wars, when the fleeting Wilsonian optimism faded before the growing pessimism that surrounded the shaky political order erected by the Treaty of Versailles. In this climate of uncertainty, further public fears were fueled by the rise of American nationalism, the consequences of Red Biennium, burgeoning international communism, the crisis of liberal democracies and the economic and financial crash of 1929. To make the situation even more worrisome, international anarchy thrived on Europe’s fragmentation into small and medium sized nation states and the powerlessness of the League of Nations. It was then that eminent voices from the worlds of culture and politics decided to enter the public debate, tackling the major issues of international order and relations, with particular attention to European equilibria. Starting from the widespread uncertainty and worry spawned by these unstable circumstances, Chiantera-Stutte discusses the political thinking of three Anglo-American scholars who in the Thirties and Forties had a significant impact on Western public opinion, as they were among the first to take a global and internationalist approach to the century’s problems. Halford Mackinder, Isaiah Bowman and Arnold J. Toynbee are the protagonists of Chiantera-Stutte’s review, which ably illustrates how these political thinkers contributed, each in his own way, to laying the groundwork for a global vision of international relations and international organizations upholding peace, democracy and human rights.

Giuliana Laschi, in her paper, emphasizes that the process of European integration after the Second World War did not proceed only as a reaction to fear, of Germany first and then of the Soviet Union; rather, the motivations were many, stemming from Europe’s own history and thus determined by the Old Continent’s complex vicissitudes.

The cold war loomed large, and the postwar scene in Europe and elsewhere was roiled by insecurity and fear: fear of a rapid resurgence of German aggression, but even more of the hegemonic urges of the USSR and international communism, of the outbreak of a new war, and of the hardships that the social and economic turmoil in the first years of postwar reconstruction had brought.
Europe’s founding fathers, including Jean Monnet and Paul-Henri Spaak, called for action in overcoming deadlock and fear, and, in particular, the causes underlying them.

The answer to this call was a new era of close cooperation between the European countries, in the hopes of arriving at a durable, structural solution to the area’s problems, warding off the risk of new conflicts and offering a less uncertain future for Europe.

As Giuliana Laschi points out, however, this was a conscious decision, an active choice, not a mere reaction to what other actors had chosen to do.

In this connection, Laschi focuses in particular on Spaak, a figure who undoubtedly made a major contribution to the process of European integration through the many positions he held in those years. In certain respects, he stands apart from such other European leaders of the time as Schuman, Adenauer and De Gasperi: as a socialist, his Europeanism did not share their Christian Democratic roots.

Spaak, moreover, though joining in the hopes for a future Federal Europe, took his own highly pragmatic tack towards federalism, stressing the need to proceed apace in building the European edifice, without worrying overmuch about the method chosen or whether the approach was theoretically consistent.

Spaak’s style, accordingly, is far from rhetorical, as it is practical and oriented towards results. Action must be taken; if not, Europe risks a decline.

In Spaak, too, we see an explicit appeal to fear, in this case the fear of totalitarianism, communism and the Soviet Union. As he himself stated, however, his is not the fear “d’un lâche”. Far from it: what is necessary is courage, responding quickly and decisively to the necessities of politics, the economy and European society. The only way to overcome fear is to be sought in uniting the Europeans and demonstrating strength, and thus in the integration of the Old Continent. This is necessary for all of Europe’s countries, but even more so for the smallest, to ensure that they are not overwhelmed by the large States and can count for something in intra-European and international relations. The answer lies in constructing, piecemeal if need be, the European federation which, as well as preserving the small States and their security, would guarantee a historic achievement: the pacification of the continent.

The paper by Raffaella Cinquanta continues the line of analysis taken by Chiantera-Stutte and Laschi on international disorder, the integration of the Old Continent, European federalism and the possible solutions advanced in the second half of the twentieth century. Cinquanta deals in particular with the work of a group of Italian scholars who, in the wake of the Ventotene Manifesto and Altiero Spinelli’s later ideas on the crisis of the nation-state, formulated an original theory of federalism which left its imprint on the initiatives of the European Federalist Movement (EFM) and the Union of European Federalists (UEF) in the Sixties and Seventies. The most eminent figure in this group and the one showing the greatest intellectual originality was Mario Albertini, at the helm of the EFM from 1966 and president of the UEF from 1975 to 1984. Together with his group, Albertini reflected on the historical process of political ideologies, ranking
federalism alongside the classic quadrumvirate of liberalism, nationalism, socialism and democracy. Albertini argues that globalization has brought the revolutionary significance of federalism to the fore: cut free of all historical precedent, it has risen to the status of a cultural and political “paradigm” befitting the complexity and global span of the contemporary world’s problems. Cinquanta discusses Albertini’s scientific study of the ideology, shedding light on the salient aspects of federalism and its relevance to contemporary issues, and demonstrating how Albertini’s federalist model is a response to international disorder and instability. Viewed thus, a European federal state is not something to be feared, but a coherent step forward in the historical process leading to international democracy and a more peaceful global order.

In a similar vein, Filippo Corigliano examines fear and the global risks stemming from today’s international disarray and the nation-states’ inability to offer a remedy. Corigliano’s analysis starts from the classic Hobbesian state of nature and notes that the state is born from fear. In Hobbes’ pessimistic view, a “rational” choice leads men to set up a sovereign order that can protect them from violence. The definition of the nature and functions of the State is then enriched in the course of its historical-evolutionary process by a series of considerations that Corigliano makes concerning sovereignty, property, the liberal order and the concept of security, both political and economic. Progressively, the State has organized itself as a set of institutions and disciplines that seek to ensure that individuals regard it as entirely normal that their initiatives and activities be compatible with the State’s aims and serve its economic and productive purposes. Corigliano addresses these issues in the light of the widening divide between the interests and sovereignty of politics, and the interests and sovereignty of the economy, via the changing concept of statehood.

With this scenario as his backdrop, Corigliano examines the role of the State in managing the fear aroused by globalization and illustrates the objective difficulties that the new global challenges present for the historical model of the nation-state. The new international panorama, in fact, gives rise to trepidation and uncertainty that can have a profound impact on state authorities, and risk undermining the legitimacy of governments that are unable to face them down. This is a further threat to the international order and stability, where security takes on a new social relevance and becomes the nation-states’ main source of leverage in attempting to shore up their faltering legitimacy and sovereignty.

These issues also spill over into the debate on democracy, and make Europe the prime focus of an analysis of ongoing developments. Corigliano explains that contemporary fears pose a very real risk for European integration and threaten its historical model, founded in shared practices, cultures and political institutions. Lastly, he illustrates how the twentieth century opened by launching a series of challenges that struck deep at the foundations of international stability, reversing early trends in regionalism and internationalism. Populisms, which feed on fear, sparked a concerted re-nationalization of European political life, creating not a few reasons for discord among the continent’s states.
These latter considerations lead into the second part of the special issue, which concentrates on the voices of opposition to the process of European integration, where the theme of fear plays an essential part, especially in the populist and euro-sceptic parties or in those political formations and factions that, without being contrary to the European construction per se, see a need for a different model of Europe, and thus take a euro-critical stance.

Alida Maria Siletti analyzes the position of France’s Front National (FN) as expressed in its public communication, and in particular in the thirteen press releases posted on the party’s website between 2008 and 2017, which portrayed the EU as a threat to the sovereignty and integrity of France and its people, its values and traditions, and its essence as a nation, all menaced by the push towards political union, the single currency and the free movement of goods, services, capital and people that, according to the FN, put Europe’s national economies and society in jeopardy.

To face down these perils, the FN set itself up as the champion of France’s national identity, prosperity and security.

Populist movements, it should be noted, generally have a charismatic leader whose stated mission is to defeat corruption and the power elites, returning the “sceptre” to the people.

In the case of the FN, this leadership is embodied by Marine Le Pen, who since she was named vice president of the party in 2003 (and even more vigorously after she was tapped to head the movement in January 2012) has consistently pursued a strategy of “déliabolisation” for the FN, i.e., “un-demonizing” or bringing it into the mainstream, both by coopting people from other political traditions in its organization hierarchy, and in how it communicates, thus giving it the appearance of a renewed, open and reliable party that is ready to shoulder the responsibilities of governing.

In this connection, there have been clear changes since the time of Jean-Marie Le Pen, as the daughter has eschewed his hectoring rhetoric in favor of a direct but tempered communication style, where the theme of past glories has been replaced by that of the unity of the French and their future. No longer labeling itself as belonging to the extreme right, the party has even altered its symbols — at least in part — as was done during the 2017 presidential campaign.

New messaging strategies apart, however, Siletti notes that the party’s traditional political line has not changed substantially. The classic themes used since the FN’s birth are still there: the appeal to the legends of the past, the nationalism, national identity seen entirely in terms of exclusion rather than integration, the security to be had only by closing the borders and curbing immigration, the call for economic and social policies whose sole aim is to defend the interests of France and her workers, the carping against the EU.

The FN starts with attacks on the status quo in messaging whose text and imagery (closely intertwined, though they also stand on their own) aim to attract voters by emphasizing how different the party is from the other political forces and
their recipes. Throughout, the FN is presented as the sole speaker of truth, the only source of accurate information, as against the lies and distortions peddled by France’s other political groups, the EU and the mainstream media. The objective is also to throw discredit on the French political class, as being inept and subservient to the dictates of Brussels.

As Siletti points out, what the FN tries to stir up, through the imagery in particular, is a set of negative emotions, a climate of insecurity, fear and threats to France’s identity, sovereignty and future.

The image of a faceless mob swarming into Europe and France, for example, is intended to stoke feelings of insecurity, with the idea of an uncontrolled invasion resulting from the lack of serious immigration laws (and thus implicating the EU as well), and stressing the taxpayers’ money spent on coping with this situation and fighting the increase in crime that immigrants have ostensibly caused.

The FN’s proposed solution is to restore power to the people and to the “patriots” who represent it and work on its behalf. In this connection, it should be noted that some of the party’s posters feature a stylized image of Marine Le Pen bearing a distinct resemblance to Marianne, the symbol of the Republic, in a nod to the party leader’s self-assumed role as the defender of French identity and independence.

This is also reflected in the party’s position on the EU, which calls for a return to full national sovereignty, reinstatement of the franc, renegotiation of the Schengen Agreements and, at times, even France’s exit from the Union.

Still dealing with France but shifting attention to a different political area and a different attitude towards the European construction, the paper by Paolo Caraffini analyzes the euro-critical positions taken by French socialists during two fundamental moments in the history of Europe’s process of integration: the French referendums held on September 20, 1992 on the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht and on May 29, 2005 on the EU Constitution, the former approved and the latter rejected.

These two referendums shed a clear light on the tensions and divisions within the French Socialist Party, which had begun to show cracks in the early Eighties when the Mauroy government adopted policies designed to ensure that France would remain in the European Monetary System (EMS), thus accepting the constraints of participating in the process of European integration. Because of his objection to this choice, the Minister of Research and Industry, Jean-Pierre Chevènement — who had been one of the founders of the Centre d’Études, de Recherches et d’Éducation Socialistes (CÉRES) in January 1966 — tendered his resignation.

The divisions reemerged in 1984 at the time of the European Parliament’s vote on the Spinelli Project; a transition point was the Single European Act, which was substantially endorsed by the Socialist Party with an eye to defending French interests as the processes of economic internationalization continued to gain strength.
When President Mitterrand announced a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, the Socialist Party’s Bordeaux Congress of July 1992 plumped for “Yes”, arguing that ratification would encourage economic growth and, at the same time, help keep the newly-reunited Germany in the European fold. Jean-Pierre Chevènement, however, came in on the “No” side, founding the Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC) presided over by Max Gallo.

After the defeat of Lionel Jospin in the first round of the 2007 presidential elections, the Socialist Party spawned two new factions, Nouveau Monde (NM) and Nouveau parti socialiste (NPS), the former being the brainchild of Henri Emmanuelli and Jean-Luc Mélenchon, while the latter was headed by Arnaud Montebourg and Vincent Peillon. Both caucuses took a rather critical stance towards the new European model.

Such was the background leading up to the referendum on the Constitutional Treaty. The Socialist Party had polled its members, a majority of whom were in favor of ratification. Nevertheless, it should be noted that a number of prominent party figures announced their opposition during the national referendum campaign, including Marc Dolez, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Henri Emmanuelli and Laurent Fabius. The charge they brought against the Treaty was that of promoting free-market economic policies.

There can be little doubt that the position assumed by Fabius caused widespread surprise, as he had been seen as the face of reformist socialism. On the European front, for instance, he had supported the Single European Act, the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties, and monetary union.

For his part, Chevènement was also against ratifying the EU Constitution, as was to be expected from his position in the 1992 Maastricht referendum. According to the co-founder of the Mouvement des citoyens, the Constitution’s underlying flaw was that it confused two entirely different conceptions of what it means to be a nation: the ethnic, i.e., nationalist, and the republican conception, seen as the natural and necessary framework for democracy and solidarity. For Chevènement, the advocates of a supranational Europe sought to uproot the nations and build an abstract identity founded on a European citizenship he saw as entirely imaginary.

On the economic level, he opposed the neoliberal model espoused by the treaty, dubbing it a form of “globalisation impériale” (Chevènement 2004: 482-507), rooted in the dogmas of market efficiency. On top of all this, the single currency’s de facto alignment with the deutschmark had created a juxtaposition with very different national economies. As a result, Europe had become a low growth area, condemned to social regression unless current policies were reversed.

Chevènement proposed an alternative to the euro: a common, but not single, currency and on the institutional level, a confederation open to all the democratic countries of the European continent.

It should, however, be noted that despite these rifts in French socialism, there had been no opposition to the principle of the European construction. Rather, what emerged was a marked difference of opinion regarded how thorough unification should be.
As we mentioned at the beginning of this introduction, fear is one of the factors that have shaped the process of European integration — at times positively — since the end of the Second World War. Nevertheless, we must not forget that fear’s weight in intra-state relations is by no means constant, and can tip the balance of supranational integration either towards more daring solutions, hastening the process of federation, or towards less ambitious formulas that slow the transfer of sovereignty and return to more “reassuring” models of governance. In recent decades, European integration has taken the latter course. Ever since the Maastricht Treaty, policies have run along two tracks, with the more strategic among them (the policies for external relations, security and economic governance) taking an intergovernmental approach. The process has thus relinquished its original goal and its hopes for a supranational Europe, increasing the institutional disarray that mars the EU’s current governance. More recently, international instability and the combination of multiple crises — economic, financial and migratory — have shown a glaring light on the inefficiencies of the European model established at Maastricht and reproposed by the Lisbon Treaty, which gave a new lease on life to the two-track Community and intergovernmental decision-making process and all the problems it entails (Fabbrini 2017). In the last few years, a creeping climate of uncertainty, and thus of fear, together with a distorted understanding of how the EU operates, have provided fodder for the populist movements that have taken aim at the integration process, blaming the EU for all of the problems besetting Europe and pointing to the nation state as the politico-institutional entity able to offer appropriate solutions.

In this connection, it should be borne in mind that fear, like all human feelings, is unpredictable and its effects, whether on interpersonal relationships or on the relationships governing dealings between peoples, hang on a delicate balance that governments and political parties can often sway one way or the other. In some cases, fear can lead to a spirit of conservatism that strives to “defend” and maintain the status quo and takes action to restore the conditions and premises that brought it about; in other cases, it tends to spark a creative optimism, paving the way to an evolutionary process that aims to go beyond the status quo and considers fear to be an opportunity and an impetus for building a better future. Which way the scale tips depends on a whole series of imponderables: circumstances and situations that make the process unpredictable, ready at any time to dig in its conservative heels or rush towards revolution. In the first case, fear often means standing stock still and blocking necessary progress, and when brought to the extreme fuels closed-mindedness and open hostility. In the second case it can lead to innovation, provided that it is accompanied by a willingness not to reject the teachings of the past outright, avoiding reckless upheaval. This is the effect that fear has had in recent European history, particularly since the beginning of integration, which has indeed been a revolution in the way relations between sovereign states are conceived. And far from eliminating the sovereign states, recent history has involved them in sharing a broader project, fit for the challenges of globalization.

The two world wars, which have been interpreted — though not without attracting criticism — as a European civil war (Nolte 2004), provide a good grasp of how fear has contributed to forging a common European consciousness, impelling
the Continent’s governments and peoples to break from the past and establish an original formal basis for their coexistence. The fear of war, of being overwhelmed and dominated by a European super-state, were among the major factors behind the push for European integration, which after the Second World War became a possibility as France and Germany were once again drawn together by the new Soviet threat and the terror of the atomic bomb. As Carlo Sforza foresaw in 1930, “all the squabbles that have poisoned the last ten years […] would lose their intensity and dangers” if these issues were examined “from the vantage point of a common European atmosphere”; and this is particularly true of Franco-German relations, because “it is on them, in reality, that Europe’s peace will depend” (Sforza 1948: 26). A few years later, the fear of Europe’s collapse under the onslaught of Nazi Germany would prove to be the impetus that drove the British and French governments to a historic and unprecedented decision that ran counter to everything that a sovereign state’s spirit of self-preservation would require: the decision to seek political unification. As Jean Monnet recalls, the Declaration on Franco-British Union was an extraordinary opportunity in a moment colored by the terror of the two allies’ imminent defeat (Monnet 2007: 11-31). Though undoubtedly a decision made in the midst of commotion, it also reflected solid political reasoning in that it would have allowed more coordinated and effective resistance to the Third Reich’s hegemonic claims. It was an episode that left its mark on Monnet’s political creativity.

The route to European integration also passed through Sforza’s reexamination of these events, which identified Franco-German reconciliation as the key to banishing the specters of the past and usher in a new era of European peace. It was thus that in 1950 Monnet proposed a new way out of the dead end of “the increasing acceptance of a war that is thought to be inevitable, or the problem of Germany” and its revival, or of the organization of Europe, still sunk in a deadlock with no solution in sight (ivi: 288). What was needed was an action “that must be radical, real, immediate and dramatic” and that must “change things and make a reality of the hopes” that the people of Western Europe hold out for peace (ivi: 290). On the Continent, “the danger was still Germany”, recalls Monnet, who speaks of a “neurosis” that is difficile explain, but is rooted deep in the Europeans’ psyche. As he saw it, “war was in men’s minds, and it had to be opposed by imagination” (ivi: 289). Here, Monnet remembered Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s celebrated statement in 1933, that the “only thing we have to fear is fear itself” (Roosevelt 1933), and the even more famous 1941 declaration of the four freedoms: freedom of speech and expression, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear.

Until May 1950, fear had brought European politics to a paralysis that risked leading to fatalism and a revival of political positions steeped in nationalism. Accordingly, “the course of events must be altered” with courageous action, radically changing perspective and, with it, men’s attitudes. This action, stemming from an original creative intuition that itself arose out of a rational consideration of fear, and which Monnet proposed in a memorandum to the Prime Minister of France Georges Bidault and his Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, was to have established the first European Community. It was an
In an effort to overcome the questions that had remained unresolved and still engendered fears and trepidation, blazing a trail to supranational integration and inaugurating an epoch of hope and peace, together with “a fundamental change” in how international relationships and the development of European civilization are understood.

Nevertheless, we must not forget that fear has roused and continues to stoke the forces opposed to the European construction, with devastating effect when anti-integration factions seek to seize the political moment and turn fear to their advantage. This is the case of the populisms discussed by Corigliano and Siletti in their paper, which are always the elephant in the room in any discussion of Europe and its recurring political, economic and social crises. As Alberto Martinelli’s insightful reflections on “nation-ache” show, the populist parties in recent years have flourished in the shadows of the European Union, and of its sluggishness and shortfalls, which have been the perfect breeding ground for resurgent nationalisms. These nationalisms have fanned the flames of the European public’s fears, turning their propaganda mills to work to magnify the threats. According to Martinelli, the slide into populist nationalism poses, just as it did one hundred years ago, “a serious risk of new conflicts and a formidable obstacle on the road to United States of Europe” (Martinelli 2013: 10).

We would like to conclude with a passage from Stefan Zweig’s The World of Yesterday: Memories of a European, with retains all of its evocative power and carries a warning from history that the risks of which it speaks did not disappear along with those bygone days, but are still very much with us today. In the spring of 1914, Zweig found himself in a small suburban cinema in France, surrounded by “workers, soldiers, market women — the plain people — who chatted comfortably” as they all watched a review of the “News of All the World” (Zweig 1943: 210). First a boat race in England, then a French military parade, to which the people paid little attention, laughing and chatting; this was followed by pictures of the Emperor Franz Josef, walking between the guard of honor assembled to receive Wilhelm II; here again “the people of Tours began to laugh heartily at the aged party with white whiskers”; lastly, the Kaiser appeared in the picture, and in that moment “a spontaneous wild whistling and stamping of feet began in the dark hall” (ivi: 210), whereupon a shudder of fear shot through Zweig:

Everybody yelled and whistled, men, women and children, as if they had been personally insulted. The good-natured people of Tours, who knew no more about the world and politics than what they had read in their newspapers, had gone mad for an instant. I was frightened. I was frightened to the depths of my heart. For I sensed how deeply the poison of the propaganda of hate must have advanced through the years, when even here in a small provincial city the simple citizens and soldiers had been so greatly incited against the Kaiser and against Germany that a passing picture on the screen could produce such a demonstration. It only lasted a second, a single second. Other pictures followed and all was forgotten. The public laughed at the Chaplin film with all their might and slapped their knees with enjoyment, roaring. It had only been a second, but one that showed me how easily people anywhere could be aroused in a time of crisis, despite all attempts at understanding, despite all efforts. (ivi: 210-211).
References


