Fears of Europe: USSR, Russia and European Integration

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION
Fears of Europe: USSR, Russia and European Integration
Lara Piccardo

ESSAYS

• Looking to Each Other: Russian-European Relations among Hostility and Fear
  Lara Piccardo

• The Russia of Yeltsin Looks to Europe
  Elena Dundovich

• EU-Russia Security Relations: Old Problems in a New International System
  Sara Tavani

• “Russophobia” in Official Russian Political Discourse
  Neil Robinson

• The Fears of Jean Monnet and of Wolfgang Schäuble
  Daniela Preda

• “Keeping Détente Alive”: European Political Cooperation and East-West Dialogue during the 1980s
  Maria Eleonora Guasconi

• Through Military Force if Necessary: US Notes on ‘Fears’ in Eastern Europe in the Carter Years, 1977-81
  Max Guderzo

BOOK REVIEWS

  Giovanni Finizio

  Stefano Quirico

BOOK RECOMMENDATIONS

  Firenze, Le Monnier, 343 pp.

ABSTRACTS ANDKeywords
CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

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ESSAYS

Looking to Each Other: 
Russian-European Relations among Hostility and Fear
Lara Piccardo

The Russia of Yeltsin Looks to Europe
Elena Dundovich

EU-Russia Security Relations: 
Old Problems in a New International System
Sara Tavani

“Russophobia” in Official Russian Political Discourse
Neil Robinson

The Fears of Jean Monnet and of Wolfgang Schäuble
Daniela Preda

“Keeping Détente Alive“: 
European Political Cooperation and East-West Dialogue during the 1980s
Maria Eleonora Guasconi

Through Military Force if Necessary: 
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Abstracts and Keywords
Introduction
Unless otherwise indicated directly in each articles, date of last consultation of the websites and web pages is 30 June 2019.
«If we don’t know how to make ourselves bearers of a human and modern ideal in a lost and uncertain Europe on the way to go, we are lost and Europe is lost with us. In this our old continent, there is a scary ideal vacuum. (...) We must oppose this triggering; and the only course of action that opens before us is the preaching of the good news. We know what this good news is: it is the idea of freedom against intolerance, of cooperation against brute force. Europe that Italy hopes for (...) is not a Europe closed to anyone, it is a Europe open to all, a Europe in which men can freely assert their conflicting ideals and in which the majorities respect the minorities and promote the same ends, up to the extreme limit in which they are compatible with the existence of the whole community»\(^1\).

These words are by Luigi Einaudi: he pronounced that speech in 1947 in front of the Italian Constituent Assembly. His words are still current at a time when fear seems to be the dominant feeling in Europe. For those who believe in Europe, there is the sense of imminent danger for European democracy, because of the advance of Euro-scepticisms and sovereignties. In Europe a poison of anger, fear, violence and hatred unfortunately winds and an antidote must be found, ensuring that all countries become “producers” of knowledge, freedom, solidarity, strong economies, sustainability, and integration.

Nowadays, the fear of immigration is certainly another hot topic. The xenophobic rhetoric against migrants and refugees seems to wipe out the most tangible symbol of the European construction for the citizens of the participating countries. The Schengen agreement was signed in 1985 by Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands to progressively eliminate internal border controls and introduce freedom of movement. However, at the beginning of the 2000s, with the attack on the Twin Towers, the European States adopted the doctrine of “national security” on the American model and more and more the borders become matters of State security. Consistent with this address, in 2004 the Agency Frontex was born in order to keep monitored and controlled access at the border of land and sea to EU countries. An intensification of these trends occurred in 2012, when more consistent migration flows affected the continent. If until that year, there were only two walls built on the borders of European countries, both along the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and

Melilla, the barbed wire fence on the border between Greece and Turkey inaugurated a new season for the European countries. The walls have sprung up all over Europe, fuelled both by the fake news that circulates indiscriminately on social media – which now seem to be the main information tool used by citizens – and by the absence of a clear political strategy that is able to manage migratory flows and reassure Europeans.

Another fear often cited by anti-Europeans relates to euro, wrongly considered responsible for national taxes, economic crisis, inflation and unemployment. In twenty years, euro has become the currency of 340 million Europeans and 19 Member States, including, among others, all the founding countries and 7 of the 13 that joined EU after the start of its circulation. Euro directly or indirectly influences the currency stability of 60 territories located even outside the borders of the old settlement, involving around 6.5 % of the world population; it is not by chance that it accounts for 20.1% of global foreign exchange reserves\(^2\). It is also a popular currency: in twenty years, support for the single currency has increased from 71% in the early 2000s to 74% today. Economists often remember that inflation and financing dynamics, incomes and employment are tangible signs of its success. Three elements agitate the debate among the “experts”: the completion of the banking union; the transformation of the European Stability Mechanism into a European Monetary Fund; the establishment of a finance minister. These tools, if adequately designed, could strengthen the capacity of European institutions to guarantee the financial and economic stability of the whole Union.

According to the Eurobarometer data\(^3\), these fears seem to be the most pervasive, but certainly, they are not the only ones and change country by country. Becoming aware of these fears does not mean justifying the European Union or obliging citizens to change their mind. An analysis, or at least an awareness of the short-sightedness of those narratives that feed these fears, would go back to thinking about the difficulties, the failures and the EU’s urgent needs, in order to propose a political agenda as much concrete and shared as possible.

This issue of «De Europa» intends to be a small contribution in this direction. It deals in particular with another fear, the USSR/Russia, which has historically been a powerful factor of aggregation and acceleration of the process of European integration at the beginning of the Cold War.

Anti-Russian hatred and resentment has developed over the centuries in different directions. There was a French Russophobia during the Napoleonic era, a British one, which began with the “big game” in Central Asia, and a German one with the fight for “living space” in the East. Finally, American Russophobia appeared. It is a dynamic synthesis of French liberal-democratic Russophobia and English and German imperialist Russophobias\(^4\).

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\(^3\) European Commission’s Directorate-General Communication, providing public access to the official Eurobarometer reports, https://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm, 8 October 2019.

The “red danger” found its lifeblood with the emergence of the category of “totalitarianism” from the late 1940s. It would later become a highly abused interpretive key to understand the twentieth-century European dictatorships, and it would have returned in vogue in the Reagan era, when the Soviet Union would have been identified with the “evil empire”.

Many of the clichés, or the most evocative and still widespread images (from the Cossacks to St. Peter to the child-eating communists, up to the mental and literary topos of Siberia) date back to those years. For the older generations, Russia remains an irredeemable home of godless, from whom it is the least to be wary. It must be added to these Russophobians those who, due to various political motivations or to the effects of the strong American influence, show a clear basic tendency towards Moscow. This hostility often flows into the merits, when it takes aim at the whole Russian people (continuously confusing Russkiij and Rossijskij) or when it took refuge in cognitive convenient loopholes (like that never really occurred, the Russian troll) in order not to analyse the complexity of reality.

On the other hand, there are those who look at Russia with manifest fondness. Here too, the reasons are very heterogeneous. On the one hand there are those who do not feel a particular connection with Moscow but with the form and expression of its most visible power, namely Putin or Putinism, Then there is of course the anti-American component, which in the framework of geopolitics has (re)seen in Moscow the most direct and close rival of Washington’s imperial ambitions. But, above all, there is a far more widespread affinity between different EU countries and Russia, deriving from social ties, cultural exchanges and frequent trade contacts in various areas.

The contributions published in this issue of «De Europa» try to complete the look on Russia, as a rival but also as a potential partner of the European Union.

The first article deals about the historical relation between Tsarist Russia/USSR and Western Europe/Integrated Europe. Since the beginning of the European construction process, by focusing on the ideological prophecies of capitalist contradictions, communist authorities did not understand the potential significance of the efforts of people like Jean Monnet, directed at economic, financial, and cultural integration. Although the Soviet bloc economy needed economic relations with Western Europe, its political rulers rejected the idea of any European federation or confederation on the old continent. Even before the birth of the Soviet Union, Europe and Russia had always looked to each other with diffidence or fear. Specifically, the geographical and identity location of Russia has always suffered because of the ambiguity of being a border between East and West, between Asia and Europe. Nevertheless, it would be misleading to measure the Russian swing between East and West by the yardstick of its greater or lesser Europeanization: this view would presuppose an implicit hierarchical

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7 Ibidem.
relationship between Europe and Russia, of which historians should “estimate” progress or involution taking “Russia’s Europeanisation” as a single unit of measure. On the contrary, the relationship between Europe – understood in different historical moments as a geographical reality and/or as European Community/Union – and Russia has from time to time been expressed by the Russians in a complex reception of European or non-European models. Moreover, Russia looks at this relationship with the ambition to be an autonomous driving force because of belief to identify itself as the center of the world and not as a periphery. So it is important to analyses how Western Europe and Russia, being located within a common geographical area, have historically created a web of relationships characterized by attraction and repulsion, conditioned for centuries by ideology and power logic and often degenerated into contradictions and incompatibility.

Elena Dundovich reflects on the fact that, as never before since the days of the October Revolution, Russia underwent radical and profound transformations between 1991 and the beginning of the second decade of the 2000s, both from the point of view of domestic politics and that of its international projection. In this respect, Yeltsin decided to continue the “new course” inaugurated by Gorbachev aimed at improving relations with the USA and Europe. In doing so, a major role was played by the will of the oligarchs who wanted to have close relations with the West in order to obtain financing and new opportunities for profit. Between 1991 and 1996, with Andrey Kozyrev as Minister of Foreign Affairs, the pro-Western policy of the Federation expressed itself with greater conviction until approval of the enlargement of the EU to Central and Eastern European countries. It was not so much for this reason that relations began to enter a period of crisis as the decision to expand NATO in that direction, a choice that aroused harsh criticism in a large part of Russian public opinion and brought Yevgeny Primakov, promoter of a less Western-centred policy, to the fore as the new foreign minister.

Sara Tavani analyses EU-Russia security relations. Since the Cold War ending, relations between Europe and Russia have progressively lost their sense of direction and experienced an ever more complicated phase, especially worrisome in the security field. In the unstable international system which followed the end of bipolarism, Euro-Russian security relations failed to be institutionalised and the European Union continued to refer to NATO as its primary security guarantee. This article argues that the current East-West European security dialogue raises difficulties already faced during the Cold War years, as the CSCE negotiation knots demonstrate. Specifically, the central issue remains the unbalanced strategic relationship between the European countries and Russia, which still lies unresolved due to the continue lack of a major European political and military integration.

Neil Robinson concentrates on Russophobia in official Russian political discourse. The charge of Russophobia has been made increasingly frequently against Western critics of Russia in the last few years. Much of this criticism has been made by Russian media and commentators rather than by high officials of the Russian state. There have been several studies of this media use of accusations of Russophobia and it
has generally been asserted that the charge of Russophobia is part of a concerted propaganda effort by the Russian state. However, there has been little examination of the use of Russophobia by top Russian politicians. This article examines the use of Russophobia by President Vladimir Putin as well as by top officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in communiques of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It finds that there has been only minor changes in the allegations of Russophobia by senior Russian politicians. The article looks at why Russophobia became a more prevalent accusation in Russian politics generally and at why there has been a difference in the accusations of Russophobia made by the media and in official political discourse.

Daniela Preda changes perspectives, and proposes a re-reading of two important men for an integrated Europe, men who, in salient moments in the history of European integration, have proposed reflections and actions for the progress of the joint construction, fearful not only of possible external threats, but also of how a “non-integration” was detrimental to Europe.

Maria Eleonora Guasconi investigates on the European efforts to keep détente alive during the 1980’s, focusing in particular on the relations with the Soviet Union after the Single European Act (SEA) signature in 1986. Although the Single European Act was not originally designed to deal with foreign policy issues, as its main goal was to complete the Single market, it represented a significant stage also for the development of a European foreign policy. For the first time it included the scope of a common foreign policy, linking the EC procedures, in a single legal instrument to the EPC. The article will deal with the issue of “consistency”, or, in other words, the increasing recourse made by EPC to EC instruments (and vice-versa) as sanctions or the use of conditionality in economic assistance, in order to further EC’s policies. In particular the article will investigate if the completion of the Single market and the revival of European integration in the second half of the 1980’s affected USSR policy, wondering in particular if it influenced the development of Gorbachev’s project of a European common home.

Finally, Max Guderzo studies some nuances of “fear” in Eastern Europe traceable in US diplomatic correspondence and key decision-making documents produced during the presidency of Jimmy Carter, 1977-80. Washington’s perceptions, attitude and policies towards the region and its countries – including the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania – are observed against the backdrop of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in a phase of the Cold War heavily marked by the invasion of Afghanistan and by the ongoing threat of Soviet use of military force to restore Moscow’s full control over its Eastern European bloc.

Since historiography is slow in exploring the more specific aspects of the Eastern part, still favouring a Western reading, the articles aim above all to fill this historiography gap. They are also meant to overcome the disciplinary limits, creating an interdisciplinary synergy that, by using different methodologies, helps to return a three-dimensional picture of a long-term historical process that still generates crises and conflicts.
Essays
The collapse of the USSR, the dissolution of the Eastern bloc, and the fifth enlargement of the European Union have radically changed the political map of the “old continent”. Today, “political Europe” consists of the enlarged EU, taking in three former Soviet republics and seven central European “satellites”; a few additional countries, which in some cases are candidates or potential candidates for EU membership (such as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, and Kosovo); and Russia.

Following the admission of twelve (and then thirteen) new countries into the EU, Russia’s neighbors Ukraine and Belarus now share borders with the EU, and Kaliningrad is completely encircled by EU member States.

In modifying the geopolitical map of the “old continent” so radically, the completion of the fifth enlargement of the EU (which had two phases, one in 2004, and one in 2007) was greeted with dismay in Moscow. The Kremlin’s disappointment is rooted in history, which shows how the “new” Russia shares with the “old” one and with the Soviet Union some aspects of its foreign policy. The Soviet/Russian policy toward the European Economic Community (EEC)/EU is a case in point.

Since the beginning of the European construction process, by focusing on the ideological prophecies of capitalist contradictions, communist authorities did not understand the potential significance of the efforts of people like Jean Monnet, directed at economic, financial, and cultural integration (Namazova, Emerson 2005). And although the Soviet bloc economy needed economic relations with Western Europe, its political rulers rejected the idea of any European federation or confederation on the old continent (Aleksandrov-Agentov 1994; Zubok 1996; Soglian 1997).

Even before the birth of the Soviet Union, Europe and Russia had always looked to each other with diffidence or fear. Specifically, the geographical and identity location of Russia has always suffered because of the ambiguity of being a border between East and West, between Asia and Europe. Nevertheless, it would be misleading to measure the Russian swing between East and West by the yardstick of its greater or lesser Europeanization; this view would presuppose an implicit hierarchical relationship between Europe and Russia, of which historians should “estimate” progress or involution taking “Russia’s Europeanisation” as a single unit of measure (Masoero 2015: 176).
On the contrary, the relationship between Europe – understood in different historical moments as a geographical reality and/or as European Community/Union – and Russia has from time to time been expressed by the Russians in a complex reception of European or non-European models. Moreover, Russia looks at this relationship with the ambition to be an autonomous driving force because of belief to identify itself as the center of the world and not as a periphery.

So it is important to analyzes how Western Europe and Russia, being located within a common geographical area, have historically created a web of relationships characterized by attraction and repulsion, conditioned for centuries by ideology and power logic and often degenerated into contradictions and incompatibility.

1. When Russia Discovered Europe … and Europe Discovered Russia

Russia-Europe relations started to take shape only at the end of the 17th century (Duroselle 1964: 159-160): at that time, Muscovy needed the West to establish the army, to modernize weapons, to work the mines, in order to make progress in processing and technical procedures; European art and theater were beginning to penetrate and little by little Western science slowly began to spread as well.

The beginning of these contacts and the inclusion of Russia “in Europe” do not have a certain date. If, for example, in 1492 the American continent was geographically open to European exploration and colonization, Europe historically learned about Russia through a gradual process of contact with an autonomous entity. While America became a part of an emigrated, transplanted, and transformed European humanity, Russia showed the ambiguous and disquieting characters of a Eurasian “bi-continentality”, which opposed to Europe as a unique and unknown – though not even as a “non-Europe” – part of it.

Unfamiliar and mysterious land for Europeans, Russia did not present itself without history, but, on the contrary, full of an extremely intense past that until the 17th century had enabled it to create its own art and literature as part of its own civilization, which was specific but, at the same time, homogeneous with the rest of Europe.

In that moment, when Russia started to discover both itself and the West, Europe began to discover Russia (Strada 1985: 15). At the beginning, the Eastern kingdom revealed itself only to merchants and ambassadors, who wrote diaries and ethnographical reportages trying to fix the external characteristics of this land.

Collecting and classifying by topics European travelers’ reports on Muscovite, the great Russian historian Vasily Osipovich Kljuchevskij noted two contradictory aspects of the European attitude towards the ancient Russia (Kljuchevskij 1958). On the one hand, given the estrangement between Europe and Russia, which lasted until the end of the 17th century, Western civilization had been left in a state of almost total ignorance on the situation and on the destiny of this remote kingdom: this is why strange ideas...
on it were born and rooted. But at the same time, no place had been described in such detail way as Muscovy. Kljuchevskij explains this contradiction with the fact that the more primitive and unknown for a traveler a country is, the more strongly exited the traveler remains, sharpening observation. It is important to add that for the European traveler Russia was not what China was for Marco Polo, it was not the “wholly other”, but, under its “Asian” exoticism of forms of life, it concealed and manifested a common nucleus to European civilization: Christianity. Russia, then, was for the European both different and similar.

At the beginning of the 18th century, the European “discovery” of Russia moved from this first ethnographic phase to a second more complex and careful analysis.

In the era of the two great revolutions in America and France, even Russia lived its no less radical renewal, linked to the activity of Peter the Great, Tsar of Russia from 1682 to 1725: albeit limited to a national level and therefore not as universal as the French and American ones, this Russian regeneration was a more subversive revolution in its specific area of action. It had been the first big “modernization”, which carried out Russia of the Middle Ages and moved it in modern history, shifting the political, economic and cultural reference of the whole country from Byzantium to Western Europe (Strada 1985: 23).

With a series of successful military campaigns, but especially with his vast work of modernization of the country, Peter I was able to transform a backward State in an empire that could compete with the major Western nations. Under his reign, Russia became a major European power; the new ruler introduced in Russia the European scientific, technological, cultural and political knowledge.

In 1696, after the foundation of a river fleet – and the creation de facto of the first Russian Navy – Peter tore the Ottoman fortress of Azov, a strategic stronghold for the sea control, ensuring an outlet to the Black Sea. Concerned by the growing of the Swedish power, two years later he tried to secure control of the Eastern part of the Baltic Sea and initiated military preparations for an attack on Sweden. Although the Great Northern War (1700-1721) began under bad auspices, with a defeat at Narva in 1700, Peter did not give up and in 1709, at the end of the Poltava campaign, brought one of the most important military victories of Russian history. In 1721, with the agreements of Nystad Treaty, which ended the war, Russia gained the control of a vast zone of the Baltic shoreline, later known under the name of “Baltic provinces”.

The last war campaign of Peter I took place in the biennium 1722-1723 against Persia and assured Russia a Southern coastal region of the Caspian Sea.

This foreign policy attracted the attention of Europe. The wars against Sweden and the fighting with Poland put the Tsar almost daily in contact with the West. The creation of St. Petersburg, the “window on Europe”, in 1703, on a Swedish territory recently conquered and the transfer of the capital to this city, showed better than any other decision the Russian willingness to move towards the West.
Nevertheless, Peter I struggled a lot to form alliances with European princes, who distrusted him. It was the Poltava victory to force them to accept him (Duroselle 1964: 162) and his “entrance” in Europe is technically marked by the dates when the European countries recognized the Western title of “Emperor” which Peter started to use since 1721, to replace the Eastern Byzantine title of “Tsar”: 1721 for Prussia and the United Provinces; 1723 for Sweden; 1733 for Saxony; 1741 for Ottoman Empire; 1742 for Austria and England; 1745 for France and Spain; finally, 1764 for Poland.

From the birth of the modern Tsarist kingdom with Peter the Great, Russia entered openly in competition with the Ottoman Empire and Persia, not only for the defense of its territory, but for the monitoring of the entire Caucasus region. It was immediately evident that the Russian penetration was not only commercial and political, but had also a strong ethnic color in the sense that the Cossacks (Russian or Ukrainian), or other nationalities began to settle more and more numerous in the Caucasus.

In domestic matters, Peter I put into effect numerous reforms, including the reduction of the power of the boyars and the transformation of the Patriarchy of the Orthodox Church in a synod controlled by the Tsar. The reforms of Peter the Great provoked such a sharp break between the old Muscovite Russia and the new European Russia, that for two centuries the whole Russian culture lived the problem of continuity and discontinuity between these two stages of development, trying to grasp what persisted of “Russian” and developed in the process of “modernization”, traumatically began at dawn of the 18th century.

The renovation process, Westernization and territorial enlargement started by Peter I continued with Catherine the Great, who reigned from 1762 to 1796.

In those years, the Russian Empire expanded considerably: as a result of the two wars against the Ottoman Empire – the first from 1768 to 1774 and the second from 1787 to 1791 – and of the annexation of the Crimean Khanate in 1783 – officially sanctioned by treaty with the khan Shaggin-Ghirej –, Russia secured the control of the Northern coast of the Black Sea, while on the West the Empress proceeded to the incorporation of large territories during the three partitions of Poland.

The 18th century was a century so crucial for the Russian national spirit, which first fully affirmed with Peter’s ideals and then was forged through the wars of Catherine. The climax of patriotism, however, would have recorded with the anti-Napoleonic wars of the early 19th century, which marked de facto the final entry of Russia into the consent of the European powers.

However, just before arriving to that moment, the great Russian intellectuals of the time, the leaders of the so-called intelligentsia, were divided into two opposing schools of thought, Westernism (or Occidentalism) and Slavophilism, in a fight that would never be played in open field.

The Westerners looked at Russian backwardness in the light of the Western European liberal values, such as political and civil freedom, the rationalistic philosophical
tradition and scientific progress. They insisted on the need for Russia to appropriate of the achievements of Western civilization, particularly the neighboring Europe, in front of which it seemed to be in a peculiar lagging. They considered the works of Peter the Great exceptionally important as they could open a “window on Europe” within the great Empire. On behalf of their ideals, Westerners denied any meaning to the life lived up before Peter’s reforms and compared history, traditions, fairy tales, moral concepts of the Russian-speaking world with the ideals of the Roman-Germanic world.

The Slavophiles, on the contrary, enhanced the cultural and spiritual heritage of the Russian people opposing, through its political and philosophical ideas, to the liberal and industrialized culture, which characterized the European people. Looking back on the whole national history, Slavophiles would have arrived at a conception which regarded Russia as a force destined to renew not only itself, but also the whole of humanity thanks to the innate virtues of the Russian people and to the possibility of a development in a collectivist sense of the “communities” (mir) of the farmers, avoiding the evils of Western individualism and disruptor of industrial capitalism.

It was a debate that highlighted the typical bipolar vision not only of the Russian world, but also of those Slavic peoples located between Eastern and Western worlds. This is a vision that still appears today inevitably rooted in the speeches of the current political leaders.

The research of the Russian specificity continued during the 19th century. While Russia was trying to form its own peculiar consciousness, the West, in front of the giant which was growing visibly, began to form a new self-consciousness. Tsarist Russia became meanwhile a key player in European politics, having a crucial role in the defeat of Napoleon, the Congress of Vienna, the Holy Alliance, the Crimean War and the systematization of Eastern Europe on the eve of World War I.

2. Soviet Union and Integrated Europe

Meanwhile, in the West some precursors of the integrated Europe were thinking about a new vision of the continent. The projects for European unification began to circulate, albeit with little importance, and the future Bolsheviks analyzed their content in view of a contribution to the internationalist strategies.

The first analysis about the Russian relations with a hypothetical integrated Europe dates back to September 1914, when the continental unification question was for the first time raised in the Tsarist Empire by Leon Trotsky, who published a pamphlet *The War and the International (The Bolsheviks and World Peace)*.

With a far-sighted vision and in many ways forerunner of his times, the author argued that the cause of World War I was not the irredentist Serb attack in Sarajevo or the desires of independence of the rebelling nationalities in the multinational Austro-

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1 The pamphlet was first published in German with the title *Der Krieg und die Internationale.*
Hungarian Empire. The reason of war was the inability of the national State, as unitary and autonomous economic territory, to give a positive response to the underlying needs of the international, tumultuous, and not regulated growth of national economies and, consequently, to resolve conflicts in Europe and worldwide.

Lenin – whose antitheses against Trotsky were not yet clearly defined even about the “permanent revolution” – initially maintained a certain reserve on the question. However, on 23 August 1915, in his article “On the Slogan for a United States of Europe”\(^2\), published in the German review *Sotsial-Demokrat*, he wrote that if on the political level there was no contradiction between European unification and socialist revolution, in economic terms, however, things changed. The United States of Europe would constitute a temporary agreement “between the European capitalists” (Lenin 1974), with the sole purpose of destroying socialism. Nevertheless, what worried Lenin the most was both the possibility of doubt that the slogan of the United States of Europe could have generated about the victory of socialism in one country, and the international relations of this new State. Lenin feared that the prospect of European unification could paralyze the revolutionary forces in a waiting condition or give a pacifist illusion on the viability of this unification of capitalist foundations (Monteleone 1975: 83).

Since then, the Soviet Union was always hostile to any form of continental integration. During World War II, on 11 January 1944, Ivan Maisky, the Soviet ambassador in London, and Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet ambassador in Washington from 1941 to 1943, delivered a memorandum to Stalin. In their view, it was “not in the interests of the Soviet Union, at least in the first period after the war, to foster the creation of various kinds of [European] federations”\(^3\). The consensus was that the USSR should remain an unchallenged land power in Europe, without even a shadow of countervailing power represented by another State or a group of smaller States.

When the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan were launched at the beginning of the Fifties, Stalin evaluated them only in the context of the process of the militarization of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Moscow did not understand the true essence of the European construction process: the political aspect of unification took second place and Soviet leaders always little discussed it. Considering the European unification as a dangerous process intended to strengthen capitalism and to support Atlanticism, a feeling of worry and anxiety prevailed in the Kremlin, especially in relation to the military nature of Western initiatives and to the delicate German question. Indeed, until the Gorbachev period the expression “European integration” was never used by the Soviet mass media, journalists and political scientists. The word “integration” was always to be written in quotation marks or parentheses, and accompanied by the compulsory adjective “imperialist” (Zaslavsky 2003: 58).

Under Khrushchev, the Soviet leadership developed a new diplomacy but, despite the initial rejection of the Stalin ways, as soon as the Rome Treaties were signed on 25

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\(^3\) Majskij Molotovu, AVPRF (Archiv vnešnej politiki Rossijskoj Federatsii, Archive of Foreign Politics of the Russian Federation), fond 06, opis’ 6, papka 14, delo 145, p. 5.
March 1957, Khrushchev and his diplomats expressed a strong opposition to the new European Communities (Forte 1968).

The week before the signature of the Treaties, Moscow submitted a proposal to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe: the proposal included a draft treaty for an all-European economic co-operation. A Soviet Foreign Ministry statement was attached to the draft proposal: it warned of the dangers of the EEC to the world peace and stability (“Soviet Proposal” 1957: 156). In 1957 and 1962, two papers were released by a number of experts of the Soviet Academy of Sciences that accused the EEC of being the economic ground of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and a form of neo-colonialism, created for the better exploitation of the working class, based on the expansionist dreams of Germany (Dutoit 1964: 41-42).

The first paper was published on the review Kommunist⁴ and was entitled “17 Theses on the Common Market”, even if it was known with the title “On the Creation of the Common Market and of European Atomic Energy Community” as well.

The “17 Theses” stated that, under the guise of the European construction, the “imperialist” promoters of the continental integration had divided Europe into economic, political and military groups, which were opposed to each other, creating an aggressive military bloc of Western powers, directed against the Soviet Union and the other People’s democracies in Europe. All these measures were taken more often on the initiative, and in all cases with the active support of US leaders, who were the head of the “imperialist camp”. The document also described the contents of the Treaties of Rome, thus proving how the authors, while presenting analysis and specious propaganda, punctually knew the Western materials. Finally, the “17 Theses” prescribed to the Western Communist Parties to denounce the reactionary and aggressive character of the European Communities, in order to avert the prospect of nuclear war, and instead strengthen the peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems.

The second paper as well gave negative judgments on European integration, whose backbone was the “union between the clerical and military dictatorship of Adenauer and the authoritarian regime of general de Gaulle⁵”. Published in Pravda on 26 August 1962, the paper was entitled “32 Theses on the Common Market”, but was also known as “On Imperialistic Integration in Western Europe”. In the document the EEC was considered an ephemeral success that would collapse at the first difficulties and the contrasts among the capitalist States were destined to sharpen more and more, hampering efforts, especially Americans’, to smooth them. The USSR – refusing to recognize the Communities (Lysén 1987: 84; Morawiecki 1989: 3) – and the socialist camp had on their side nothing to fear because “our countries have become (…) in such a powerful force that no ‘Common Market’ constitutes a threat to us” (Pravda 1962).

⁴ Kommunist, 1957, 88-102. The document was published also in the IMEMO review (1957), Mirovaja ekonomika i meždunarodnye otnošenija [World Economy and Intenational Relations], 83-96.
⁵ Ibidem.
The events of the following years did not confirm the Soviet theses. If it is true that European integration experienced a setback, it did not dissolve.

In the Brezhnev period, the same approach towards the EEC prevailed. The Soviet goals were now the fragmentation of Western Europe and its separation from the United States (Adomeit 1984: 9). The Soviets used propaganda again and in 1971-1972 the Muscovite review La vie internationale (published in Russian, but also in French and English in order to be addressed to a Western audience) dedicated eight articles to the European integration process, bitterly criticizing it. Other four articles expressed the Soviet position against the first enlargement of the European Communities and denounced Chinese openings to the EEC.

In the 1980s, the Soviet position radically changed mainly because of Mikhail Gorbachev (Rey 2015). Facing in 1985-1986 strong economic problems, the new Soviet leadership was for the first time willing to admit the reality of these problems and was able to look for a global solution to them. It called for a completely new attitude to international relations, the so-called “New Thinking”.

Three practical ideas emerged from this innovative approach: peaceful coexistence had to be cooperative, true security had to be mutual, and the USSR and the US had to promote the concept of “reasonable sufficiency” in their strategic thinking. These principles resulted in a resumption of dialogue between the Americans and the Soviets concerning nuclear weapons as well as the end of Soviet involvement in many parts of the world (Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan first of all).

In his address to the 43rd UN General Assembly Session on 7 December 1988, Gorbachev talked of a “new world order”, and on 6 July 1989, addressing the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, he outlined his idea of “a Common European Home”. At that time, there was still an opportunistic dimension in Gorbachev’s proposals: since the relations between the USSR and its Eastern satellites became increasingly difficult and their economic exchanges weakened, the Kremlin had a clear economic incentive to develop trade and exchanges with Western Europe.

However, Gorbachev’s perception of Europe was becoming more global and ambitious. In his mind, “the Common European Home” (Casier 2018) could contribute to evacuate the bipolarity of the world, to bring in this way security to the continent, and to provide a framework in which the reformed USSR and its reformed Eastern satellites could grow. This framework would be based on a “socialism with a human face”, a socialism that would be tolerant, respectful of others’ values, of the principle of renunciation of force and of freedom of choice.

The concept of “Common European Home” remained an idea more than a concrete political strategy, but it did not preserve Gorbachev from the disappointments of the Soviet leadership.

Gorbachev also began the slow rapprochement between EEC and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON or CMEA). Already in 1986, the Soviet General
Secretary expressed hopes for the revival of COMECON, advanced the Soviet candidacy to the GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs) and started negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement with the European Community.

Under the aegis of Gorbachev, the CMEA accepted the so-called “parallel approach”, under which the EEC could enter into bilateral commercial agreements with the members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, but not with the Western organization itself.

The new attitude of the Soviet government to the European Community was confirmed by a recognition agreement signed in Brussels on 25 June 1988 by the European Commission and the COMECON, which followed the opening of negotiations for an economic agreement between the USSR and the EEC.

Between 1988 and 1990, the European Community was then able to reach several key results. It established diplomatic relations with Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), eliminated the import quotas applied for a long to different goods, extended the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) to the East and concluded in short the so-called “first generation” trade and cooperation agreements with Poland and Hungary in the late Eighties. Moreover, in order to provide financial support to Central and Eastern reconstruction, the EC gave birth to the PHARE program (Pologne-Hongrie Assistance à la Restructuration Economique, Poland-Hungary Aid for the Reconstruction of the Economy), created by the EEC Regulation no. 3906 of 18 December 1989 and in force from the following year.

Despite the pressures of Communitarian agricultural and industrial lobbies, these measures allowed the rapid development of trade between the Community and the East of the Continent (Pravda 1992). The members of CMEA abandoned the internal trading system (Daviddi 1992), allowing before the EC and then the European Union (EU) to become their most important economic partner.

However, these relations lasted for a short time. In Budapest, on 29 June 1991, the forty-sixth (and final) plenary session of the CMEA signed its dissolution protocol. The decision had become inevitable, because in September 1990 the Soviet Union, already proven by a long process that would lead to its collapse, announced that, starting from 1 January 1991, it would withdraw from the exchange rate system of CMEA.

3. After the Cold War

A new dimension of the relations between Russia and the EU developed following the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the advent of the new Russia on its ruins.

From that date, a new and more intense period of contact between the parties ensured relations, which confirmed the importance assigned by Moscow to its relationship with Europe.

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6 These lobbies insisted that the EEC states would have disadvantages without an adequate protection from the lower costs of labor and the lower environmental standards in the CEEC.
It is necessary to remember that, under Yeltsin’s presidency, Moscow had continued to assign to the relations with Brussels a role that was subordinate to an agreement with Washington: this orientation was the result of the idea that, despite severe economic difficulties, Russia continued to be a superpower and had to negotiate on an equal level with the United States. In those years, Russian-European communications were able to overcome recurring tensions, due largely to initiatives by the Russian government, at international and domestic level, in breach of the standards of democratic and responsible behavior, formally sanctioned between the parties (breach of human rights, restrictions to freedom of the press, repression of minorities). Even the expansion of the EU to Eastern Europe, which was central to a lively debate in Moscow (Dundovich 2004), failed to prevent the progress of mutual relations.

The purpose of this political line was the definition of an organic and articulate system of relations, responding to the desire by Russians and Europeans to satisfy the implicit commitment in a strategic partnership. On the Russian side, the awareness that Moscow was facing a EU seeking release from the condition of “economic giant, political dwarf” contributed to the commitment with Western Europe.

The focus on the political and diplomatic relationship responded to Brussels’ hopes, providing a significant contribution to the effort undertaken to acquire an important role in terms of intercontinental relations. In fact, albeit in terms that could not be compared to the type of privileged relations held with the United States, Russia was the other great power capable of offering to the EU valid cooperation at international level.

In December 1990, during a meeting of the European Council in Rome, it emerged that the Community Member States were aware of the importance of the political and economic reforms being undertaken at the time by the Soviet Union for the promotion of peace and stability on the Continent and in the rest of the world.

In order to sustain and help the new political activities launched by Moscow, in July 1991, the then twelve European Member States created the TACIS Programme (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States)\(^7\). This was conceived in consideration of just one partner, Gorbachev’s USSR. Shortly afterwards, the Soviet Union collapsed, ending up with the independence of the Baltic States and the creation of twelve independent republics.

It was on that occasion that the EU acknowledged the importance of sustaining the reformative impetus following the creation of the new States. Their decision to opt for democracy and for an economic system aimed towards the free market meant breaking with the structures and traditions that had been consolidated over decades and introducing new legal and administrative mechanisms to affirm themselves as new autonomous States.

The TACIS Programme was aimed at the Russian Federation, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Mongolia as well, becoming a key instrument in political cooperation between the EU and its partner countries. The first phase was completed on 31 December 1999, but a second set of regulations (99/2000), adopted by the Council on 29 December 1999, renewed the programme for 2000-2006.

Despite the role played by the TACIS Programme in supporting the transition of the Russian Federation to the state of law and free market, the milestone in Russian-European relations was the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)

Signed in Corfu during the European Council held on 24-25 June 1994 and subsequently ratified by the parties – including Austria, Finland and Sweden, the three members that joined the EU in 1995 –, the PCA became effective on 1 December 1997, at the end of the hostilities in Chechnya. The Agreement was based on the principles of promotion of international peace, security and the support of a democratic society based on political and economic freedom. It also intended to create an “economic cooperation of wide scope” (PCA, art. 56, par. 1) within the context of successful political and institutional dialogue inspired by the suggestions of the institutionalist approach, but the effective commitment of both parties was required in order to produce results and not empty declarations of principles.

In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced another instrument used in Russian-European relations: the common strategy. This was more than an act of mere and generalized address; it was a precise decision that was binding to the Council of the Union, reminding the European Council of its definition: “The European Council shall decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where the Member States have important interests in common”9. In this case, the instructions were much more detailed. Targets were established, along with the duration of the strategy and the means made available. The Council of the Union was responsible for implementation, with the adoption of collective stances and actions.

The common strategy was adopted for the first time during the European Council meeting held in Cologne, on 2-3 June 1999, in order to outline the general framework of European actions in relation to the Kremlin.

The strategy should last four years and emphasized the need for communication with Moscow and the development of the programme based upon cooperation. The specific initiatives pursued by the EU within the scope of the strategy concerned political dialogue and communication on security, economic matters, trade and


investments, energy, the fight against organized crime and twinning programmes. These actions, however, were to be drawn up within the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and be fully accomplished within it.

The PCA had a duration of ten years. Upon its expiry, in 2007, the new Russian President, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, showed no intention of entering into a new agreement, nor did the EU seem capable of offering tangible and shared counter-proposals: so far, at the moment EU and Russia share no agreement about their relations.

Meanwhile, the EU had tried to boost cooperation with Moscow, activating another “foreign policy” instrument. During the European Parliament Session held on 18 December 2002, the then President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, launched the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), developed from 2003 to establish privileged relations with the countries bordering on the EU (Alcaro, Comelli 2005), “sharing everything with the Union but institutions” (Prodi 2002). The ENP was centred on the promotion of democracy, freedom, prosperity, security and stability, while being conditioned by the reciprocal interest in respecting common values, specifically those of democracy, the state of law, human rights, good government and the principles of a sustainable development and market economy.

Having evolved after the latest expansion of the EU towards the broader formulation of the Wider Europe Neighbourhood Policy (WENP), it presented several important innovations. Firstly, the Commission’s intention to bring external relations between the EU and its neighbours under a single strategic design should be seen positively. Only in this way did it become possible to create “a ring of friends” (Prodi 2002) and offer a clearer definition of the scope of the Union’s external action. From this point of view, the policy of proximity made the boundaries within which to pursue the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) more visible.

The construction of peaceful and cooperative relations around the EU corresponded to a plan by Brussels aimed at the creation of an area of commercial integration and close institutional cooperation, really capable of making the old concept of frontier as a “limit” obsolete, with the foundation of a new concept of “link”.

This, however, seems more of a moral philosophy than a political practice. An example is the Russian-Georgian conflict of summer 2008. Putin was Prime Minister at the time: having been elected President for two consecutive terms (2000-2004; 2004-2008), he could not stand for a third. One of his right-hand men had, however, been elected in his stead. Dmitri Anatolevich Medvedev was President until 4 March 2012, when Putin was reinstated in the highest office in the Russian Federation.

In the night between 7 and 8 August 2008, the Georgian army moved into Ossetia, which had declared its independence. The following day, on 9 August, the Russian Federation, which had had a military presence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia since 1992, as interposition force by international mandate, heavily intervened, blocking the
Georgians and occupying a very large part of the territory, advancing to within a few dozen kilometers of the capital, Tbilisi.

On 15 August, Georgia and Russia signed a preliminary agreement on the ceasefire, with the mediation of the European Union led by the President at the time, Nicolas Sarkozy. On the bases of the agreement, a mutual commitment was made to withdraw the troops to their positions prior to start of hostilities, and obliging Georgia to abstain from taking action against the two secessionist republics. After an initial withdrawal from the front, from the town of Gori for instance, Russia had decided to continue its military occupation of two buffer areas in Georgia to prevent possible attacks towards South Ossetia and Abkhazia. These areas of occupation initially included the port of Poti on the Black Sea, as well as the presence of several Russian checkpoints on the main national access routes, lasting about two months. From 1 October 2008, 200 EU military observers were assigned to the two buffer areas, as envisaged in the meetings held between Moscow and Brussels in September. The withdrawal of Russian troops from the buffer area near South Ossetia was completed on 8 October 2008.

Russia acknowledged the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia on 26 August 2008, subsequently signing military agreements with the two Republics.

It should be noted that, in this case too, crisis prevention measures had no effect and the European Union found itself having to cope no longer with a crisis, but with a war, for which it was completely unprepared. The attitudes of the Member States were not always convergent and this revealed, once again, all the weakness typical of a foreign policy, which was not “common” but, rather, “traditional”.

In an attempt to repair the damages caused by the Russian-Georgian war and develop better forms of prevention, on 7 May 2009, at the Prague Summit, the EU launched six Eastern Partnerships (EPs) with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldavia, and Ukraine. For Europe, the partnership means greater security and stability along the Eastern frontiers, considering that the region has become a hive of crisis and is still suffering the effects of the well-known “frozen conflicts” (Lynch 2002).

4. The Crisis of 2013 and the Russian Annexation of Crimea

The request for ratification of the Eastern Partnership triggered the complex and delicate Ukrainian crisis. When, in November 2013, under pressure from the Kremlin relating mainly to the energy question, President Janukovych suspended negotiations with the European Union, peaceful protests began in Kiev. Janukovych, elected in 2010 thanks to strong support from the Crimean and Southern and Eastern Ukrainian electorate, condemned the protests, deciding at the end of the month to bring in the Ukrainian special forces, the Berkut. The protest became a situation of urban warfare and dissent began to increase against Janukovych who, on 22 February 2014, was forced to flee Kiev following his de-legitimisation by Parliament. This was followed by the liberation of the former Prime Minister, Julija Timoshenko, but, while the new
power tried to take hold, protests started up in several cities with a Russian majority, which condemned the events as a *coup d’état* and a danger to their communities.

This triggered further political crises in different Ukrainian regions, first and foremost Crimea. Here, on 27 February 2014, unidentified troops, suspected of being led directly by Moscow, occupied the Crimea Supreme Council building and that of the Council of Ministers in Simferopol, where Russian flags began flying. In this situation of increasing chaos, the Crimean Regional Parliament appointed Sergeyj Valerijovich Aksyonov, representative of Russian Unity, the Russian minority party, as Prime Minister of the Crimean Autonomous Republic. The appointment was censored as illegal by the government of Kiev, which declared Aksyonov to be wanted pursuant to art. 109 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code – an article relating to acts of violent amendment or overturning of constitutional order – and objected to all his acts. On the same day, the Crimean Berkut set up security checkpoints for entry to and exit from the isthmus of Perekop and the Chongar Peninsula, which separate Crimea from the mainland: in the space of just a few hours, Ukraine and Crimea were *de facto* divided.

Two days later, on 1 March 2014, Aksyonov announced that the new Crimean authorities would exercise control over all Ukrainian military installations on the peninsula and asked Putin to act as guarantor of peace and public order in Crimea. The invitation triggered immediate action by Russia and, that very same day, the Russian Duma ratified military intervention and sent troops and weapons to Sevastopol, causing protests by the international community.

Meanwhile, the Crimean Supreme Council announced a referendum on annexation to the Russian Federation. Initially planned for 25 May 2014, on 6 March the Assembly of Simferopol brought it forward to 16 March, emphasizing the fact that the consultation would involve Crimean citizens only.

Despite strong opposition from Kiev, where Parliament issued the act of dissolution of the Crimean *Rada* and the Constitutional Court declared the referendum to be illegal, the election went ahead as planned. It recorded an almost unanimous result in favor of joining Russia: approximately 96% of the Crimean voters answered yes to the question: “Are you in favor of reunification of Crimea with Russia as constituent authority?” (Rizzi 2014).

On that same day, the United Nations Security Council voted by large majority for a resolution to declare the referendum invalid. This result was a foregone conclusion, proving Russia’s international isolation. The referendum was characterized by a conflict between two principles of international law. The first principle was that of “self-determination of peoples”, sanctioned for the first time in the Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points on 8 January 1918 and invoked by the Crimean Republic and by Russia. The second principle was that of the “inviolability of frontiers and the territorial integrity of States”\(^\text{10}\), proclaimed in 1975 in the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference

\(^{10}\) It should be remembered that the established principle is not that of the non-changeability of frontiers, but that according to which the frontiers cannot be changed under threat and by the use of force (Ronzitti 2013: 81).
on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), evoked by Ukraine. These are equally valid principles in relation to which international law has still to express an opinion, opting in favor of one or the other.

On 17 March, after officially announcing the results of the referendum, the Crimean Supreme Council, renamed the Crimean State Council, declared the formal independence of the Crimean Republic, including the territories of the Crimean Autonomous Republic and the city of Sebastopol, which was granted special status within the juridical order of the Separatist Republic. The Crimean Parliament announced the partial abrogation of the Ukrainian laws, the adoption of the Russian ruble as official currency, alongside the hryvnia (the Ukrainian currency), began the nationalization of the Ukrainian State’s assets and made a formal application to Russia for annexation.

This annexation came on 18 March, with the signing of the pertinent treaty by Vladimir Putin, the Russian President, Sergey Aksyonov, the Crimean President, and Aleksei Chalyj, Mayor of Sebastopol. The treaty became effective three days later on 21 March, with the approval of Russian federal constitutional law no. 61, Adhesion by the Crimean Republic to the Russian Federation and Formation within the Russian Federation of New Authorities – The Crimean Republic and the Federal City of Sevastopol12.

The international community did not recognize the annexation. The United States and the EU subsequently applied the so-called “intelligent sanctions”, which selectively penalize those close to the head of power, but which seem to be unable to induce a change in the Russian stance in relation to Crimea, which remains, for the moment, unchanged.

5. Conclusions

While the Ukrainian matter was still in progress, on 27 June 2014, the governments of Ukraine, Moldavia and Georgia signed Association Agreements with the EU, provoking a harsh reaction by Moscow.

Already on 10 June 2014, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Grigorj Karasin, commented the signature as follows: “Moldova’s signature of the association agreement with the European Union can complicate relations with Russia and put them to a serious test”13. Moscow felt that the Agreements signed with Brussels were incompatible with the areas of free market, which it had created with the countries in question, threatening to apply higher tariffs and stricter border controls.

12 At the moment, Russia has three federal cities: Moscow, St. Petersburg and Sevastopol.
Moreover, it is clear how Putin intends to keep back Russia to its great past. After having solved the principle economic problems of Russia using the energy sector\textsuperscript{14}, he moved to rebuilt the former Soviet space in Europe and he is now concentrating in coming back to play an important role in the Mediterranean Sea: Russian attitude toward Turkey and Syria is a signal of it.

Putin’s plan started years ago with the gradual return to Moscow of the former Soviet Union. The realignment maneuver took place in October 2014 with the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), with the full membership of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. The objective of the EAEU is to create a unified economic space between Europe and Asia: within it, the Kremlin obviously has a decisive role. Putin explained:

Eurasianism is a tradition of our political thought. It has been rooted in Russia for a long time, and now it is acquiring a completely new sound, especially in connection with the intensification of integration processes in the post-Soviet space. (…). We need to adopt specific laws related to the regulation of the economy in the States of the Customs Union [it was the previous name of the EAEU] and in our common economic space. (…) An integration core has already taken place and is developing, but all our closest neighbors do not yet belong to this core, and economic logic will (…) encourage all our closest partners to participate in these integration processes (Putin 2012)\textsuperscript{15}.

Putin uses EAEU for two purposes. On the one hand, it exerts pressure on the Eastern side of Europe, proposing attractive economic partnerships to those countries “disputed” with the EU. On the other hand, it tries to guarantee to Moscow a greater political role in Asia, favoring a merger on several levels between the EAEU countries and those adhering to the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations).

By placing itself at the center of this very extensive network of diplomatic and trade relations, Putin cultivates not only relations with Beijing but also with the other great powers of the Asian chessboard: first and foremost Iran, Japan and India, States which are increasing solid partnerships in the energy and military sectors with Russia.

On relations with Moscow, the EU does not seem to have a clear strategy now. The different intensity with which the European Member States are economically linked to Russia is one of the factors behind the lack of cohesion in Brussels’ policy with the East. The EU was divided once again when the Ukrainian crisis exploded and on the stance to take with regard to Moscow’s annexation of Crimea. The Baltic Republics and former satellite countries would have liked the West to react more strongly and decisively to the authoritarian return of Moscow in the post-Soviet space.

\textsuperscript{14}It is not a case that Putin’s PhD dissertation was entitled \textit{Mineral and Raw Materials Resources and the Developing Strategy for the Russian Economy}. An English summary is available at website \url{http://www.theatlantic.com/daily-dish/archive/2008/08/putins-thesis-raw-text/212739/}.

\textsuperscript{15}The translation is mine.
The countries that have important economic relations with Russia in strategic sectors like energy – Italy, France and Germany – condemn Russian revanchism, while mediating within the EU to avoid exacerbating the tension and excessively isolating Russia.

Over the past years, expertise on Eastern Europe has been systematically reduced throughout the EU, to a point where it is impossible to adequately monitor political processes in Russia and the post-Soviet space. Moreover, broader political developments play a role in determining which issues absorb the attention of experts and political decision-makers. Between the Russo-Georgian war of August 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, other major events such as the EU’s financial and institutional crisis and the Arab Spring largely overshadowed Eastern Europe. The resulting policy was unable to respond in adequate detail to problems arising in the region’s various States. Its self-perception as a transformative force for peace made the EU blind to the growing geopolitical tensions in Eastern Europe. Last but not least, internal disagreements within the EU also hampered the development of a consistent and proactive policy towards Russia (Fischer, Klein 2016: 5-6).

Urgent reflection by the EU seems necessary in relation to the significant rise in consensus around Putin following the annexation of Crimea and on the effects of his policies in the neighbourhood. If, on the Russian side, foreign policy can be traced back to a “new doctrine” of the Putin administration, Europe proposes the ambiguous nature of the external action of the EU against Russia. The absence of a clear long-term strategy and a lack of consistency and linearity in foreign policy, together with the recent initiatives proposed in the post-Soviet space and perceived by Moscow as damaging to its interests in the area, have contributed to determining today’s strong tension. The countries of the post-Soviet space are subject to offers from stakeholders who represent models of political and economic integration, which collide, putting them in a position of fragility. Their oscillations between one pole and the other, according to a logic dictated by pragmatism, have had destabilizing effects on domestic policy and have not favored democratic consolidation and good governance. In today’s multipolar world, the stakeholders are no longer merely the two old hegemonic powers, as the scenarios have been diversified. This explains the European position, weakened, however, by the absence of policies that really are community wide. It seems unnecessary to say that, when the EU decided to sign an Association Agreement with Kiev, it had to expect a reaction by the Kremlin.

Perhaps the EU has overestimated its “transformative” power and underestimated the weight of traditional geopolitics, contributing to ignite a now latent crisis “in the interregnum between the ‘no longer’ and the ‘not yet’” (Bauman, Mauro 2015).

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16 The highlights of this doctrine can be traced back to Putin’s famous speech in Munich on 10 February 2007: V.V. Putin, Speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138_type82912type82914type82917type84779_118123.shtml.
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The Russia of Yeltsin Looks to Europe

Elena Dundovich

1. Introduction

As never before since the days of the October Revolution, Russia underwent radical and profound transformations between 1991 and the beginning of the second decade of the 2000s, both from the point of view of domestic politics and that of its international projection (Benvenuti 2013: 47-74; Giusti 2012: 33-40; Giannotti 2016: 1-10). The dissolution of the Soviet Union definitively freed its 15 component republics from federal constraints and which, starting with the Baltic states in 1987, had clearly and repeatedly expressed their desire for independence, including RSFSR, later the Russian Federation. The latter was the official heir of all the long, tormented but also exhilarating Soviet experience that had characterised the history of the former Russian Empire for many decades: an experience that had marked the lives of millions of men with moments of revolutionary illusions and phases of profound political involution, economic modernisation and totalitarian rigour, dramatic defeats and military triumphs, Pax Sovietica and economic growth, nuclear successes and global role, socio-political crisis and stagnation (Graziosi 2011: 13-20).

The new Russia maintained its federal appearance in the name of the 190 or so nationalities that lived there and lost almost 25 million Russians, who were now living outside its borders. From the USSR it inherited a powerful nuclear arsenal, the seat on the UN Security Council and a large part of the great Soviet heritage, taking on almost all its debt in exchange. Wisdom would have wanted the process of transition from a planned economy and one-party regime to a liberal economy and democratic institutional model to take place through a period of slow and adequate transition. But this was not Yeltsin’s intention: together with his closest collaborators, from Ygor Gajdar to Gennady Burbulis, from Anatolij Chiubais to Viktor Chernomyrdin, he opted for a rapid conversion to the free market that imposed immense sacrifices on a population already stressed by years of profound economic crisis and favoured the formation of a new powerful and corrupt elite, thus opening up large pockets of organised crime on a vast scale (Gajdar 2017).

Backed by a markedly presidentialist Constitution, approved without the convocation of a regular Constituent Assembly and which cost him an attempted coup by his opponents in October 1993, Yeltsin won the first political elections of post-soviet Russia in December of that year under the illusion that proceeding successfully on the
road of accelerated privatisation of buildings, shops, industrial plants, monopolistic giants and technological enterprises would have allowed him to avoid a real democratic transition and thus limit popular discontent which instead, from year to year, was becoming increasingly strong, undermining his personal power.

However, he lacked the strength to keep the federal structure steady, so much so that the very possibility of Russia’s survival as a unitary state entity seemed to be called into question several times. In order to gain the support – or, at least, non-hostility – of part of the population and the political class of the regions and the republics, he promoted a “segmented federalism” characterised by dozens of bilateral treaties between the centre and the peripheries, each in its own way intent on obtaining maximum independence from the Kremlin. The result was a chaotic and, in the long run, ungovernable situation, as demonstrated by Chechnya’s attempt at secession, followed by a failed intervention of federal troops.

With Chechnya proclaiming itself independent from 1991, without clear reactions from Moscow, then unable to bring its small republic into line, Yeltsin decided to attack it in 1994, opting for a military solution that he imagined would be quick and painless in the hope of thus increasing that popular consensus which, instead, began to falter. The war lasted much longer than expected and, ending two years later without a real victory, exposed all the limits of a President now worn out not only by the bad use he had made of power but also by alcohol abuse (Bensi 2005; Buttino 2008).

With popularity rates in free fall but supported by the close circle of oligarchs he himself had favoured, Yeltsin managed to stay in power until 1999. Resurgence of economic crisis following the collapse of the Asian Tigers in 1998, and the humiliation of having to helplessly watch NATO bombings of Serbian brothers over the Kosovo question – which he had repeatedly said he was against – marked the end of his political era. His successor was Vladimir Putin, chosen as prime minister in August 1999 and then elected with 52% of the votes in the presidential elections of March 2000.

2. An Eye to the West

With specific regard to foreign policy, in this same decade Yeltsin decided to continue the “new course” inaugurated by Gorbachev aimed at improving relations with the USA and Europe. In doing so, a major role was played by the will of the oligarchs who wanted to have close relations with the West in order to obtain financing and new opportunities for profit. Thus the relationship was immediately characterised by a huge influx of foreign capital, mainly through the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Gould-Davies, Woods 1999: 1-21)1.

It was certainly during the first part of the decade, and in particular with the stay of Andrey Kozyrev as Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1991 and 1996, that the pro-

1 The total amount of funds disbursed to the Russian Federation between 1992 and 1999 exceeded twenty billion dollars.
Western policy of the Federation expressed itself with greater conviction along three different lines: relations with the United States, strongly encouraged by the benevolent attitude of Clinton, considered by the Kremlin as the main interlocutor; relations with NATO, characterised by a mutual desire for collaboration as demonstrated by renegotiation of the “Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe” (CFE), conclusion of the Treaty on “Open Skies” (both in 1992) and creation of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994; and finally those with the European Union, penalised in the long run by the inability of its members to draw up a common position despite the “Charter of Paris for a New Europe” approved by the CSCE in 1990 to try to manage the world scenario after the fall of communism and by which, in theory, it should have been inspired.

The history of relations between the Russian Federation and the newly formed European Union was, like that with NATO, completely new and initially marked by prudent steps, not without uncertainties, but at the same time on the whole positive. The first question that Brussels asked itself was whether and how much Russia could be considered a truly European country and consequently give it a role without this constituting a threat to European security in the future. The second was the extent to which Moscow was ready to accept radical changes both in domestic and international politics in order to transform itself into a real liberal democracy and consequently into a reliable partner both commercially and in the international context. However, even for the Russians themselves, it was not easy in the early 1990s to answer these and the many other questions they faced: how to better manage the internal transition? How to deal with European institutions? How to do so while respecting its role as a great power?

Therefore, since in the short term it did not seem easy to find a shared answer, the European Community, shortly to become Union, decided to focus on economic programmes and actions, also considering Moscow’s need for external financing. Already in December 1991, and thus on the imminent eve of the collapse of the USSR, the TACIS programme was launched, designed to offer technical assistance to the former Soviet countries engaged in the process of transition to democracy and a market economy. Demonstrating its importance were not only the substantial sums allocated, but the fact that it was not even suspended during the Russian-Chechen conflict, despite the many criticisms raised by European governments.

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2 Originally the treaty was signed in Paris in November 1990, immediately after German reunification, by the then 22 NATO member countries and by those of the Warsaw Pact, actually dissolved a few months later, in July 1991. The agreement imposed limits on conventional weapons necessary for surprise attacks or large-scale offensive operations throughout the area from the Atlantic to the Urals. But even before its entry into force in 1992, the disappearance of the Soviet Union and its bloc had created a radically new geopolitical situation in Europe. Just as the ratification process was in progress, special negotiations were conducted in parallel to allow the Russian Federation, along with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova and Ukraine, to succeed the USSR. In this way, on this albeit shaky basis, it was possible to start implementing the Treaty, which produced very positive results and led to the destruction, over the next three years, of over 50,000 pieces of heavy weapons (tanks, armoured combat vehicles, pieces of artillery with a calibre greater than 100 mm, attack helicopters and combat aircraft).

3 The TACIS programme was divided into two sub-projects: the first, between 1991 and 1994, financed emergency measures and pure economic assistance; with the second, between 1995 and 1998, minor initiatives were launched which saw civil society involved, also in social terms, in fields such as education and all those sectors that could be useful for conveying respect for European values.
The following year, the Federation asked to join the Council of Europe, a long and troubled path that was to conclude only four years later. The Council carried out constant monitoring and evaluation of the progress made by the candidate country in the field of legal and institutional rapprochement to the principles established by its own Statute and which were considered indispensable requirements: democratic pluralism, respect for human rights and the rules of international law in this sphere, and realisation of the rule of law. To this end, three commissions were set up respectively for political issues, relations with non-member countries and legal and human rights issues. Although the dialogue within these bodies was not always simple, it was above all Yeltsin’s decision to attack Chechnya that caused a suspension of work in January 1995. The issue returned to the agenda only in early January 1996 and the following month Russia became a member of the Council of Europe.

Before the war in Chechnya began, in 1994 in Corfu the new Russia signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the Heads of State and Government of the European Community which came into effect in 1997 because of the tensions caused by the war in northern Caucasus starting in 1994 (Timmins 2005: 3): according to this agreement, for the first time Russia and the European Union recognised themselves as strategic partners in the political, economic and cultural fields, formalising the will of both sides to undertake a common path whose cornerstones were recognition of the most favoured nation clause, progressive limitation of any reduction in the import-export sector, legislative harmonisation, the possibility of creating and opening companies, progressive liberalisation of services, free circulation of payments and movement of capital, regulation of intellectual property and, finally, the start of negotiations that were to lead to creation of a free trade area between the two signatories. In addition, particular forms of collaboration were to be developed in the field of justice and domestic affairs, especially in the fields of the fight against organised crime, energy, environment, science, technology and transport (Timmermann 1996: 219). It was further envisaged that the regional cooperation process also be developed and strengthened among the countries of the Community of Independent States in order to promote stability, commitment to the promotion of peace and international security through greater collaboration with the United Nations, OSCE and other international bodies. Although this agreement did not contemplate any suggestion of integration, contrary to what was instead emerging with the countries of Central-Eastern Europe, it was equally very important because, for the first time, relations between the European Community and Russia were not limited to economic support from the former to the latter but to definition of common objectives also at the political level and to strengthening of the European security system.

In the wake of the optimism of these early years, again in 1994, Yeltsin agreed to start a dialogue for potential collaboration with the Western European Union in

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4 The body guaranteeing and monitoring this cooperation would have been the two annual summits (one to be held in Moscow, the other in the country of the rotating EU presidency) envisaged by the agreement itself and in which the EU President, the President of the Commission and the President of the Russian Federal Republic would participate.
certain areas of common interest. The formation of a group of experts of the two parties was suggested with the task of identifying the main problems concerning European security and envisaging the start of regular consultations between Russia and Brussels, in order to activate stable cooperation in peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia, where in the meantime war between Croatia and Serbia had broken out, and then between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bowker 1998: 1245-1261). In 1999, on the eve of the Cologne European Council meeting of June 3-4, where dissolution of the WEU was decided within the EU, the WEU Assembly institutionalised the presence within it of a permanent Russian delegation in order to intensify Moscow’s participation in European military and defence projects.

In those same years, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the European Community had launched a policy towards Central Eastern European countries, a choice which the Federation did not show itself hostile to in the hope of reaching a strategy of common security extended also to Eastern Europe in which Moscow had a clear interest. Everything started as early as 1989, at the G7 summit first in Paris and then in Brussels, when the PHARE project was launched, which provided for the granting of economic aid in particular to Poland and Hungary, which had been the first to break the Iron Curtain. In 1990 the project had been extended to Bulgaria, Romania and Czechoslovakia and then, between 1991 and 1992, to Albania, the Baltics and Slovenia. In the same year the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development had begun to operate and in April, at the meeting in Dublin of the European Council, “Second Generation Agreements” had been signed which opened discussion about the possible association of these countries with the Union. Negotiations had begun with Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary to reach “European Agreements” in December 1991, considered the starting point for gradual integration of these countries into the Community framework. In 1993, the Copenhagen meeting of the European Council established the three fundamental criteria that had to be met to enter the Union, and in 1994, at the Essen meeting of the European Council, the actual pre-accession strategy was drawn up. Faced with all these initiatives, the Kremlin maintained its favourable position from year to year, interested in participating in the redefinition of European geopolitical balances. After the collapse of socialism, the hope was that, by creating a strong European political space, a new role for the United States, the old rival, and NATO could somehow be contained in this area. Moscow remained faithful to this orientation even when there was talk of real enlargement.

3. NATO Enlarges

The first phase of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, the most pro-Western phase, did not, therefore, cease either because of the criticisms from European countries about the way in which Yeltsin had led the first Chechen war, the consequences of which were eventually overcome, nor by the start of the process of

5 Created as an instrument of aid for those countries in the transition towards a market economy, it would then become the financial instrument of the pre-accession strategy.
enlargement of the Community area towards the east, but fundamentally due to the
decision to enlarge NATO in that direction, a choice that aroused harsh criticism in
a large part of the Russian public opinion. The first tangible sign of change was the
replacement of Kozyrev with new foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov.

As regards more specifically the first contacts that had taken place between the
Atlantic Alliance and Moscow, these had led, in December 1991, a few days before
the dissolution of the USSR, to the creation of the North-Atlantic Cooperation Council
(NACC). In addition, of course, to the members of NATO and Russia, soon to be no
longer Soviet, the negotiating table was also joined by countries that had become
independent after the fall of the Berlin Wall, countries which had been given a political
voice for the first time. This body was to have dealt with some aspects of defence and
security on the European continent but, given the radical changes taking place in the
Soviet world, its activity remained in fact a dead letter. It is undeniable that this first
attempt at dialogue failed, but it constituted the beginnings of future Russia-NATO
relations and showed that an agreement for cooperation was possible, even if at that
time it may have seemed difficult to implement.

A new opportunity for dialogue was re-proposed in 1994 with the aforementioned
Partnership for Peace (PfP), which Russia decided to join in order to launch broad
and strengthened dialogue and cooperation with NATO. The meetings, which took
place at the level of ministers, ambassadors and experts, allowed for a considerable
exchange of information and studies on important topics of common interest such as
peacekeeping, environmental security and scientific research. The first opportunity
to capitalise on the work done was implementation of the military clauses of the
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995. Russian and NATO soldiers
worked together first in the forces for implementing the plan, IFOR (Implementation
Force), and then in the force for stabilising peace, SFOR (Stabilisation Force), which
followed the implementation plan. Russia participated in SFOR with 1,200 men out of
a total of 20,000.6

Thus, in the mid-1990s, relations between the Atlantic Alliance and the Russian
Federation seemed ripe for a further step forward. So, in December 1996, NATO foreign
ministers gave Secretary-General Javier Solana the task of exploring the possibility of
reaching a real agreement. The negotiations led to the signing, on May 27, 1997 in
Paris, of the “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between
NATO and the Russian Federation”. This was a document, that propitiously allowed

6 The following year a significant initiative was launched on a Russian proposal in a sector different from the
strictly military one: a Memorandum of Understanding was signed on civil emergency planning and state
of preparedness in the event of disasters, which led to creation of the “Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response
Coordination Centre”.

7 The treaty comprised four sections: Section I set out the principles on which the NATO-Russia relationship
is based; Section II, and this was the real novelty, provided for the creation of a Permanent Joint Council which
allowed for consultation, cooperation, decision-making and action mechanisms between the parties; Section
III indicates the areas of consultation and cooperation; Section IV was devoted to military political issues,
including the renewed political commitment of NATO member states to have no intention, no plan and no
reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states of the alliance.
foreseeing times ripe for the creation of a strong, stable and lasting partnership through the work of a “Permanent Joint Council”, which was to have ensured constant consultation and cooperation between the parties. But it was precisely at the time when new perspectives seemed to open up that Moscow began to look suspiciously at the birth of a project – announced by the NATO summit of July 8-9, 1997 in Madrid – which would lead the Alliance to expand in the East in a period of just two years to include Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary in 1999. The feeling of the Russians was that they did not in fact have any say in NATO decisions within the framework of a relationship that was configured more on the lines of a “19+1 model” than on a “20” model, that is, all partners of the same rank gathered at the same table with equal dignity. This impression seemed to be confirmed in the decision, strongly opposed by the Russians but also upheld by NATO, to bomb Serbia in March 1999 to induce it to return to the peace negotiation table and end the war in Kosovo. Abandoning the “Permanent Joint Council” in protest, Moscow however agreed in June to let its soldiers participate in the international contingent in Kosovo (KFOR). Russian troops were to collaborate with those of NATO in three regions of the country, along with France in the north, the United States in the southeast and Germany in the south. Furthermore, they were to have ensured the security of Slatina airport in the British zone. It was an important decision, the only one at that time making it possible to save the small steps previously taken for a real rapprochement between historical enemies.

In order to save the pro-Western policy followed until then, Yeltsin also tried to propose the alternative of a security system centred on OSCE under European leadership, but this was not well received.

4. Primakov at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

It was then in the context of these events that the new foreign minister Primakov outlined for the first time his concept of “multi-vectoriality” (Primakov 2018). According to this doctrine, the US-led unipolar system resulting from the fall of the USSR, in addition to being conceptually undesirable in the eyes of the Kremlin, had already demonstrated its impracticability due to the uncertainty of American choices and the time had come to develop a new international system. In Primakov’s view it was to have been based on a plurality of major players among which, in addition to the USA, he included China, India, Brazil and, obviously, Russia. Almost a decade ahead of time, he had in fact predicted the BRICS group that was to have much success from the early 2000s. From the list of the components of the new “international concert”, he did not

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8 The Permanent Joint Council, which could meet at different levels, from Heads of State to ambassadors, had the faculty of creating specific working groups on topics of common interest: the situation in the former Yugoslavia; peacekeeping; security in the Euro-Atlantic region; activities in the political and defence fields against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; issues related to nuclear weapons; strategies and doctrines of NATO and Russia; disarmament and arms control; search and rescue at sea; fight against international terrorism; scientific cooperation related to defence; civil planning in the case of emergency and assistance in the case of disaster. It met for the first time on July 18, 1997.

9 Acronym formed from the initials of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, whose extraordinary economic growth has made them the protagonists of the international economy.
exclude Europe but, with a sixth sense that the future would unfortunately confirm, he believed that the community dimension was incapable of expressing a unified line and that it was therefore appropriate to direct attention to individual European nations, in particular France. It would be improper to conclude that the Russian-European dialogue broke off with Primakov. Rather, compared with the idealism that had characterised the previous phase, the new multi-vectorial orientation re-established relations according to the yardstick of Russian national interest. That is, no longer an almost uncritical passion for the European (and American) model, but rather the search for agreements that would respond to the Federation’s main economic or strategic needs. It is in this light that the start of activity of the Cooperation Council between the European Union and the Russian Federation, with the summit held in Brussels on 27 January 1998, should be seen. The meeting was defined a “very important milestone” in relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation, which was expressly recognised as an equal partner. The significance attributed by Moscow to the Cooperation Council was demonstrated by the large delegation sent to the meeting. Led by Primakov, it included Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Afanassievsky, First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Vladimir Vasiliev, Deputy Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Ronald Piskoppel and Deputy Minister of Justice Liudmila Zavadskaya. During the talks, the representatives of the EU and Russia reaffirmed the mutual status of strategic partners for peace, stability, freedom and prosperity in Europe, expressly speaking about sharing responsibility for the continent’s future. After reaffirming attention and support for the reform processes under way in Russia in order to strengthen political and economic freedoms and confirming the will to promote the integration of Moscow into a wider European economic area, the delegations focused on a wide range of concrete dossiers, including: cooperation in the fight against crime, trade relations and economic cooperation, including the creation of the necessary conditions for the future establishment of a free trade area, assistance programmes such as TACIS, regional cooperation and new potential areas of common interests such as space research, environmental protection and arms conversion. Good progress in that same period of negotiations for Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organisation was considered a further positive factor10.

However, the good auspices expressed in Brussels suffered the very serious financial crisis that hit the Federation in the summer of that year and then the decision of most European governments, including Italy, to support the NATO attack launched on Serbia in 1999 against the will of Russia and without UN authorisation. Precisely in the light of the emergence of these new tensions, it was Germany that revived the issue of relations with Moscow through the creation of a “Common European Economic Space” (CEES) with the Federation. The idea, barely mentioned in reality in the 1994 agreement, was taken up at the European Council in Cologne in June 1999, in the last phase of the Yeltsin presidency: on that occasion an articulated and long-lasting action plan was adopted which was given the definition of “Common Strategy

10 In fact, these negotiations would have continued for a lengthy period and the Federation only entered the WTO in 2012.
towards Russia” (CS) (European Commission 1999: X). It was the first application of a new instrument envisaged by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, which, within the CFSP, was intended to launch “common strategies” which would compensate for the lack of effectiveness in European Union foreign policy. Specific initiatives were envisaged in the political and security fields, economic issues, trade and investment, energy, etc. Each new EU presidency would have to present a plan to improve the strategy in question, the ultimate aim of which was to make the already many beneficial tools provided for by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EU-Russia Summit Statement 2001: X) tangible and maximise them\(^\text{11}\). In the case in question, the primary goal of this four-year Common Strategy was to support Russia’s reintegration into the European political and economic area through the consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and public institutions; integrate the country into the European economic and social space with the aim of creating a future free trade area; cooperate for strengthening security and stability in Europe and in areas of common strategic interest; and work together to respond to international challenges in the nuclear, organised crime, international terrorism and environmental security sectors. The idea of promoting common initiatives in the field of conflict prevention, peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations, not only in Europe but also in areas outside Europe that were of common interest, was very interesting.

Despite the numerous ups and downs and although never a word was said in favour of the idea of an association of Russia with the European Community nor, even less, of the idea of its possible integration, on the whole relations between the Federation and the European Union were thus positive in the 1990s. In fact, the various agreements stipulated enabled systematic collaboration at the level of ministerial apparatuses on concrete questions, above all trade issues and the matter of security, guaranteeing, even in the most difficult moments of that decade, the thread of a constant dialogue that the arrival of Putin, at least during his first presidency, that of the “golden age” of Russian-Western relations (between 2001 and 2004), did not appear to call into question.

\(^{11}\) Among the meetings envisaged by the agreement, and regularly held, one of the most important was that of May 17, 2001 in Moscow which led to the creation of a “High Level Group” charged with working towards the effective realisation of a common European space in order to link the Russian and European markets, which together represented around 600 million consumers.
References


EU-Russia Security Relations:
Old Problems in a New International System

Sara Tavani

This article aims at both investigating the serious state of security relations between the European Union and Russia as well as comparing it with the traditional difficulties encountered by the Euro-Russian security dialogue during the Cold War period. Far from presuming to offer an exhaustive analysis of this vast issue, this study wants to propose some causes for reflection regarding the historical continuity of the European key security problems. The goals here are in fact those of both identifying the central reasons which continue to prevent the establishment and the strengthening of an efficient European security system as well as highlighting their connections with the historical evolution of the continental strategic system, finally advancing some considerations about current perspectives of an improvement in bilateral wary perceptions.

This analysis must however be introduced by a necessary clarification. Speaking about bilateral Euro-Russian relations is arduous, due to the plurality of approaches traditionally adopted by the European countries towards Moscow as well as towards the Kremlin’s course. As historiography has extensively demonstrated, differences in the aptitude of the EU governments have considerably lessened during the Cold War in the light of the common goal of ending the continental divide\(^1\). Deriving from different national strategic, economic and cultural interests, European divergences have nonetheless always been present and they started to deepen again since the eve of the Soviet dissolution, therefore hindering the development of a productive post-bipolar dialogue between the EU institutions and Moscow.

As this article points out, the European political division on the security approach to Russia is one among the main unsolved questions inherited by both the Cold War international system as well as the EU unaccomplished political integration. Though


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not new nor alone, this problem is still at the core of the Euro-Russian security confrontation and it has become ever more worrisome in the unstable multipolar system, which has followed the Soviet Union collapse. Recent cross-border conflicts in Eastern Europe have indeed revived the issue of the lack of cohesion among the European foreign policies, as demonstrated by disagreements on what should be the common reaction to the invasion of Crimea as well as on the size of the EU trade sanctions to Russia during the Ukraine crisis\(^2\). The lack of a common European stance towards Russia is today, as it was in the past century, one of the main signal of weakness of the EU international personality. Only the recovery of the European political integration process would allow to nourish hopes of a substantial improvement of the current situation\(^3\).

1. The Missed Institutionalisation of EU-Russia Security Relations after the Fall of Bipolarism

Since the Cold War ending, relations between Europe and Russia have been experiencing an ever more complicated phase, especially worrisome in the security field, as a consequence of the bipolar system dissolution as well as of the international disorder it brought about. Primary reason of this dangerous evolution lies upon the progressive failure of the numerous ambitious projects of international reorganisation, which have been promoted at both regional and universal levels between the end of the ‘80s and the beginning of the ‘90s. This does include the striking inability increasingly shown by the European Union to play a leading international role.

At the end of the ‘80s, a conventional wisdom was widespread that from a prominent EU political personality new significant international responsibilities would have derived, as well as the tools needed to stabilise the European scenario\(^4\). In the mid of the ‘90s, however, a growing number of scholars started to wonder about the real shape that the EU political architecture was going to assume as well as about the nature of the new established relations with its continental neighbours. Many observers and researchers therefore started to address the rising issue of the European system, which would have followed the breakup of the Soviet Union. Among these

\(^2\) The issue of the EU commercial sanctions to Russia after the Crimean invasion, especially, allows to observe very diversified stances taken by the EU members: from those uncompromising, such as the British ones, until the softer Italian or Greek positions, which reveal different levels of commercial cooperation and economic interdependence with Moscow. Cf. S. De Galbert, *A Year of Sanctions against Russia: Now What?*, CSIS Europe Program Report, October 2015.


scholars, Michael Smith can be recalled as well as his article “The European Union and a Changing Europe: Establishing the Boundaries of Order”, appeared in 1996⁵.

During the 90’s, in fact, cooperation between Europe and Russia undertook a very different direction compared with that envisaged during the Cold War final stage, as demonstrated by growing difficulties in handling cross-border relations. Since the mid of the ‘80s, Mikhail Gorbachev and the major European leaders optimistically hypothesised a fruitful reform of their relations into a “Common European Home” under whose “security and confidence roof” all peoples in the continent would have been reunited⁶. That proposal quickly lost its consistency, while the trustful mood that had marked the decade of the ‘80s was overtaken by a pragmatic and rushed transformation of the international relations, rather based on the emerging new balance of military as well as economic powers than on a clear vision and organisation of the international system which had to replace bipolarism and its security foundation⁷.

One among the main consequences of this disappointing progression was the lack of a clear definition of the Euro-Russian relations, which progressively lost their sense of direction and kept evolving outside of any institutional framework, leaving unresolved the issue of their security rationale⁸.

Failure of projects of international reorganisation did not only involve the European scenario, but encompassed the whole international picture, given the progressive abandonment of the UN reform plans. It is possible to connect in a common picture both regional and universal cooperation and collective security problems⁹. At the regional level, in fact, the stall of the European political integration prevented the birth of a united as well as influential player, able to talk with Russia on an equal ground and to tackle the most serious issues in the foreign policy agenda, especially in the strategic sector. On a wider level, moreover, the lack of a cohesive European interlocutor in the relationship with the Kremlin jeopardised the whole institutionalising process of Euro-Russian relations, thus contributing to the broader crisis of the UN collective security system as well as to the missed international support to its reform projects¹⁰.

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¹⁰ Regarding the historical development of the Un activities and the evolution of the Un agencies, as well as the difficulties faced by their more recent reform process, cf. the works recently edited by L. Tosi, *Le sfide della pace. L’Onu e l’Italia per una World Community (1945-2015)*, Padova, Wolters Kluwer/Cedam, 2017.
At the end of the Cold War, the European integration was among the first projects to enter a profound, though not immediately evident, contradiction. In the climate of great enthusiasm that accompanied the fall of the Berlin Wall and the following policies of enlargement to the East, the integration process started to abandon its original goal, that was the creation of a political - and possibly federal - entity. Eastern enlargement quickly became a goal in itself, with immediate and beneficial economic implications but with far more uncertain political objectives in the medium and long terms\(^1\). The united Europe, wrapped in the emotional fanfare of the end of the East-West confrontation, was actually going forth with unfurled sails towards the worse setback of its history, which would have matched with a deep and lasting internal crisis, paving therefore the way to the crisis of credibility and democratic support of our days\(^2\). After the fall of bipolarism, member states’ interests grew ever more diversified and, unable to share a common political and socio-economic vision, the European governments fell back to limited efforts of reconstruction and reunification, by favouring temporary as well as noncommittal choices. The so-called “horizontal” dimension of the integration process - namely the extension of the internal market - prevailed over the “vertical” one, that is the increase and the deepening of the powers effectively integrated into common institutions, therefore preventing the Eu from acquiring the necessary instruments of government as well as from assuming a clear political profile\(^3\). Theoretical approaches to the study of the European Political Cooperation too, as well as the empirical analyses, started to diverge, often becoming conflictual\(^4\), until, in more recent years, they came back to focus on comparative analyses of the European national defence policies more than on a trans-supra-national level\(^5\).

Even in the aftermath of the reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, the foreign and defence policy sectors remained ground of sole competence of the national states as well as the common foreign policy goals remained incredibly

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2 About the difficulties faced by the European integration process, in historical as well as current perspectives, there is availability of a wide international bibliography that is impossible here to recall for understandable limits of space. The reference is therefore only to some more recent works: L. Mechi, D. Pasquinucci (eds), *Integrazione europea e trasformazioni socio-economiche*, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2017; S. Cruciani, M. Ridolfi (eds), *L’Unione Europea e il Mediterraneo. Relazioni internazionali, crisi politiche e regionali (1947–2016)*, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2017.


generic. Not by chance, most recent EU initiatives in this fields have pursued limited and sometimes ambiguous aims, as in the case of the launching of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and later of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) which, while aiming at improving relations with Russia and the Common Neighbourhood, were not able to find neither the conceptual coherence nor the practical tools necessary to their effective implementation16.

Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that even after the birth of the Common Security and Defence Policy (PSDC) the Euro-Atlantic dimension remained the prevailing dimension of the European security, making up for the lack of a common European integrated defence. Following the 1999 NATO Summit and the creation of a European Union Military Staff (EUMS) within the Shape, the Euro-Atlantic strategic collaboration has been further strengthened thanks to the 2002 Berlin Plus agreement17. In fact, as Nicoletta Pirozzi observed, the European countries continue to prefer defence and security alliances external to the EU framework, aimed at both pursuing specific agendas and influencing the European policies18. As a result, the EU does continue to refer to NATO, and therefore indirectly to the US, as a primary security guarantee in the new and highly unstable international system. Plans for strengthening both political and military integrations nurtured during the ‘80s, for instance the consolidation of the Western European Union (WEO), ended up by taking the shape of partial and inadequate solutions, such as the ambiguous and abstract “window” towards a European Defence Community provided for by the Lisbon Treaty (article 42, paragraph 2).

Moving to a broader level of observation, the whole process of institutionalisation of the Euro-Russian relations over the last decades seemed doomed to failure. The ambitious but unrealistic “great designs” of the mid-‘80s, such as the Common European House, were soon deserted by the political discourse, overwhelmed by the mounting rhetoric of the Western prevailing in the East-West confrontation. Even those plans which initially appeared grounded and achievable progressively lost attractiveness and consensus, such as the idea of entrusting the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) with the task of institutionalising the Euro-Russian relations in the security sector. This was due to the concerns of those who feared a dangerous OSCE overlapping with NATO prerogatives19 as well as to the spreading persuasion that the Russian power had entered a phase of irreversible decay, which would have inevitably led it to orbit around the sphere of influence of the European common market20.

16 On the difficulties faced by the ENP and the EAP initiatives are quickly increasing scholars’ commentaries and have been published numerous self-critical revision documents on the part of the Eu institutions themselves. Cf. for instance R. Alcaro e M. Comelli, La politica europea di vicinato, marzo 2005, n. 22, IAI, Quaderni.
17 Regarding the current state of NATO-EU strategic cooperation cf. NATO and EU official texts: http://www.natolibguides.info/nato-eu/documents.
20 About Western Europe’s change of perspective regarding the Russian international status cf. D. Allen’s paper, West European Responses to change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, ECSA Biennial Conference, George Mason University, May 1991.
The project of creating a single area of security, economic and social cooperation was gradually replaced, during the ‘90s, by the Euro-Russian “Partnership” project which since the outset claimed to pursue far more limited goals, especially in the security sector. Moreover, this project was based on the controversial principle of “conditionality”, which related the entity of the EU “concessions” to the post-Soviet Russia’s goodwill in carrying on reform processes. This EU growing ambition of standing out as a “norm maker” in Russia as well as in the Eastern neighbour countries has been interpreted by some scholars as a compelling aptitude of the EU institutions to replicate themselves. Benedetta Voltolini, for instance, defines this behaviour as the “tendency of the institutions to export ‘institutional isomorphism’ as a default option”\(^{21}\). The rationale of conditionality, which will later provide the conceptual framework of the whole ENP, was soon perceived by the Russians and by the rest of the Neighbourhood as an annoying instrument of political and social leverage. The ENP itself started to be criticised for its “one-way modality”, hinting at the unilateral transfer of regulatory models from the EU to the Eastern countries\(^{22}\).

Finally, to complete this picture, it is possible to observe a connection between the failure of the institutionalisation of the Euro-Russian relations and the broader failure of the reform efforts aimed at revitalising the Un collective security system. At the universal level too, indeed, ideas advanced at the end of the Cold War have been progressively set aside, and especially those proposals aimed at modifying the functioning of the Security Council in order to extend its composition so to make it more correspondent to the multi-centre international system\(^{23}\). In this way, a precious opportunity went lost of relaunching the Un system by taking advantage of the temporary Russian overtures. In fact, during the ‘90s, the Un system represented for Moscow an attractive alternative to a feared “unipolar system” and to the assertion of the Us as the “controller” of international security. Nonetheless, a growing number of states - and among them many Eu members - then embraced the idea of a Western Governance as a possible convenient assurance against the new international disorder. As a result, Russia was induced to focus on a more unilateral approach in foreign policy, based on the restoration of its traditional hard power tools and aimed at reaffirming its regional control. After a quick phase during which it really seemed possible to undertake a reform of the world organisation, the international system inexorably fell back to a traditional division in “areas of influence”\(^{24}\).


\(^{22}\) Regarding the difference among the Eastern Neighbours reactions to the introduction of the principle of conditionality, see the 2008-2010 ESRC survey “Europeanising or securitising the Outsiders?”, and Elena Korosteleva’s research *Eastern Partnership: A New Opportunity for the Neighbours?*, London, Routledge, 2011, that is the result of a field-research based on interviews to officials from both the EU institutions and the Eastern partner governments, together with public opinion surveys.


The failure of any reform project between the ’80s and ’90s explains the increasingly worrying direction undertaken by the Euro-Russian relations since the end of the last century. EU attempts at establishing new forms of cooperation with the Kremlin were inspired by an unlimited trust in the attractive power of the common market as well as in the European ability to support the Russian transition, which should lead Moscow towards a development model more compatible with the European one. This approach, based on the belief in both the EU market magnetism and the EU institutions’ ability to bargain the conditions of East-West rapprochement in Europe, was supported by the so-called “negotiated order” theory, which emerged in the mid of the ’80s in the sociological field. This political rationale underlies the 1991 credit policy which, in 1994, took the shape of the first Partnership Agreement. Meanwhile, cooperation in the security field remained neglected, or at most disguised as timid attempts at cooperation between the Russian Federation and NATO, as in the case of the first joint observation mission during the Yugoslav crisis.

2. The EU Eastern Enlargement and the Increased Tensions with Moscow

It is well known that EU initiatives of the ’90s, based on a too optimistic assessment of its soft power tools, failed to achieve the desired effects and were finally overwhelmed by the 2008 economic crisis. Since the end of the ’90s, the EU Eastern policy started to be perceived as ever more hostile by Russia which, after the disorientating phase followed to the USSR dissolution, began to recover its internal stability as well as the desire to fortify its new borders. In terms of security, Putin’s advent marked indeed the return to old foreign policy methods, which traditionally relied on both direct and indirect control of the surrounding “buffer” territories.

Since 1999, moreover, EU and NATO Eastern enlargements started to overlap, according to a dual dynamic that in Moscow’s perspective inevitably appeared as preordained and threatening. The evolving military balance in Europe seemed to fatally renew the blocks’ confrontation, now represented by NATO and Russia, since Europe had proven incapable of creating an alternative security and cooperation system. In the lack of a direct EU security role, NATO represented the only available security net for the former Warsaw Pact countries, which had lost the Russian protection by asking to join the European Union, and its enlargement was unavoidable.

29 Since the ‘90s, the idea of an unavoidable comeback to a “Cold War” style of confrontation with Russia became increasingly popular, as demonstrated by Samuel Huntington’s book, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1996. See also S. Bielanski, “Russia, Poland and the New Europe: inevitable clash?”, in A. Ferrari (ed), Beyond Ukrain, cit., pp. 65-78.
Nonetheless, this produced serious repercussions in the EU relations with the Kremlin, leading to a continental strategic status quo far more precarious than in the original idea of the concurrent dismantlement of the two military blocks.

To worsen this situation, from the beginning of the new millennium the EU took two other unwise political stances: the adoption of the unpopular principle of conditionality as ENP and later EAP foundation and, on the other hand, the increased search for energy independence from Russia. In particular, though the EU energy policy remained unclear and unreliable in absence of a common approach, the numerous declarations about a possible transfer of US shale gas technologies to Europe (impracticable until now) combined with recent national investment policies in renewable energy and energy saving were enough to generate Moscow’s apprehension.30

High tension between Russians and Europeans increasingly affected the management of the security crises that erupted since the beginning of the ‘90s. Triggered by the geo-political instability which followed the USSR dissolution, such crises took the shape of re-awakening “frozen” ethnic and territorial conflicts in the former Soviet space, as in the case of Transnistria in 1992 and Nagorno-Karabakh between 1992 and 1994, and they gradually induced the Kremlin and EU institutions to take opposite stances. EU-Russia confrontation easily fueled the following “coloured” revolts in Georgia and Ukraine between 2003 and 2004, which quickly assumed an ideological character, with media and politicians contributing to revive Cold War behaviours and languages, proving once again that 1989 was all but a clear caesura with the past.

Tensions in Euro-Russian relations remained palpable until the explosion of the 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict and the 2009 Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis, which originated from an apparently limited dispute between Gazprom and Naftogaz Ukraini, state companies of a gas-exporting and a gas-transit countries. Nonetheless, the latter crisis ended up in the larger conflict that led to the Russian annexation of Crimea and further antagonised EU relations with the Kremlin.31 Putin’s presidential re-election in 2012, against some expectations of a government turnover, was therefore perceived by many Europeans as a confirmation of the authoritarian and warlike course adopted by the Kremlin which, since 2010, had started to threaten to adopt a “povorot” policy by re-orientating its traditional European foreign policy axes towards the East.32 The revival of the Eurasian Union project as well as the

new energy agreements with China and India gave a certain credibility to what was initially looked as an unrealistic danger. The same is for the enhanced military cooperation and the renewed strategic dialogue between Moscow and Beijing.

Political regression in East-West relations in Europe very negatively impacted also the public opinion, favouring the revival of traditional mistrust and grudges, thus compromising a great part of progresses made over the ‘70s and the ‘80s in the recovery of a climate of mutual trust. This especially revived the fears of the East European countries, historically and geographically more exposed to the Russian influence. Public perceptions have been inflamed, in recent years, by the public discourse that was dominated by Brussels and Moscow mutual accusations of aggressive expansionist ambitions. The EU is in fact depicted by the Russian media as a fierce competitor, determined to undermine the Russian political and commercial leverage in the Common Neighbourhood area. The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) offered by the EaP Association Agreements, in particular, is pointed out as the demonstration of the EU hostile and far from collaborative attitude, due to its controversial membership “exclusivity”, which implied the impossibility, for the adhering countries, to become part of other custom unions such as Putin’s Euroasian Union. On the other hand, the unilateral foreign policy course adopted by Russia in recent years has induced the EU institutions and the European governments - some more than others - to denounce a Russian will to restore its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, even by the use of force if necessary. Putin’s Euroasian projects strongly fuelled this European mistrust. The Kremlin plans, indeed, seem to go far beyond the creation of a simple custom union in order to favour the birth of a new political and institutional organisation revolving around Moscow’s direction, aimed at associating the countries in the post-Soviet space in a more effective re-edition of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

3. Traditional European Security Problems and Current Weaknesses

In this climate of hostility, the recent Russian calls for the resumption of the pan-European cooperation on security within the Osce frame ended up falling on deaf ears. At the end of the Cold War, the Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe was universally expected to embody the new Euro-Russian security dialogue, by inheriting the experience of East-West cooperation led within the frame of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) between the ‘70s and the ‘80s. Nonetheless, the Organisation is currently demonstrating that its heritage include both positive as disappointing experiences, especially unsatisfying when relating to the unresolved issues of the European security. In fact, OSCE is striving

today to overcome those same limits already faced decades ago by the CSCE in the context of the so-called “first basket”, where the Soviet and the Western stances proved to be irreconcilable\textsuperscript{34}.

Security matters have always represented the most sensitive and difficult field for Europeans in negotiations with Moscow, given the clearly unbalanced relationship in favour of the Kremlin on the military (both conventional and strategic) ground. This unbalanced relationship had already provoked the failure of the Mutal Balance Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations, led over the ’70s in parallel with the CSCE works. MBFR primarily aimed at promoting a reduction in conventional forces of the two blocks in Europe and, secondly, at subtracting from the CSCE baskets a difficult negotiating sector, in which the Europeans would have found themselves in a disadvantaged position. While the MBFR talks, as expected, did not produce results, the CSCE negotiations, on the other hand, resulted in this way much more productive for the Western countries, though they could not completely avoid the issue of the continental security management, which remained a burden and partly conditioned the broader reform goals pursued by the Helsinki Final Act as well as by the Conference follow-up.

During the Cold War period, only the close alliance with the United States in NATO could allow to balance, at least in part, the unbalanced strategic relationship between the Europeans and the Russians. For this reason, since the ’60s the European countries demand a direct involvement of the United States in order to open the pan-European negotiations, by prompting Moscow to accept to modify its original idea of a Conference on Security in Europe (CES) in an “extended” conference including Canada and the United States. The theme of “security”, moreover, had to match with broader themes of economic and social “cooperation”, by contemporaneously working on three contextual “baskets”: security, economic cooperation and human rights\textsuperscript{35}. In this way, thanks to the linkage negotiation tactic, it would have been possible to balance the agreements reached in parallel in the different baskets, putting in place a convenient mechanism of mutual “exchange” between security and economic-social concessions which would have allowed to maximise the leverage of the EC countries’ soft power instruments.

Also today, since the strategic weight of the European countries has not substantially changed, US participation and support continue to be necessary preconditions,


from the European point of view, to enter security negotiations with Moscow in order to avoid agreements negatively conditioned by the greater Russian military leverage. Even if, as mentioned, the EU defence integration process did make some progresses, the persistent fear of a direct negotiation with the Kremlin is manifest, due to the Russian possession of major conventional resources and deterrence tools. This unbalance relationship is in fact the main obstacle which keeps preventing the Osce institutionalisation of the security dialogue which, in the long run, would risk to overlap and weaken the role of NATO in Europe.

A clear signal of these fears was the clumsy response of the European governments to the 2008 Dmitry Medvedev’s proposal of relaunching the building of a new pan-European security architecture by resuming the project of an OSCE direct role. Actually, the proposal of the newly elected Russian President was little innovative compared to the past and proved that Moscow does continue to consider the continental security as a form of “crystallisation” of the European status quo, without taking into account the will of the common neighbourhood countries to make their own political and economic choices. The Russian side also continues to demand NATO and US exclusion from any possible negotiation. Although there has been no official response on the part of the European countries, Medvedev’s initiatives managed to revived a debate in the EU from which very distant opinions have emerged, especially between those who agree with recovering of the “spirit of the Paris Charter” and with turning the OSCE into an instrument of exclusive Euro-Russian dialogue flanking the EU-NATO cooperation, and those who prefer to look at OSCE as a future “Euro-Atlantic Council” including both Russia and the US.

In any case, reasons for rejecting the Kremlin’s proposals are not lacking, starting from the fact that, as in the ‘50s, Moscow still prefers to address bilaterally the smaller European governments on these issues rather than open a direct dialogue with the EU institutions, although it is impossible to deny that the member countries have not yet attributed to the EU the necessary jurisdiction in this field. A further obstacle to the resumption of dialogue is the hard security concept which is at the basis of the Russian security projects. In Moscow opinion, in fact, a true security can only derive from the observation of two key principles of territorial integrity and the prohibition of the use and of the threat of the use of force. This traditional Russian interpretation of international security is today very distant from the European one which, on the opposite, mainly refers to security as a measure of the domestic stability of any single state and implies the right of the international community to inspect - what for Russia is tantamount to interfere - the behaviour held by governments within their own borders. From this concept of security derives the right to observe and verify, for example, other governments’ respect of both human rights and the rule of law as well as their ability to guarantee adequate social and political reforms.

Finally, to complicate matters, there was the bad timing of the Russian war initiatives and the blatant contradictions of Medvedev’s proposals with the onset of the Georgian crisis in the same 2008. In fact, the Russian military intervention, justified
by the right to protect the self-determination of Russian citizens outside the Russian border, was perceived as an open violation of Georgia's territorial integrity. In this way, the Kremlin demonstrated that, when its interests were at stake, it was ready to promptly trample on those same principles it was proposing as the basis of the new “European security architecture”. Equally negative was the European reaction to the parallel presentation to the Western media, again by Medvedev, of the so-called “five guidelines” of the Russian foreign policy, among which stood out Moscow’s right to protect Russian citizens living abroad, along with the “special treatment” she was entitled to reserve to her “areas of special interest”.

4. The Limits of the Western Governance

Not by chance, since the mid-'90s the EU demonstrated a predilection for an opposite process of “de-structuring” and “de-institutionalisation” of its relations with Russia, by setting them at the same level of relations with other major powers of the Asia-Pacific area and therefore denying the existence of a privileged dialogue. Since 1994, the Communication from the European Commission to the Council entitled “Towards a new strategy for Asia” showed signs of a desire to “distance” Russia from a pan-European perspective as well as to abandon the search for a closer and more structured form of cooperation. In 2001, the new Communication from the Commission “Europe and Asia: a strategic framework for an enhanced partnership” reaffirmed this approach, together with the implementation of the diplomatic instrument of the Asem summits. The Asem summits, in fact, started to operate in 1996 and involved over the years a growing number of Asian countries, including Russia, in a wide dialogue mainly focused on socio-economic cooperation and limited other issues of common interest.

Dangers underlying this progressive de-structuring of the Euro-Russian relations, together with their increasing vagueness, are today intensified by the concurrent weaknesses of the universal security system, of which regional relations should be part. In fact, during the ‘90s, collective security system reforming and strengthening processes were obstructed by an emerging Western ambition to exert a unilateral governance which should replace the UN role. Key factor of this evolution has been the progressive assertion of NATO as the manager of not only the European but of the whole international security, pursued by a continuous widening of its rights to military intervene out-of-area in order to protect its members’ interests as well as to act outside any Un mandate in order to assure the respect of international law and security.

At moments, during the ‘90s, it seemed possible that a security system based on a Western governance made root, by including Russia in its composition and therefore becoming a sort of new edition of a “concert of great powers”. In this direction seemed

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36 Medvedev’s interview with Television Channel Euronews is available at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/48303.
37 The first Asem summit took place in Bangkok in 1996 on proposal of Singapore and France and, from then on, the ASEM summits kept to gather every two years.
to go both the G7 enlargement to G8, in 1998, and the creation of the Partnership for Peace, in 1994, which NATO opened to Russia and to its former European allies. Nonetheless, the NATO “partnership policy” of the ‘90s did not take into the right account the weight of emerging states such as China and India, and it was completely frustrated, in 1999, by the starting process of direct annexation on the part of NATO of the former USSR satellites. Nato Eastern enlargement, followed by the start of the EU Eastern enlargement, negatively conditioned the Russian perception of both the Partnership’s goals and the minority role Moscow was asked to play in it, thus putting an end to any talk.

NATO enlargement to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary took place in open contradiction with the public commitments made by the Bush Administration at the end of the Cold War, namely the assurance that none of the superpowers would have taken unilateral advantages from the dissolution of the blocs. The Clinton Administration did not seem to consider itself really bound by its predecessors’ commitments and, since the end of the ‘90s, its relations with Moscow became openly confrontational.

After the inauguration of the G. W. Bush administration, in 2001, NATO cannot be said to have toned down its approach to Russia, further worsened, on the contrary, by the plans to install a new anti-missile system in Poland and an interceptor system in the Czech Republic. Moreover, the prospect of a NATO follow-up enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia, manifested at 2008 Bucharest summit, was the final blow to the precarious relationship established between East and West after the dissolution of the USSR and lit the Crimean fuse. With the 2008 Bucharest Declaration, in fact, NATO initiated talks with Albania and Croatia about their membership into the organisation, reaffirmed its commitment in the Balkans and Afghanistan, and, at point 23, anticipated the further membership of Ukraine and Georgia: “NATO welcomed the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia to acquire NATO membership. The North Atlantic Council pointed out that the two countries will become members of NATO”. NATO enlargement plans involved this time two former Soviet Republics directly bordering with the Russian Federation, both in control or disputing territories considered as legitimately Russian by Moscow. A hypothetical NATO enlargement

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to Ukraine, especially, could have provoked not only the Russian loss of the strategic naval base of Sevastopol in favour of a country with a clearly pro-European orientation and linked to the Eu by association agreements, but in favour of NATO itself⁴³.

### 5. Conclusion

The picture of Euro-Russian security relations is currently all but cheerful. Nonetheless, it seems possible to conclude this analysis with some optimistic comments, based on the experiences of both Cold War as well as more recent difficulties between Brussels and Moscow. It is indeed possible to hypothesise the existence of a sort of “natural” limit to the escalation of confrontation between the two, mainly due to their economic complementarity which continues to nourish a prevailing interest in cooperating, especially in the energy field. The strong interdependence that traditionally connects Russia and Europe, or at least a great part of the European countries, seems enough to guarantee a certain degree of security, although this *modus vivendi* has not been “institutionalised” or made the object of any binding agreement. It is difficult to expect from the EU members, at present, something more than a spontaneous instinct of self-preservation as well as of preservation of their vital interests, given the persistent differences among them on the better approach to Russia and the consequent lack of common positions.

Traditional European mistrust about the real Russian purposes is in fact still alive and the long-standing problems of the European security system remain unsolved. To date, the situation has not substantially changed, although a limited progress has been identified in some of the Kremlin’s most recent foreign policy reforms, such as the upgrades introduced into the 2013 “New Foreign Policy Concept”, which included a partial evolution of the Russian interpretation of international security⁴⁴. Though continuing to depict security mainly in terms of territorial integrity, the 2013 “new concept” for the first time made open reference to other factors that Moscow considers significant in order to guarantee its security, such as the internal economic growth, the technological modernisation and innovation capabilities, the improvement of citizens’ quality life as well as of the quality of democratic institutions, the respect of human rights and individual freedoms. According to some analyses, these changes can be read as a Russian desire, or at least as the desire of a part of the Russian leadership, to elaborate a security concept more suitable for the dialogue with the European countries as well as closer to their ideas. These adjustments in the Russian foreign policy have also been explained by some scholars as a possible effort to abandon a policy solely focused on hard power instruments, in order to exploit the growing Russian soft power tools and better respond to the Western moves. This course, however, does not appear to be

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⁴⁴ Text of the 2013 document “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation” is available at [http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptlCkB6BZ29/content/id/122186](http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptlCkB6BZ29/content/id/122186).
confirmed at all, nor does it seems to be uniformly accepted by the Russian political élites, thus keeping unpredictable the future of the Euro-Russian dialogue.

In conclusion, it is possible to affirm that the main difficulty which is today hindering the progress of the Euro-Russian security relations is the same that has prevented since the end of the Second World War the stabilisation of the continental security framework, namely the lack of a strong strategic actor in Western Europe and the imbalance between the involved military powers. The Russian military superiority, affirmed since when the USSR evolved into a strategic superpower, is still exerted by Russia despite the dissolution of both its military block and the Union of the Soviet Republics. Nonetheless, the only way to overcome this historical dilemma seems to be, today as before, a radical change in the military dimension of at least one of the involved actors. This perspective, at present, is only conceivable with a relaunching of the EU political and strategic integration and with the EU evolution into an equal interlocutor with respect to the Kremlin.

In order to face the difficulties of the European regional cooperation, it is therefore first of all necessary to focus on the EU internal problems and, only secondly, on the problems of communication and comprehension with Moscow. The strong complementarity between Russia resources and those of many European countries - for instance their geographical extension and population density, the energy availability and consumption rates, the technological development and the need for economic diversification - favours a natural interdependence and a return to a cooperative security framework. Anyway, we cannot demand from Moscow the willingness to equally dialogue with Brussels on security and strategic grounds since the European governments first show not desire to provide the common institutions with the necessary jurisdiction in the foreign and defence policy.
“Russophobia” in Official Russian Political Discourse

Neil Robinson

1. Introduction

Until relatively recently the term “Russophobia” was used infrequently in official Russian discourse and in discussions of Russian domestic and foreign policy generally. There were, of course, many claims that Russia was misunderstood and that policy towards it was wrong. Such claims were made both by Russians about other Russians and non-Russian commentators and analysts, and by non-Russians about each other and about Russians. These claims only rarely escalated into a charge of Russophobia, however.

This reticence to lay a charge of Russophobia has ended in recent years. Over the last five or so years there has been a rapid growth in charges of Russophobia and the term has become a fixture of political debate. This article looks the development of Russophobia’s use at the apex Russian official political discourse, at how the term is used by senior Russian politicians and spokespeople. It is not the intent to judge the validity of charges of Russophobia. Before 2012 the term was used sparingly and, largely, to criticise ethnic discrimination against Russians in other post-Soviet states. It was also used by second-tier officials, that is not by Putin or other senior officials. This partial usage of Russophobia was because there was no wider ideational frame for the charge of Russophobia to work within. As a result, in official political discourse at least, the accusation of Russophobia was either not differentiated from general critiques of Russian politics and policy, or was a specific and geographically focussed accusation of ethnic bias. This changed somewhat after 2012 and the adoption by Putin of a conservative-traditional discourse based on a broader understanding of “Russianness”. This enabled the charge of Russophobia to be levelled at a wider range of regime opponents but at the same time did not identify the Russian political system and Putin’s regime with ethnic Russians alone so that some of the potential dangers of using an accusation that has nationalist overtones were weakened. This change goes someway to explaining the wider social and media usage of Russophobia, and the wider usage of the term by regime politicians, but at the apex of the Russian polity the term has still been used relatively sparingly. It has been used more than previously, but it is still used in a focussed fashion, as a critique of Ukraine, as a means of explaining why Russia’s policy toward Ukraine has not been accepted in the West, and as an explanation for what is seen as mistaken hostility to Russia in the USA and its allies.
2. Russophobia and Official Discourse, 2000-2012

Russophobia can be defined as an excessive animus against the Russian state and its actions, and/or ethnic Russians, that constitutes part of the belief system of critics of Russia. Russophobia’s roots have been described as laying in what Lieven (2000) calls a historicist approach to Russian politics. This historicist approach views Russian sins as a consequence of essential historical and political-cultural patterns that Russia cannot escape. Tsygankov (2009: 14-15) argues that Russophobia is based on three “myths” about Russia, namely that Russia is intrinsically anti-Western and expansionist; it is autocratic and inimical to liberal rights; and that Russia is driven to oppress other national groups, particularly those that share its geo-political space. These myths and the way that they inform the historicist approach to Russia lead Russophobes to find historical equivalences in Russian policy and politics that lead to distorted, and one-sided, critiques of Russia. For example, it is asserted that there is an equivalence between, say, the deportation of the Chechens under Stalin and human rights abuses during the first and second Chechen wars under Yeltsin and Putin. Such critiques are decontextualised historically and ethically. Differences between historical events are not explored so that contemporary Russian behaviour and political personalities are equated to historical figures and events – Putin = Stalin – and Russia’s policies and policy preferences are thus dismissed as abnormal and abhorrent. Ultimately, the purpose of this is to undermine the nation’s political reputation and force Russia “into submitting to the United States in the execution of its grand plans to control the world’s most precious resources and geostrategic sites” (Tsygankov 2009: xiii, xiv).

Most of the literature on Russophobia, like the work cited above, focusses on attitudes towards Russia amongst foreign policy makers and intellectuals. Some of the critiques of Russophile attitudes that are identified in this literature are no doubt valid, as is the charge of double standards that the anti-Russophobe literature often makes about the West (“we kill people because they are bad; Russians kill people because Russians are bad”). However, the charge of Russophobia was used sparingly. The texts by Lieven and Tsygankov, cited above, were, until recently, the only ones that levelled the charge against critics of Russian foreign policy that did not come from some extremist element of the Russian nationalist/communist community. Russophobia was something that had been common in the nineteenth or early twentieth centuries (Gleeson 1950; McNally 1958), and had occasionally endured under special circumstances into the middle of the twentieth century, but had since faded away (Luostarinen 1989). This is not surprising given that generally, and for most analysts, Russophobia was supplanted after 1917 by “Sovietophobia”, which was seen as a rational fear based on intellectual disagreement with Marxism-Leninism rather than an irrational phobia. Where Russophobia was discussed as a modern phenomenon it was – Lieven and Tsygankov excepted – seen as in decline (Taras 2014), or it was a concept that used at the fringes of Russian political debates (Epstein 1994; Brun-Zejmis 1996). When used at the fringes of political debate the
charge of Russophobia was as likely to be levelled against the Russian government, and Putin, as it was levelled against the West. Indeed, the West and Russia’s regime were often seen as acting in tandem to diminish and destroy Russia and Russians. For example, in October 2011 Vladimir Nikitin (2011), a member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation’s (CPRF) Presidium argued to the CPRF Duma faction that the “world government” aimed to exterminate Russians as a “superfluous people” in the same way that Native Americans had once been decimated. The Russian government was, he argued, complicit in this since

guided by the West the Russian powers-that-be are obediently realizing [a Western] anti-Russian plan for the moral and physical destruction of the Russian nation, for the sophisticated humiliation of the Russian people both in Russia and beyond.

Whilst there was some reference to the term in state controlled media, Russophobia did not get used much by Russian officials (Feklyunina 2012: 98). Official complaints about the West tended to be framed in terms of “bias” rather than “phobia”. Bias was a result of factors such as a lack of understanding of Russia’s position and politics due to ignorance, poor information or the malign influence of anti-Russian information from Russia’s enemies that had taken people in and duped them (Feklyunina 2012). It was also a product of what Sergei Lavrov (2007) called “the inertia of bloc-based attitudes” that the West had still to overcome in the post-Cold War world. Bias, as Lavrov went on to explain, could be overcome if “[b]oth sides (…) display a broad-minded and unbiased vision”, something that should be possible if Russia and the USA recognised that they were “two branches of the European civilization, each contributing its own share of value added. We could meet at the ‘common table’ on the basis of the European view of the world”.

The preference for explaining Western criticisms of Russia as a product of correctable bias rather than phobic hatred of Russia meant that accusations of Russophobia were relatively rare, and when made from “below” were sometimes dismissed. For example, in 2006 the failure of Aleksei Mordashov’s Severstal to take over Arcelor (a European steel firm), was condemned by Viktor B. Khristenko, the minister of energy and industry as an instance of Western double-dealing and blamed in the Russian media on Severstal’s rivals exploiting “the ‘Russian threat’ myth” (Timmons and Kramer 2006). Not long after this Putin was asked about Russophobia in the West in an interview with a French TV channel. Like Lavrov, Putin (2006) blamed inertia in thinking, rather than Russophobia, for problems in Russian relations with the rest of the world, but saw this inertia as a diminishing problem:

not everyone in the West has understood that the Soviet Union has disappeared from the political map of the world and that a new country has emerged (…) some still base their positions on an outdated view of the world, but I think that the situation is changing quite fast (…) sooner or later everything will fall into place in any event, because life itself will show just how fundamentally Russia has changed and how its role in the modern world is changing.
On this occasion, and on others around this time where charges of Russophobia were made, Putin ignored the term completely. Occasionally there was some overlap between a charge of Russophobia and “the inertia of bloc-based attitudes”, as when the Russian ambassador to the USA, Yuri Ushakov, linked Russophobia to “Cold War sentiments still nurtured by some members of the US political establishment”, when criticising remarks made by the late Senator John McCain at the time of the Yukos affair (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MFA 2003). Even here, however, the expectation was that these Russophobic sentiments were hangovers from the past that were out of sync with positive developments in Russia’s relations with the USA so that the charge was again as much one of bias as hatred. Similar sentiments were expressed about Russophobia in other countries (for example Sweden, see MFA 2008a).

Not surprisingly, therefore, instances of official usage of the term Russophobia were very rare. Figure 1 shows the number of times that a charge of Russophobia is recorded in the online archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 2000 and mid-September 2018. A charge of Russophobia was made more than once in only a few years prior to 2014, and in four years no charge of Russophobia was made at all. Where the charge of Russophobia was made it was generally very specifically. The most frequent charges of Russophobia were made against the Baltic states. These charges fell into two categories: over Baltic state elite attitudes towards the Russian state; and over attitudes towards ethnic Russians living in the Baltic states.

An example of the former, from March 2000, is an MFA (2000) press release commenting on an interview in a Latvian newspaper Estonian foreign minister Toomas Ilves. The MFA’s charge against Ilves was that he had used a Russophobic historicist frame of the type identified by Lieven and Tsygankov, equating Russia and
the USSR and falsely claiming that Russia was a threat to Latvian and Estonian territorial sovereignty. Similar arguments were made later in the decade following the 2008 war with Georgia. Charges of Russophobia that followed the war argued that criticisms of Russia were made from historicist positions that treated the war as an equivalent of tsarist-Soviet aggression rather than as an unique event that had specific causes and for which Georgia was to blame. For example, in an interview Aleksandr Yakovenko, then a deputy minister in the MFA (and now ambassador to the United Kingdom and levelling other kinds of accusations of Russophobia), argued that not just “noted Russophobes” but a “significant part of the Council of Europe’s parliamentarians” could not accept that Russia was a different state to previous iterations of the country, and that its actions, unlike actions taken in the past were in accord with international law and agreed international obligations. Consequently, criticisms of Russia were not fully objective. Even where there was recognition of Georgian malfeasance, as in the resolution that Yakovenko was criticising, there was inertial thinking and bias, which in this case meant that there was alignment between Russophobic thinking and other criticisms of Russia (MFA 2008b).

Examples of charges of Russophobia about attitudes towards ethnic Russians living in the Baltic states can be found in other MFA press releases condemning lack of action in the Baltics against groups and publications promoting Russophobic racial intolerance towards Russians (MFA 2001a, 2002, 2004, 2007), or double standards over treatment of Russian nationalists and “home-grown” Baltic “fascists” (2001b). Unlike the other charges of Russophobia discussed above, these accusations of Russophobia had ethnic connotations, i.e., the charge is that there is a specific animus against Russians as an ethnic group. However, there is no association in these texts of the Russian state with ethnic Russians. To be prejudiced against ethnic Russians was a separate and distinct problem from attitudes to the Russian state, the issue in the historicist examples of Russophobia. Of course, it would probably be right to infer that people who were (are) prejudiced against Russians as an ethnic group also have an animus against the Russian state. However, this inference was not drawn in official communiques; when people were Russophobic they were offensive to all the peoples of Russia, the rossiiskie, rather than to ethnic Russians (the russkie). This is clearly a very different use of the term Russophobic to that of people like Nikitin, where (at best) ethnic differences within Russia are subsumed into an all encapsulating “Russianness” that erases the line between ethnic and non-ethnic Russians so that they are all threatened as an ethnic group.

The character of accusations of Russophobia in official discourse during the first years of Putin’s rule and the period of the Putin-Medvedev “tandem” was therefore somewhat mild. Moreover, accusations of Russophobia were generally made by second rank officials rather than by the top political leadership. There was only a weak, and very focussed association of Russophobia with hostility to Russians as a people, something that was in marked contrast to accusations of Russophobia that were made by political actors outside the regime. It might be that the relative mildness of official
uses of Russophobia was partly because of a desire to separate official critiques of foreign actors distinct from those of non-regime actors. Hence Russophobia was often associated with bias, rather than prejudice. Where it was associated with prejudice the accusation of Russophobia was focussed, i.e., it was concerned with actions and attitudes towards relatively small groups of ethnic Russians living in the Baltic states. This specificity of accusations of prejudice rather than bias is, perhaps, telling. If Russophobia is a prejudice against an ethnic group levelling the charge runs the risk of associating a political actor with that ethnic group. This would have conceded political ground to oppositional political forces, both “systemic”, like the CPRF, and “non-systemic”, like fringe Russian nationalist groups. This might have emboldened them and, moreover, it would have been contrary to the idea that Putin was a unifying figure, the antithesis of the types of factional politics that had led to chaos under Yeltsin, as was argued by ‘ideologists’ of the Putin system like Vladislav Surkov (2007). There was, as yet, no discursive frame in official political discourse that defined “Russianness” in a way that would allow Russophobia to be used as a general charge without problems like these presenting themselves. Such a frame only developed after the 2012 presidential election.

3. Official Discourse and Russophobia after 2012

Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012 was based on what Richard Sakwa (2013) has called a “cultural turn”, a move toward a increased use of culture as a tool for rallying support to the regime. The “cultural turn” saw distinctions drawn between regime opponents and supporters along cultural lines. Supporters were increasingly defined as being true to a Russian traditions and organic ideas about community, opponents were described as betraying (at worst) or undervaluing (at best) these ideas and traditions (Robinson 2017).

The ideational foundation of this cultural turn created the basis for a wider usage of Russophobia. It did this because of the way that it conceived the Russian state as a civilizational entity. Russia, Putin (2013a) argued, is a “state-civilization”. By this he means that there is a close alignment between Russia’s ability to exist as a state and as a civilization; each depends on the other; without the state there would be no civilization, and without the civilization, there would be no state. The strength of a state is a function of how strong its civilizational identity is. This identity is a resource, one that needs to be protected so that the state can survive, and one that the state has to protect so that it can survive. The character of this civilization is essentially a religious one, but it is not determined by one religious denomination and hence is not dominated by one ethno-confessional group. Although the main source of Russian civilization is Christian Russian orthodoxy, something that Russia shares with Belarus and Ukraine, Russia’s “state-civilization” is not underpinned by Orthodoxy alone. Russia’s “state-civilization” is formed because Orthodoxy and the other religions that are present inside the territory of Russia are joined by a common concern for
the preservation of traditional moral values (religiosity, family, heterosexuality etc.). This enables Russia to exist as a multi-faith society and a multi-ethnic society. The dominant values are Orthodox and Russian, but the other faiths fit with Orthodoxy and coexist with it to support the state. There is no room or need for them to propose state missions of their own in the form of separatist projects, because their core moral concerns are already addressed in the larger Russian Orthodox faith. As a result, they are, according to Putin’s logic, subsumed in the greater Russian “state-civilization” and have not (and cannot and should not) develop state-bearing cultures of their own.

The task of the Russian state, according to Putin, is to protect Russia as a “state-civilization”. This, Putin argued, has never been more necessary than at the present. Other “state-civilizations” are giving up and debasing the traditional values that they once had. This is because of globalization, on the one hand, particularly cultural globalization, and because of their abandonment of traditional values. The key danger is the latter. Putin acknowledged that there has always been competition between states, of which globalization is just the latest form. However, globalization is different to previous types of competition because it is not just military or economic, it is also ideational. Population movements and the attempts to deal with them have given rise to multiculturalism. This multiculturalism is not based on any organic intellectual foundations like the mixture of religions that underpin Russia’s “state-civilization”. It is instead founded on abstract principles, like the idea of “tolerance” which, Putin argued, are “neutered and barren”. As a result, Putin (2013b) argued in his address to the Federal Assembly in 2013:

Today, many nations are revising their moral values and ethical norms, eroding ethnic traditions and differences between peoples and cultures. Society is now required not only to recognise everyone’s right to the freedom of consciousness, political views and privacy, but also to accept without question the equality of good and evil, strange as it seems, concepts that are opposite in meaning. This destruction of traditional values from above not only leads to negative consequences for society, but is also essentially anti-democratic, since it is carried out on the basis of abstract, speculative ideas, contrary to the will of the majority, which does not accept the changes occurring or the proposed revision of values.

This quote is telling in several different ways. First, Putin is not rejecting “democracy”, but claiming to be its truest representative, articulating a truly populist position that is more in tune with societal aspirations than anything that can be uncovered through an electoral system, especially where elections, such as to parliaments, are designed to secure representation of sectional interests, i.e., fractions of the people that destroy representation of the majority (Robinson and Milne 2017). Putin is putting himself above such elections as President and representative of the majority, which of course and according to him, is opposed to the erosion of traditional values. In this way Putin sets his version of democracy against the forms of democracy that are most common in Europe. Not surprisingly Putin also argues that the erosion of traditional values
is especially advanced in Europe, which thereby stands in stark contrast to Russia. Second, Putin is arguing that Russia is preserving ethnic differences by adhering to traditional values that are shared by the different religious and ethnic groups within the Russian Federation. A civilizational basis of “Russianness” is therefore a guarantee of ethnic particularities preservation rather than a threat to any ethnic group. Threats to ethnic groups comes from “false” universalisms (like liberalism and multiculturalism), rather than the organic universalism created by an alignment of religiously inspired traditions.

For Putin (2013c), Russian “state-civilization” as a conglomeration of ethnic and religious traditions is a form of immunity that keeps at bay revolutionary and reformist ideas that have negative results. Such ideas “are always some kinds of bacillus that destroy this social or public organism”. When “immunity decreases (…) millions already believe that things cannot get any worse, let’s change something at any price, we shall destroy everything there, ‘we shall build our new world, and he who was nothing will become everything’. In fact, it did not happen as one wished it to be”. Change meant that the “loss of the state self-identity both during the Russian Empire’s collapse and during the Soviet Union’s breakup was disastrous and destructive”. The chief culprit in this was the elite, in particular the intelligentsia, which was keen to “emphasise their civility, their level of education; people always want to be guided by the best examples”. The result was copying from abroad, which was tantamount to opposing Russia as a collective, multi-ethnic state civilization (Putin 2013c). Equally dangerous and perverse is the threat of “mono-ethnicism”, which for Putin is any attempt to put the interests of ethnic Russians above those of the broad set of inter-religious traditional values that join different ethnicities and religionists in the Russian “state-civilization”. Putting one nationality above another, Putin argued, “was the formula used by those who paved the way to the collapse of the Soviet Union”, and stands in contrast to the longer-standing cultural values of Russia that have been reaffirmed over the centuries. Promoting “Russia first” simply opens up the floodgates to competing claims to sovereignty as it did when the USSR collapsed, and is anyway a Western idea too since it is based on “the notorious concept of self-determination, a slogan used by all kinds of politicians who have fought for power and geopolitical dividends, from Vladimir Lenin to Woodrow Wilson” (Putin 2012). Although many nationalists and liberals would see themselves as poles apart in Russian politics, they are, Putin argued, essentially the same. They both work from abstractions and as a result the differences between them “cancel each other out insofar as they are used to express something identical underlying them all”, namely their opposition to the true values of Russia’s “state-civilization”.

Russia, Putin argues, was lucky to survive previous attempts at change through revolution and reform. The dangers to Russia from reform are, however, greater than ever before. In the past, competition between cultures was not as intense as it is now and it did not so clearly involve the transfer of “ways of life” from one place to another. The signs of this for Putin (2012b, 2013a) are many: “global development is becoming increasingly
contradictory and dynamic”; the very idea of “soft power” implies a matrix of tools and methods to reach foreign policy goals by exerting information and other levers of influence” that uses “illegal instruments” to manipulate the public and to conduct direct interference in the domestic policy of sovereign countries”. The cultural ties that bind Russian people are, for Putin (2013a), weaker than they have been before as Russian’s tolerance of “corruption, brazen greed, manifestations of extremism and offensive behaviour” shows. Traditional values can no longer be relied on to renew themselves as they have in the past, because they are not a finite resource in the current global order. This Putin has argued on several occasions, is the lesson that has been learnt over the course of Russia’s post-communist history and as Russia has dealt with competition from abroad: “we eventually came to the conclusion that there are no inexhaustible resources and we must always maintain them. The most important resource for Russia’s strength and future is our historical memory” (Putin 2013d). The fact that the “Russian people are state-builders, as evidenced by the existence of Russia” remains true, but the “cultural code” that has historically underpinned state building “has been attacked ever more often over the past few years; hostile forces have been trying to break it, and yet, it has survived. It needs to be supported, strengthened and protected” (Putin 2012a).

This view of Russia and “Russianness” that Putin put forward opened up the possibility of putting charges of Russophobia to greater use. It avoided the issue of conceding ground to nationalists on both the left and right by conceptualising “Russianness” as an inclusive entity, rather than as an ethnic one. Being Russian was no longer either an ethnic category or a legal one based on fulfilment of citizenship criteria, as the traditional distinction made between russkii and rossiiskii had it. To be Russian was to be a part of a community of values that were opposed to the values of others, particularly the value of the (falsely) universalising Western “Other” with its globalist project and their colour revolutionary outcomes. This view of Russia had much in common with one of the foundational texts about Russophobia, Igor Shafarevich’s ([1991] 2005) Rusnofobiya. Shafarevich ([1991] 2005: 14), like Putin, argued that “Western democracy” is presented as a “universal solution to all social problems” and, therefore, “the only solution to our problems”. However, it was not “natural”, it was just another form of messianic ideology, like Marxism that was being exported to Russia. The attractiveness of Western democracy, for its proponents was, according to Shafarevich ([1991] 2005: 12), the fact that it was not Russian; it is “an alien experience that does not grow organically from Russian history (…) it is not infected with the poisons that impregnate (…) all of our past”. However, since democracy was not natural, in Europe let alone in Russia, it could only be developed through “a painful and bloody cataclysm: it is obvious that some sort of violence is required to overthrow the natural historical process”. Could Russia, Shafarevich ([1991] 2005: 14), asked and Putin echoed, “risk such a cataclysm (…)? Is it possible for it to survive?” For Shafarevich, and for Putin, the only possible solution to Russia’s problems was for it to be true to the history of the mass of its people, rather than to accept the dismissive view of Russian history propagated by elites, both foreign and Russian (for Putin’s approach to history see Edele, 2017).
The overlap between some of Putin’s ideas and those of thinkers like Shafarevich points to the ways in which the articulation of the new ideational framework about “Russianness” by Putin around 2012 implicitly identified elements of oppositional and foreign critiques of Russian policy and politics as Russophobic. Putin, without actually using the term Russophobia, laid out the intellectual ground from which accusations of Russophobia could be made; anything that was not “organically” Russian, that was an attack on the sovereignty of the Russian state, anything that was not “traditional” could be Russophobic since it was opposed to the essence of “Russianness”. Not surprisingly, and largely in response to this and then to events in Ukraine, accusations of Russophobia multiplied and it became a mainstay of what some label Russian “state propaganda” (Darczewska and Żochowski 2015). There has been much greater usage of the term by Russian politicians (see the examples cited in Whitmore, 2017). As we have seen from Figure 1 above, the use of the term by MFA officials rose from 2014 onwards. So too did its use in the Duma, and the deputies who used it changed too. Before 2012 the term was used relatively rarely and generally by CPRF or nationalist deputies. Duma records of debates record only one example of the term’s use in 1990s (by a Liberal Democratic Party of Russia deputy). There was more reference to Russophobia in the 2000s: under Medvedev, for example, there were twelve mentions of Russophobia in the Duma, again mostly by opposition deputies. After 2012 its use grew – there were 30 mentions in 2017 alone – and the term was used by a wide range of deputies. For example, it was used by A.K. Pushkov in November 2015. Pushkov at the time was a United Russia deputy and the Chairman of the Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs. His comments fit the new discursive frame of Russianness as a civilization as he argued that “Russophobia is not only a dislike for Russians, it is the rejection of our whole country – Russia as such. (...) Russophobia (...) is turning into a systemic ideological basis for the contemporary policies of several countries of the Western alliance”.

Making accusations of Russophobia became something of a cottage industry. The annual use of the term in the Russian media rose threefold in 2014 and 2015 in comparison to usage between 2011 and 2013 (Deprez 2016). Naturally the term has gone online: there’s a #Russophobia on Twitter and it gets used on a daily basis to protest perceived anti-Russian bias in the non-Russian media and in policy. The Ministry of Culture, for example, announced a study into Russophobia in July 2016 that was to look at its effect on “national interests and national security” and its internal and global dimensions. Russia Today (2017, 2018) has run stories listing its ‘top ten Russophobes’ of the year since 2017 and 2018. Internationally there have been a spate of publications that have outlined how Russophobia has been created. These have often been published by people with links to Russian media and cultural institutions. The author of Russophobia. How Western media turns Russia into the enemy (Basulto 2015), was at the

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time of publication the US executive editor of *Russia Direct*, which was supported at the
time by *Rossiiskaya gazeta* (which is owned by the Russian government). Guy Mettan
(2017), the author of *Creating Russophobia*, has associations with Natalia and Vladimir
Yakunin’s “Endowment of St Andrew the First Called Foundation”, and Russian culture
minister Vladimir Medinsky³. Mettan’s book (originally in French) has been translated
into Russian, Italian, German, Finnish and other languages, and the Russian version
was launched at TASS. This campaign may have had some affect as some Western
conservatives have argued that there is a common cultural ground between Russia
and the West (even if they do not necessarily understand what Russia sees as that
cultural ground) that should lead to common foreign policy positions, and would if it
were not for Russophobes (see, for example, Donovan 2014). This, in turn, has helped
to make the charge of Russophobia a political trope in US politics given the furor
over possible Russian interference in US elections, links between Russia and the Trump
campaign and administration etc. (Tsygankov 2018).

A distinction needs to be drawn, however, between the large amount of
accusations of Russophobia that appeared in the Russian media, the implicit charge
of Russophobia that Putin’s “cultural turn” involved, and high level accusations of
Russophobia. The accusations of Russophobia that appeared in the Russian media and
the implicit charge of Russophobia that came with the “cultural turn” are broad and
often sweeping, such as Pushkov’s claim that Russophobia was taking on aspects of a
“systemic” ideology. However, accusations of Russophobia from Putin and from senior
ministers and spokespersons continued to be specific as in the past. Senior officials have
generally often described Russophobia as being instrumental in character, tactical if
you like, rather than as having a fundamental essence, an in-built and insurmountable
hostility to Russia, a pathology. Occasionally, the implicit accusations of Russophobia
in Putin’s championing of “traditional values” have led to specific charges of national
betrayal as when Putin (2014a and 2014b) talked of the possibility of a “fifth column”
in Russia and drew distinctions between the “nationally oriented opposition”, i.e.,
parliamentary parties, and “the so-called non-systemic opposition”, which he equated
with the type of oppositional betrayal of national interests that led to Russia’s defeat
in World War I. However, these have been relatively rare, and sometimes subsequently,
at least partially, disavowed⁴. More generally, charges of Russophobia made from the
apex of the Russian political system have shown continuity with earlier accusations
of Russophobia, discussed above, made by foreign policy officials in the period 2000-
2012.

What has changed is the focus of accusations of Russophobia, which,
unsurprisingly, moved to Ukraine, and accusations have been made more commonly
by Putin and senior ministers, like Lavrov. There is continuity, however, in that the
effect of Russophobia is still largely seen as creating misunderstanding of Russian

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³http://www.st-andrew-foundation.org/en/2016/05/12/russkij-izdana-kniga-gi-mettana-o-prichinax-
zapadnoj-rusofobii/

⁴ See Putin’s December 2014 comments that clarified his use of the term “fifth column” in *Bol’shaya press
policy, although to this has been added an equivalence between Russophobia and anti-Semitism. Putin himself has taken the lead on creating this equivalence. Two of his infrequent mentions of Russophobia have been made at events marking International Holocaust Remembrance Day and one at an event commemorating the centenary of the Armenian genocide (Putin 2015a, 2015b, 2018). This equivalence between Russophobia, anti-Semitism and other forms of extremism dovetails with the charge that the events of the EuroMaidan and after were “anti-Russian” in inspiration and character and led by extremist, chauvinist forces, neo-Nazis etc. The West, this narrative continues, took its lead from these forces when allocating responsibility for what followed the fall of the Yanukovych regime. Consequently, Western understanding of the events has been flawed, biased and one-sided. This has prevented an equitable solution to the crisis in Ukraine as Russia and pro-Russian forces, it is argued, are expected to make all of the compromises in Ukraine. The West was supporting “Russophobic sentiments” in Ukraine, as (Putin 2014c) explained to a German TV channel, and not doing enough to influence them so that a joint resolution of the conflict could be achieved. This support for, and demonstration of, Russophobia was just ignorance, the turning of “a blind eye to (...) violent Russophobia and anti-Semitism” (MFA 2014). The result was that the West had connived with the establishment of “a government of Russophobes” (Lavrov 2015a) and was “acquiescing with the revival of neo-Nazism in a very important European country” (Lavrov 2014a).

These accusations of Russophobia divided it into two parts. Some states were being fooled into anti-Russian action – they were “on the leash of Russophobes” as Lavrov put it (2014b) – whilst others, the ones holding the leash were pathologically Russophobic. These pathological Russophobes were the new NATO member states, particularly the Baltic states but also Poland and occasionally Bulgaria. The Russian argument was that they had warned the traditional NATO states that they were admitting irrational Russophobes into the alliance before enlargement, but that this warning had been neglected and Russia had been given false assurances: “NATO leaders assured us that as soon as they become members of NATO they would calm down, they have not (...) they have started to do everything to call the tune in this organisation” (Lavrov 2014c, also 2016a). Russophobia was, therefore, at least in part a virus that had spread and could be gotten rid of: time will heal all those who are now “sick”, and our relations will resume their normal course. However, to do so it is imperative to do away with Russophobic paranoia and stop trying to exploit instincts that harken back to the era of McCarthyism or the Cold War in order to achieve political goals in the United States (Lavrov 2016b also 2015b). Russophobia is therefore serious, but at the same time is dismissed as a folly. Russophobia in the USA in particular, is dismissed as “a trend from the past” (Zakharova 2015), or seen as something deployed instrumentally as “just business (...) a good way to make some good money. The fact that Washington plans to increase its already significant defence budget is a clear and obvious proof of this” (Zakharova 2016). Alternatively, it is instrumental as a by-product of political competition – “primarily a result of the escalating political infighting” (Putin 2017) – that had little to do with Russia and could pass a result.
4. Conclusion

Putin’s adoption of a more aggressive form of cultural conservatism enabled the adoption of Russophobia by a broader segment of Russian political society, but it did so indirectly. We are accustomed to Western politicians being accused of “dog whistling”, where they articulate some position into which potential supporters can read their own prejudices. In many ways the expanded use of the charge of Russophobia looks like a Russian example of politicians responding to a dog whistle. Putin set out a framework in which Russia and the West were described as diverging: Russia kept to an organic route of development whilst the West went further off into a world of its own in which elite values have diverged from popular ones. Since Russia and the West possess such different values, and because the West’s are artificial but given an inflated “superior” status by the wealthy and powerful states that articulate them, they had to be opposed to Russia, to be anti-Russian and condescending. This opened up the floodgates for the condemnations of the Russophobia that we have seen over the last few years in the Russian media. However, as we have pointed out, the usage of Russophobia in top level official discourse has been more muted, has only identified Russophobia as pathological in a few countries. Except in these few states, Russophobia is a bias that they have taken on from the pathological and they can overcome this bias if they communicate with Russia. In this way the regime has kept possible channels of communication open, sought to divide Western forces into “good” and “bad” camps, whilst at the same time rallying domestic political forces to the flag and occupying a part of a section of the opposition camp’s rhetorical space.

This strategy may be a risky one. The distinctions that it rests on are subtle. They may not be appreciated by either domestic constituencies who are persuaded of Western hostility to Russia, or by Western audiences, elite or otherwise, who get messages about Russophobia from the Russian media as well as from Putin, Lavrov et al. In the first case, it may prove difficult to put the Russophobia weapon back in its case when it is no longer needed, or persuade Russians that the Russophobe threat is over if at some point Putin wants to compromise over Ukraine or some other foreign policy issue. In the second case, the broader message of Russophobia that is received in the West helps develop the idea that foreign policy differences with Russia are existential. This feeds the idea of a “new Cold War” as more than a cooling of relations but as an ideational divide that cannot be bridged. Ironically, accusations of Russophobia as they are made beyond the subtle discourse of Putin and Lavrov might in the end be the Russophobes best weapon by becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy that drowns out the subtleties of official discourse.
References


The Fears of Jean Monnet and of Wolfgang Schäuble

Daniela Preda

1. The Fears in the Era of Bipolarism: Jean Monnet

In Monnet’s Memorandum of 3 May 1950, the French term peur (fear) recurs several times, and even when reference to fear is not explicit, its essential characteristics are often present.

Above all, there is the fear of war, of which the Cold War is, according to Monnet (Bossuat, Wilkens 1999: 505-519), only a prodromal phase. His words echo the First World War, when the opposition between the two great alliances – the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente – had rigidified the European system of states to the point solutions could no longer be sought for the problems at hand. Monnet’s fear, which lay behind his revolutionary proposals, is thus that the Cold War could lead again to the same dynamics in Europe of a harsh conflict between two opposing blocs, which would be even more dangerous due to the absence, in the world system of states, of what Ludwig Dehio called the “marginal spaces” of the system.

In the spring of 1950, Monnet clearly saw the problem: another war was approaching, of which Germany would not be the cause but the country at stake. It was necessary for Germany to stop being the stake and to become a link; France had to act and propose a link with Germany.

After the long period of peace in Europe, it was difficult to make tangible those incontrovertible signs of war that, nevertheless, had crossed the continent from 1948 to 1950. Yet, in the spring of 1948 there was a belief that a Third World War could occur. In February, the coup in Prague removed any illusion that countries could remain outside the opposing blocs. The US commander in Germany, Gen. Clay, stated in March that the war was approaching, while the Soviet general, Sokolovski, established military control regarding the relations between West German and West Berlin (the “small block” of Berlin). On 24 June, it was decided to create the “great bloc”, after ratification by the French National Assembly on 18 June of the decisions taken at the Conference of London between France, Great
Britain and the US on the recovery of West Germany and its inclusion in the life of Western Europe.

After the creation of two states on German territory – the Federal Republic of Germany on 20 September 1949, and the German Democratic Republic on 7 October 1949 – the situation would become even more dramatic with the explosion in August of that year of the Soviet atomic bomb, which put an end to the US atomic monopoly. In turn, the International Authority of the Ruhr, created on 26 April 1949, to resolve the Franco-German conflict, was viewed as discriminatory by the Germans, who were the only ones to be placed under international control, and insufficient by the French, who feared they would not be able to oppose new requests for increased production: both France and Germany began no longer to feel secure without each possessing the entire territory of that natural coal and steel basin between France and Germany, which had been artificially divided by a border.

In other words, as Monnet wrote in his Memoirs, recalling the observations in his Memorandum of 3 May 1950, Europe was at that moment faced by an impasse:

> Whichever way we turn, in the present world situation we see nothing but deadlock – whether it be the increasing acceptance of a war that is thought to be inevitable, the problem of Germany, the continuation of France’s recovery, the organization of Europe, or the place of France in Europe and the world (Monnet 1978: 289).

It was thus fundamental that the European countries, far from distancing themselves from bipolar conflicts, regained their place in the world by overcoming the sterile contrasts using the arms of the imagination. Monnet wrote: “In 1950, fear would engender paralysis, and paralysis would lead to disaster. It was vital to break the deadlock. The course of events must be altered” (Monnet 1978: 291). It was Monnet himself, moreover, who recalled as a reason for his inspiration a statement by Roosevelt: “The only thing we have to fear is fear itself” (Monnet 1978: 291).

However, the fear could be overcome by a change in perspective. If the usual response to the fear of war was the strengthening of defence, rearmament, border closings, the erection of barriers, the centralization of power, and economic nationalism, Monnet proposed instead carrying out an “immediate action on an essential point (…).This action must be radical, real, immediate, and dramatic” (Monnet 1978: 291), capable of changing the terms themselves of the problem and replacing resignation to the inevitable tragedy of war with the hope for a better future. In other words, he proposed undermining at its core the logic of the Cold War, getting Europe to extricate itself from the shoals of a typically bipolar conflict.

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1 Decisions were taken at London about convening in September an Assembly to draft a constitution for the Federal Republic of Germany, economically integrating the new state in Western Europe, creating the High Authority of the Ruhr, maintaining US military forces in Europe, and coordinating the US, British and French occupation zones in the Trizone.
With the prospect of an association with such a strong America, he wrote, the creation of a united Europe with faith in its future shows that the nations of Europe “will not yield to fear” (Monnet 1950).

In proposing this, Monnet is in line with Altiero Spinelli, who, in a speech to the First International Congress of the Union européenne des fédéralistes (UEF) at Montreux in August of 1947, stated that “creating a federation of European democracies is the only way to stop these states from becoming protectorates and instruments of an American imperialist politics” (Spinelli 1973: 97). He was also in tune with Alcide De Gasperi, who went beyond the idea of a united Europe based on the fear of the Russians: the binding force of Europe must not be the “opposition to” but the “construction of”. In March 1950, De Gasperi stated, reaffirming the concept during a discussion in the Senate in April 1952, that the sole policy of autonomy of the US is a united Europe (De Gasperi 1985: 704), which for him became an end in itself. The first priority was the need to harness the strong pacifist feelings in Italy and Europe to positive campaigns in favour of peace, thereby moving beyond simple military contrasts. Rather than emphasize the military aspects of security, the West should focus its attention on topics such as democracy and a united Europe.

Closely intertwined by then, but far removed, with the logic of the Cold War was another fear, which we can define as atavistic: the fear of Germany, which was very strong especially in France, where it manifested itself in the resistance to any agreement that would allow Germany to reacquire the two great foundations of its power: the economy – in particular, coal and steel, which were the basis for its industrial and military superiority – and the army. Midway through 1947, it was already clear to the allies that the German steel industry would on its own monopolize all the coke in the Ruhr, with grave consequences for France and Europe. In 1950, after France, in the immediate post-war period, had believed in peace and given proof of its faith in the future, Monnet wrote: “L’augmentation de la production de l’Allemagne, l’organisation de la guerre froide, ressusciteraient chez eux les sentiments de crainte du passé” (Monnet 1950). Germany had unquestioned superiority in steel production. The rapid expansion of the German economy created strong tension around 1950, which went well beyond a simple economic issue. “Déjà l’Allemagne demande d’augmenter sa production de 11 à 14 millions de tonnes. Nous refuserons, mais les Américains insisteront” (Monnet 1950). Having quickly entered into a bipolar frame of mind, the US had in fact for some time begun to seek a normalization in the German situation and the inclusion of Germany in the European and Atlantic collaborative organisms. Therefore, even with reservations, France had to give ground, and French steel production slowed down. The consequences were easy to imagine; Jean Monnet describes them incisively in his Memoirs (Monnet 1978: 253): the German economy would grow, thereby creating a

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[^4]: Monnet had sent to the Prime Minister, Georges Bidault, a previous Memorandum on 28 April 1950, which was published by Le Monde on 9 May 1970.
[^5]: When asked to cite a single case in which Italian policy was independent and different from that of the US, he indicated without hesitation its European policy. Speech by De Gasperi to the Senate, 15 February 1952 (De Gasperi 1985: 1056).
situation favourable to German dumping on the export market; French industrialists, in turn, would have sought protection, leading France down the road toward a limited and strongly protected production. All this would have slowed down the liberalization of trade in Western Europe, starting with the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), and favoured the return of the pre-war cartels. There would thus have been a return to the logic of the First World War, with the reconstruction of the divided sovereign national states and of their power.

Emblematic of this was the official communiqué in March 1950 from the French information minister, Pierre Teitgen, in response to rumours of Anglo-American initiatives for the entry of the German Federal Republic into the Atlantic Pact: “The world must be aware of the fact that France cannot remain a member of a security system that authorizes the rearmament of Germany” (Adenauer 1966).

The classic response, which France was in part already preparing and might very well implement, was to seek out security and protection, defence: first of all, plans for the break-up of the old Reich, then attempts at slowing down Germany's economic recovery and control over the economy, the internationalization of the Ruhr, and proposals of a political distancing of the Saar from Germany.

Therefore, while the US was facing the German problem mainly in the context of a containment policy against Soviet expansionism, in France the aim was to once and for all end any chance of reappearance of a policy of German aggression. According to Monnet, the German problem could not be resolved through the unification of the country due to the bipolar division, or by integrating the Federal Republic into the West, since that would mean the Germans had accepted separation, which would have led to a Soviet reaction.

In this case as well, Monnet proposed a radically new point of view, seeking a solution to the German problem by changing the facts surrounding it, “transforming” it through a Copernican revolution in the relations among the European states: from a fear of Germany, and thus the impossibility of any agreement with the country, to an acceptance of Germany so complete as to make it become the best partner for Europe’s future. Faced with the worsening in the Franco-German conflict, he began to become convinced that the only way to stop Germany from laying its hands on material bases for military power was to bring it under the control of an authority even France had agreed to submit to. This would have ensured that in future Germany would not be subject to discriminatory unilateral controls. However, Monnet went even further, and his response to the fear of Germany became at the same time a response to the fear of war and bipolarism. He proposed a special supranational (not inter-governmental) authority with limited powers in the area of coal and steel production, at the same time linking the solution to the European problem to the plan for European unification: “Cette proposition réalisera les premières assises concrètes d’une fédération européenne indispensable à la préservation de la paix” (Monnet 1950). This aim was central to the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950:
Par la mise en commun de productions de base et l’institution d’une Haute Autorité nouvelle, dont les décisions lieront la France, l’Allemagne et les pays qui y adhéreront, cette proposition réalera les premières assises concrètes d’une Fédération européenne indispensable à la préservation de la paix.

The creation of a European pool for coal and steel was thus transformed by Monnet into the first step toward the gradual formation of a European federation through the gradualist approach he favoured: Europe would not be created in one go or through its immediate construction, but realized through concrete measures capable of creating a de facto solidarity.

The Schuman Plan dealt with the post-war economic and political problems using a different approach than the one adopted in the past. It did not merely propose a bilateral or multilateral lowering of tariffs or the gradual elimination of import quotas, which would have kept intact the political divisions among the states with the obvious consequence of long-term instability. It did not simply oblige German to eliminate cartels, based on the failed logic that was as discriminatory as it was ineffective in the interwar period, proposing instead a supranational union of states and strong political control over the economy, and monopolies in particular. It proposed a method and institutions capable of guaranteeing the definite elimination of national barriers and thus even the permanent creation of a free market. In short, it proposed European unification on the basis of a new governance model that represented a historical turning point and, though following the slow timeline of history, created a de facto watershed in the history of international relations, for example, by excluding the right of secession from the Community by unilateral decision.

The bipolar logic – the need to integrate Germany into the new Europe to make sure it was not seduced by the Soviets – gave way to a multipolar one – the creation of the United Europe. Fear, which leads to division and opposition, was to be overcome through a spirit of union and sharing.

2. Europe’s post-1989 Fears: Wolfgang Schäuble

During the Cold War, European integration, though showing indisputable signs of self-determination, was destined to occur imperfectly: the reasons for union clashed with those for preserving national sovereignty, without either reason winning out over the other. Europe avoided choosing between confederation and federation, following instead a “third path” and succeeding in resolving the many crises it faced even without a solid framework of reference of states, given that U.S. leadership guaranteed Europe the essential instruments of sovereignty: security and a common defence, through NATO and the nuclear umbrella; and monetary stability, at least until 1971, through the dollar and gold exchange standard.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and consequent break-up of the Soviet Union and disappearance of bipolarism substantially modified the prospects for European unification. Sandwiched between micro nationalisms, on the one side, and global pressures on the other, Europe was aware of the need to play an international role if it did not want to become a second-rate power. However, what appeared on the new globalized world scene was a Europe that was still largely incomplete.

A question thus naturally arose: without the outside “glue” of bipolarism, which Europe would appear on the new international scene, which by then had already become multipolar? A more united Europe, even from the political point of view by strengthening the twin pillars of sovereignty (the currency and defence), or the Europe of the old national states?

The fall of the Berlin Wall thus brought back the long-standing contrast between equilibrium and hegemony, accompanied by the spectre of German hegemony spreading over the continent.

The geo-strategic consequences of Germany’s position in Europe are known, even if not enough attention is paid to them. During the era of European anarchy, Germany, forced to look both toward East and West, felt itself trapped between a rock and a hard place, undertaking as a result policies involving the strengthening of its military and hegemonic projects. With the birth of the European Community, the search for a new system of security in the bipolar world, and the return of the German Federal Republic to a situation of parity with the other states in the new context of European and Atlantic solidarity, this syndrome had for some time lessened, replaced by a conflict along the single anti-Soviet front. However, the new post-bipolar international context and the weak responses by the Community were enough to rekindle it.

This time the fear of German hegemony in Europe was not simply the subject of debate inside France but, significantly, spread to Germany as well.

In the document presented in Bonn on 1 September 1994, by the CDU/CSU Group in the German Parliament, also known as the Schäuble Document, the three drafters of the document – Wolfgang Schäuble, President of the Christian-Democratic Group in the Berlin Parliament, who would later become the Finance Minister in Angela Merkel’s government, Karl Lamers and Theo Waigel, the then German Finance Minister – evoked, in assessing the effect of the break-up of the Soviet system in Europe, the fear of a return to the unstable pre-war system that placed Germany in an uncomfortable position between East and West, the fear that once again a void would be created in the heart of Europe that would threaten its stability. The solution proposed was to quickly integrate the Central-Eastern European countries into the post-war European system, at the same time maintaining a broad understanding with Russia.

If (West) European integration does not evolve in that way, Germany could, because of security fears, be led or incited to determine for its own account, turning to traditional means, the stability of East Europe (Schäuble 1994).
According to Schäuble, this would have led to the dismantling of the Union and increasingly closer cooperation between Germany and Russia, even at the expense of Central-Eastern Europe.

The document thus expressed the hope for an urgent opening of the European Union to East European countries; but at the same time, to enable the EU to deal with the immense tasks this would entail, it asked for internal consolidation of the Union to avoid its disintegration into a wide free-trade zone incapable of satisfying Germany’s need for stability.

Starting from these premises, the objectives the Schäuble Document proposed as having priority are the institutional development of the Union and the strengthening of its capacity to act in the foreign policy and security spheres. These aims would be advanced by the drafting of a “quasi-institutional document” providing for the federalist reform of all European institutions. Moreover, the document underscores the importance of eliminating the system of unanimity by forming a “hard core” within a Europe that has a “variable geometry” and “variable speeds” (Schäuble 1994).

Therefore, even Schäuble responded to the new fears emerging in the post-bipolar era by re-launching the prospects of a united Europe. He saw as of primary importance the need for an enlargement to include the East European countries removed from Soviet influence, which would have triggered in the entire Central-Eastern area bordering on the EU a virtuous process of stabilization and democratization, indispensable for maintaining peace on the continent. However, this enlargement had to be accompanied by a strengthening of EU institutions through the reform of community institutions and the re-launching of Europe: a Parliament which became a legislative body together with a Council of Ministers, which, in turn, would take on the role of a Chamber of States; the transformation of the Commission into a European government; the elimination of the principle of unanimity; and the creation of a variable-speed Europe.

Therefore, both in the Cold War and the post-1989 eras, the European Union, though in different political and historical contexts, represented the prerequisite for overcoming fear and an alternative and vital path for ending the political stalemate, opposing nationalisms, international anarchy, and the spectrum of war.
References


1. Introduction

At the beginning of the 1980s, the atmosphere of détente which had characterized the “long 1970s” seemed to be definitively vanished: the events of 1979, from NATO’s dual track decision to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, had contributed to the return of a climate of tensions and confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, which contrasted sharply with the rhetoric of dialogue typical of the Nixon-Breznev era.

Soviet interventionism in the Third world, from Southern Africa via the Horn to the Middle East, along the so called Bzrezinki’s “arc of crisis” alarmed the Carter administration, thus contributing to the return of the “fear of Russia”. The President considered USSR foreign policy particularly aggressive and adopted a series of countermeasures, as the suspensions of the SALT II ratification, a new doctrine for the Persian Gulf, the reduction of grain exports to the Soviet Union and the boycott of the Olympic games of 1980, which clearly demonstrated that for Washington the dialogue with Moscow had come to a halt (Westad 2007: 288-230; Zanchetta 2013: 271-293).

The deterioration of the East-West climate reached its climax in 1983, when the SDI announcement by president Ronald Reagan in March, the South Korean Air Lines airplane incident in September and Soviet intelligence’s miscalculation about a NATO exercise named Able Archer 83 dramatically increased the fear of a war (Jones 2016: 25-39).

On the other side of the Atlantic, the European countries looked at these tensions with great apprehension: loyal to the principle of a “global and indivisible détente”, which repeated in their declarations, they were not eager to follow the US confrontation policy with the Soviet Union.

The aim of this article is to investigate the European efforts to keep détente alive during the 1980s, focussing in particular on European relations with the Soviet Union (Bange 2008: 230-240). The European policy will be analysed from the particular perspective of European Political Cooperation (EPC), the mechanism of coordination of the European Community (EC) member states foreign policies, a forerunner of the CommonForeign and Security Policy (CFSR) established by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.
The article is divided in two parts: after a short description of the EPC’s functioning and of its main achievements during the 1970s, the first part will deal with the European interest in revitalizing détente in the first half of the 1980s, analyzing two case studies strictly intertwined: the economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, following the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981 and the thorny issue of the Siberian pipeline.

The second part of the article will deal with the issue of the relationships between the EC and Soviet Union after the Single European Act (SEA) signature in 1986. Although the Single European Act was not originally designed to deal with foreign policy issues, as its main goal was to complete the Single market, it represented a significant step forward also for the development of a European foreign policy. For the first time it included the scope of a common foreign policy, linking EC procedures in a single legal instrument to the EPC (Nuttall 2000: 16). It introduced the issue of “consistency”, or, in other words, the increasing recourse made by EPC to EC instruments (and vice-versa) as sanctions, or the use of conditionality in economic assistance, in order to further its policies. In particular the article will investigate how the completion of the Single market and the revival of European integration in the second half of the 1980s affected the EC’s policy towards the USSR, wondering if the dialogue established between the European countries and the USSR through the EPC’s framework represented an ultimate effort to keep détente alive (Bange 2008: 230-244).

2. The European Attempt to Speak with a Single Voice during the 1970s

The EPC, set up by the Davignon Report of 1970, was an informal arrangement by which the EC members coordinated their foreign policies, in the attempt to give a political dimension to the European Community, which aimed to play a role in the international system. The Report did not establish a real political union, instead it created a network of meetings, contacts and relationships at all levels from the Foreign Ministers, through the Political directors right down to working desk level in the Foreign Ministries of the member countries. The EPC machinery worked alongside the EC, but was completely outside the Community framework, it was purely intergovernmental and cooperation was limited to foreign policy issues, with the exclusion of defense and security matters (Nuttal 1992, Gainar 2012).

The most impressive result achieved in the EPC’s framework during the 1970’s was represented by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). During the negotiations, which ended at Helsinki in August 1975, the EC member countries, which coordinated their works in the EPC framework, were able to speak with one voice and played an important role in the so-called “third basket” which guaranteed civil rights and political liberties, thus contributing decisively to the success of the Conference. As is well described by the literature on this topic, the Helsinki process increased relations and developed contacts between the two halves of Europe, thus contributing to the emergence of various dissident groups, which took advantage of
the new environment, as the movement Charta 77 in Czechoslovakia, or the Moscow Helsinki Group (Thomas 2001; Andréani 2005; Romano 2009).

In other cases, as for example the Euro-Arab dialogue, which grew out in the aftermath of the oil shock of 1973, or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, or the seizing of US hostages in Iran in 1979, the European countries were not so able to speak with one voice.

For example, in the case of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which took place on 26 December 1979, the Nine did not react promptly, due to the fact that the Presidency was passing from Ireland to Italy at the end of the year. The Foreign ministers issued a declaration condemning the Soviet invasion, only on 10 January 1980, two weeks after the beginning of military operations, on the eve of a meeting of the Asia working group and did not reach an agreement on sanctions against Moscow, which the Carter administration asked its allies to adopt to condemn the military intervention.

The reasons for this slow reaction depended only partially on the Christmas holidays and the turnover of the EPC’s Presidency, they were mainly due to the European attempt to preserve, as much as possible, a policy of détente. The Nine showed little inclination to give up the accomplishments of détente for the sake of a confrontation with Moscow, as suggested by the Carter administration. They interpreted Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan less dramatically than the United States and considered the American reaction as thoroughly excessive (Loth 2014: 98).

Finally they decided to follow a policy of openness but firmness: openness towards a dialogue with the Soviet Union, but firmness in not making concessions to Moscow.

A Coreu dated 11 February 1980 clearly explained the European attitude towards the Afghanistan crisis:

*Détente remains a fundamental goal for the Nine and they do not wish to compromise its achievements to date. The search for stability in Europe and cooperation among all European states must continue, but the process must benefit both sides and there shall be no presents for the Soviet Union. If the process of détente should falter, it will be because it has been gravely prejudiced by the actions of the Soviet Union*.


In the first half of the 1980s, the European attempt to keep détente alive became particularly evident with regard to the economic sanctions taken against the Soviet Union, following the imposition of the martial law in Poland on December 1981 against the Solidarity movement.

Poland and the issue of sanctions against Jaruzelski’s regime became one of the most thorny and debated issues in the EPC framework, which provided a forum where some member states exerted pressure on the others in order to take a common position, more favourable to dialogue with Poland and the Soviet Union.

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The FRG, in particular, was one of the main supporter of a policy of détente. By the mid 1970’s, alongside the deterioration of US-Soviet relations, the Schmidt-Genscher government had increased its efforts to extend a web of economic relations with the countries of the Soviet bloc (Bange, 2008: 230-240). West Germany expanded its economic cooperation with Poland, the Soviet Union and from 1978, the GDR and, following the imposition of martial law in Poland, it resisted the pressure for new sanctions against Poland and the Soviet Union made by the Reagan administration (Loth 2012: 89-109).

The Chancellor Helmut Schmidt conceived the economic dimension of Ostpolitik as a means of “diplomatic cathedral building” and preventive diplomacy, aiming to involve the Soviet Union in a network of trade, industry and technology agreements, in the attempt to cope with the hazards of foreign affairs and the arms race (Kieninger 2018: 188-189).

So, when in January 1982 the EC Foreign ministers issued a declaration, which expressed the Ten’s willingness to envisage economic sanctions against the Soviet Union (considered the accomplice of Jaruzelski) due to the opposition of the German Foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, the Nine refused to extend these measures to Poland. Subsequently, in March 1982, the European Council adopted a regulation imposing some watered-down restrictions on imports from the Soviet Union³. By reducing imports of items as caviar, pearls, alarm clocks and pianos, while deciding to not restrict truly significant commodities such as natural gas, oil, raw materials and automobiles, the countries of the EC demonstrated that they did not want to punish the Soviet Union for its role in crushing the Solidarity movement and that they wanted to distinguish themselves from the United States (Domber 2008: 97).

From this moment on, the EC countries pursued a common strategy towards Poland, using a mixture of political dialogue and economic leverage, with the aim to preserve détente as long as possible (Smith 1999: 38-42; Tavani 2014: 52).

In this context convergence between EPC and EC instruments took place, and the EC recourse to financial tools as sanctions, or the use of conditionality in economic assistance in order to reinforce the policies adopted in the EPC framework became if not the rule, at least more frequent and familiar, thus representing an important precedent for the introduction of the principle of “consistency” in the EPC’s mechanism (Guasconi 2018: 190).

The European response to the imposition of martial law in Poland caused serious strains with the United States, which considered the measures adopted by the Europeans too weak and ineffective and started to exert strong pressures in order to convince their allies to take firmer steps in commercial measures against the USSR.

The quarrel over economic sanctions against the Soviet Union overlapped with an other dispute, which animated the European debate at the beginning of the

³ Historical Archives of the EU (ASUE), Florence, Emile Noël Papers (EN), Folder 1111, Relations Est-Ouest, 23-02-1982.
1980’s representing an other example of the European effort to keep détente alive: the Siberian natural gas pipeline. This project had the goal to connect Urengoy, in the Yamal peninsula of Western Siberia, to Western Europe and was aimed at building one of the longest pipelines in the world, with a length of 5000 km (Kieninger 2018: 83-148).

The oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 for the Europeans had increased the importance of the Siberian natural gas, considered stable and more convenient than the Middle East’s oil. Over a decade, from 1970 to 1980, Soviet gas exports to Western Europe had risen sharply, from 1 billion cubic meters per year, to approximately 24-30 billion cubic meters per year and the Urengoy pipeline would enable the USSR to export further 40 bcm (Kieninger, 2018: 110). The Soviet Union had huge gas fields in Siberia, but did not have the necessary technology available to extract and transport it, a technology which Moscow could acquire from the Western European countries. The agreement consisted of a gas for pipes deal: the Western companies in 1981 signed long-term contracts with the USSR for the delivery of gas in exchange for steel pipes and other gas-transportation equipment⁴.

From July 1981 the Reagan administration, seriously concerned that this involvement and the long-term contracts for the supply of natural gas would make the Europeans too dependent on the Soviet Union for energy supplies and that the hard currency earned would strengthen the Soviet economy, started to impose a series of sanctions and an embargo on all the technological exportations of American companies towards the Soviet Union (Kieninger 2018: 83-148)².

One year later, on 18 June 1982, the United States extended the sanctions to equipment produced by subsidiaries of US companies abroad, as well as equipment produced abroad under licenses issued by US companies⁶.

The Europeans, even Margaret Thatcher, contested the extraterritoriality of these measures, fearing an outbreak of an economic war with Moscow⁷: they opposed the American embargo against the Soviet Union, considering the US request to extend the sanctions to equipment produced by subsidiaries, unilateral, extraterritorial and retroactive and issued a note, protesting against US policy, because those miscalculated economic pressures could lead to a “dangerous worsening” of East-West relations⁸.

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⁴ The agreement involved several European companies for delivering the turbines: in Italy Nuovo Pignone and Italsider; in Great Britain John Brown; in FRG AEG and Mannesmann/Demag and in France Creusot-Loire, Alsthom Atlantique and Dresser-France. West Germany’s Mannesmann and AEG took orders for approximately 4,5 billions of Deutsche marcs; the French companies Creusot-Loire Alsthom Atlantique and Dresser-France for 4,9 billions of French francs, the Italian Nuovo Pignone for 900 millions of dollars. See: Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères (AMAE), La Courneuve, Paris, Cotes 1930 Inva 1981-1985, Box 5674, Gazoduc d’Ourengoi, Tel. 31153 de Paris à Diplomatie, 27-07-1982; Note de synthese de F. Mouton, 30-08-1982.


It’s impossible to describe in detail the debate which developed among the European countries, also because the EC’s members decided to treat the issue of the Siberian pipeline as a matter of trade policy, therefore a Community one which did not involve EPC. The question was discussed informally at a Political Directors’ dinner when it was feared that some members states were planning bilateral contacts with the United States (S. Nuttal 1992: 193-194). At the Brussels Council of 28-29 June 1982 the ten heads of State and Government issued a declaration in which they protested against the US attempt to provoke an economic war with the USSR, which stated:

The European Council emphasized its view that the maintenance of the open world trade system will be seriously jeopardised by unilateral and retroactive decisions on international trade, attempts to exercise extraterritorial legal powers and measures which prevent the fulfilment of existing trade contracts. The European Council expressed its concern at these recent developments which could have adverse consequences for their relations with the United States.

In the end the commercial and economic war that the United States had provoked against the Soviet Union had become a transatlantic dispute: none of the European countries involved did rally to American requests and proceeded with the manufacture of turbine rotors.

In September 1982, the new secretary of State George Shultz proposed a conciliatory démarche to the British Foreign minister, Francis Pym and the other European countries gradually decided to support a negotiation with the United States in order to find an agreement on the Siberian pipeline.

Finally, on November 1982, president Reagan lifted the embargo and in January 1984 the Urengoy pipeline was finished.

4. The Single European Act and the Relations with the Soviet Union in the Second Half of the 1980s

If the question of economic sanctions against the Soviet Union following the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981 and the thorny issue of the Siberian pipeline represented two case studies which clearly demonstrated the European willingness to keep détente alive, in spite of the new Cold War climate, the election of Mikhail Gorbachev as general secretary of the Communist party of the Soviet Union in March 1985 did not prove a dramatic turning point for East-West relations. Few Europeans recognized in him the seeds of transformation.

As well documented by the literature on this subject, Margaret Thatcher was the first European leader to assess Gorbachev, as she met him in December 1984, before he became general secretary during a visit in Great Britain, and received a very positive

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9 The European Council Brussels, 28-29 June 1982, in https://www.aei.pitt.edu
impression from the meeting. “I like Mr. Gorbachev – she famously remarked – We can do business together” (Sheehan 2009: 46-48, Braithwaite 2010).

Thatcher’s positive feeling was particularly important, both for her close relationship with Reagan and because it paved the way to an evolution of British-Soviet relations during the second half of the 1980s, typified by a continuous dialogue between London and Moscow and by the progressive widening of the agenda of the meetings\textsuperscript{11}.

French President François Mitterrand also welcomed Gorbachev as a partner. In October 1985 the Soviet General Secretary chose Paris for his first official visit to Western Europe and when Mitterrand visited Moscow in 1986 they seemed to agree on a range of issues, including the renewal of détente.

Conversely, the German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, in spite of West German efforts to keep détente alive, was initially very skeptical about Gorbachev. This was due to the fact that Gorbachev’s policy towards West Germany beard striking similarities to Soviet West-policy in the 1960’s and the soviet elite still regarded the FRG as a potential threat to European stability, blaming it for its support for the US security policy.

From his own side, Kohl invited such criticism, expressing doubts on the sincerity of Gorbachev’s advances. Lacking proof that Gorbachev was different from his predecessors, Kohl adhered to former perceptions and policies towards the Soviet Union. Moreover, in an embarrassing interview to \textit{Newsweek} magazine in 1986, he compared Gorbachev to Joseph Goebbels, Hitler’s propaganda minister, thus seriously damaging this already fragile relationship (M. Gehler 2013: 241, H.D. Genscher 1998: 196-200, D. Shumaker 1995, 41-47).

Although in the following public discussion Kohl defined the interview a “monumental nonsense”, trying to explain that he never wanted to offend Gorbachev, that he did not even mean to compare him with Goebbels, and that his conversation with \textit{Newsweek} had not been reported correctly, this diplomatic incident effectively froze Soviet-German relations.

At the beginning of 1987, Gorbachev started a systematic reevaluation of his foreign policy, which also involved Soviet relations with West Germany: the CPSU secretary embarked on a new path, beginning to evaluate Chancellor Kohl more favourably and sending clear signals of this change, as shown by the highly successful visit of the FRG president in July 1987, thus making the summit with Kohl possible in October 1988, when the “ice was finally broken” (M. Gehler 2013: 242)\textsuperscript{12}.

As regards Italy, since the visit of Bettino Craxi to Moscow in May 1985, the Italian government started a fruitful dialogue with Gorbachev, which contributed to increase


\textsuperscript{12} It is worth stressing that the German Foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher distinguished himself, as he maintained an outspoken support for better relations with Gorbachev and the Soviet Union.
the economic and commercial flow between the two countries, as shown by the large amount of economic and financial investments made by important Italian companies in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev, whose views had been particularly influenced by his travels in Europe, when he was Central Committee secretary for agriculture, had been particularly impressed by the Italian communists and by their Euro-communist ideas (Adomeit 2016: 395).

In October 1988 the Italian Trade Agency (ICE) organized an exhibition in Moscow, called *Italia 2000*, with the aim to demonstrate the contribution that the Italian companies could give to improving the Soviet economy.

Less certain and documented is how important Europe and the EC seemed to Gorbachev. When the Italian Prime minister Bettino Craxi visited Moscow in May 1985, he was told by Gorbachev, in a luncheon speech, that “inasmuch the EEC countries act as a political entity, the Soviet authorities are ready to look together with them for a common language, including on specific international questions.” This concept was repeated by the Soviet leader few months later, during his visit to Paris.

Gorbachev’s remarks raised a debate among the European Foreign ministers, developed mainly inside the EPC framework, on how interpret such démarche. The USSR, in fact, had started to change its traditional negative attitude towards the EC since the beginning of the 1970’s, when Breznev, in a public speech in 1972, had talked about the necessity to recognize the Community “as an independent economic entity within the capitalist world” (Romano 2014: 33). In spite of the Soviet efforts to seek the establishment of official relations between the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA-COMECON) and the EEC, the EC countries preferred to sign commercial and trade agreements with the single Eastern European countries.

During his first two years in office Gorbachev continued to meet his Western European partners, but he developed “a tactical and opportunistic approach” to European questions, concentrating his attention on Soviet-American relations (Rey 2004: 33-65). According to Svetlana Savranskaya: “The effort to split NATO was always at the heart of Soviet strategy during the Cold War years and early Gorbachev-era Politburo discussions show that the reformers did not shy away from the same thinking” (Savranskaya 2010: 19).

So, in 1985 and 1986, Gorbachev viewed his relations with European leaders mainly in terms of their usefulness in dealing with the United States and hoped that he could use the European channel to force the US to give up the SDI project, regarding which most West European leaders had been reluctant (Kalic 2009: 98-123).

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13 Istituto Luigi Sturzo (ILS), Rome, Giulio Andreotti Papers (GA), Series USSR, Box 709, Note by the Italian Foreign Ministry for the visit paid by Giulio Andreotti to Moscow on 28/30-05-1985; a huge number of Italian companies made investments in the Soviet Union in this period; just to mention the most important: FIAT, Finsider, Finmeccanica, Fincantieri, Montedison, Olivetti, Pirelli and of course ENI.

14 In 1984 Gorbachev had visited Italy to participate in the funeral celebrations of the Italian communist leader Enrico Berlinguer and he acknowledged that the visit made a “deep and lasting impression on us”.

15 ILS, Rome, GA, Series USSR, Box 710, Tel. 5589 from Moscow to Rome, 15-10-1988, urgentissimo riservato.

16 ILS, Rome, GA, Series Europe, Box, 368, Note from the Italian Foreign Ministry for the EPC Meeting in Luxembourg, June 1985.
In spite of Gorbachev’s remarks at his meetings with Craxi in May and with Mitterrand in October 1985, the Soviet strategy towards Europe remained rather tactical in nature, designed to induce the United States to negotiate on arms reduction.

As a consequence, the Ten’s reactions were extremely prudent. They believed that the “Gorbachev style” and tone were new, but that the substance of Soviet foreign policy had not changed.

This attitude would start to change in 1987, when Gorbachev became increasingly interested in European affairs and, regretting Soviet lack of knowledge about the European Community, emphasized the need to study the organization, its functioning and decision-making process. During Margaret Thatcher’s visit to Moscow, commenting a report written by the deputy minister for Foreign Affairs Anatoly Kovalev, the CPSU secretary said in front of the Politburo: “Europe is our business. There our interests are enormous […] You have to understand that Western Europe is our essential partner” (Rey 2008: 28).

In 1988 Gorbachev established the Institute for Europe, within the USSR Academy of Sciences, under Vitali Zhurkin’s direction, a specialist on US and arms control matters. This institute provided the Central Committee with detailed analysis on current developments in Western Europe and on East and West Germany (Adomeit 2016: 367).

During a conversation with the Italian Foreign minister Giulio Andreotti, on 27 February 1987, Gorbachev described the change in Soviet attitude towards Europe:

As in spring small streams flow together, so, also for peace, it’s necessary to take small steps. Nowadays we miss definitive steps, but something is moving. East-West dialogue has resumed. In the last years, Europe has given its contribution. It would be a mistake to reduce Europe’s weight only to economy. We had made such a mistake.17

Which were the reasons for such a change of Soviet attitude towards Europe and European integration?

Scholars have usually stressed the role played by perestroika, by Gorbachev’s contacts with West European leaders, by his travels in Western Europe, as well as by the reassessment that the socialist bloc was more a burden than a strategic asset for Moscow. However, the role played by the relaunching of European integration process in the second half of the 1980s and in particular by the implementation of the Single Act has been underestimated, and generally told as a separate story (Evangelista 1999; English 2000; Savranskaya 2010: 18-19). My point of view is that instead they were strictly connected: a reinforced, prosperous, democratic European Community as a consequence of the implementation of the single market in 1992 and the Soviet fear to remain excluded, encouraged Gorbachev to imagine an extended system of

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17 ILS, GA, Series USSR, Box 365, Meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Giulio Andreotti, Moscow 27 February 1987, 11.00 a.m.-13.00 a.m.
relationship between the two halves of Europe. He would call this system “a European common home” in which a reformed Soviet Union could find its place and security (Malcom 1989, Savranskaya 2010: 350, 595).

The Single European Act, in fact, triggered the EC’s resurgence and spurred on a revival of the European integration process after years of stagnation and decline. By eliminating all non-tariff barriers and establishing the free movement of goods, labour, capital and services within 1992, the Community established a European single market of over 325 million people, thus rescuing the European countries economies from the doldrums of the 1970s.

What is interesting in the Cold War context was that member countries not only pressed forwards with creating a large, competitive economic market that the Soviet bloc could not emulate, but they also developed a policy on social justice that gave fair treatment to individuals and workers. It guaranteed basic rights such as those contained in the Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of 1989.

On the other side of the Cold War curtain, instead of being an integrated community, Eastern European countries were heavily in debt, inefficient in their use of resources, unable to compete in world markets and a burden on Soviet Union, which supplied them with oil and raw materials (Young 2012: 302).

From 1988, Gorbachev focused on the concept of a European common home, as a way to overcome the Cold War by working together on a gradual rapprochement between the two halves of Europe (Piccardo 2015: 13-33). The EPC became the main framework where the Twelve Foreign ministers debated the project of a European Common Home and tried to develop a common European foreign policy.

In his famous speech delivered in Strasbourg at the Council of Europe on July 6, 1989, the secretary of the CPSU explained that the European common home combined four elements: collective security based on the doctrine of restraint rather than deterrence, full economic integration, environmental protection and respect for human rights in every country. This idea, based on the assumption of the gradual dissolution of the two military-political blocs of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, was quite persistent among Gorbachev’s advisers and supporters and had the goal of strengthening the CSCE structures as the main framework of European security (Savranskaya 2010: 21-22).

So my point is that the revival of the EC after the implementation of the Single European Act, the fear to remain excluded from the forteresse Europe but also the EPC’s mechanism influenced Gorbachev’s concept of a European Common Home.

The EPC’s working group on Eastern Europe was appointed to produce a report on the Soviet concept of a European Common home, issued in March 1989, which stressed the connection existing between the implementation of the Single European Act and Gorbachev’s fear of remaining excluded:

Le leader soviétique a transmis ses craintes à ses interlocuteurs européens plus récents: le chancelier allemand Kohl, le président Mitterrand et le premier ministre italien De Mita, en exprimant son inquiétude à l’égard d’une perspective d’une Europe fermée, et le besoin urgent de coopérer avec la CEE afin de pouvoir parvenir à la modernisation et au démarrage économique qui sont indispensables pour son projet politique. Tout récemment l’URSS a déclaré qu’elle reconnaissait maintenant que la Communauté ne se replie pas sur elle-même et ne devient pas une “forteresse” face aux autres.\(^\text{18}\)

In the EPC framework, the twelve governments debated at length on how to react to such a change in the USSR’s policy towards the West, as some European governments were slow in picking up the signals that Gorbachev was sending out. There was a clear difference of attitude between those governments, led by Germany, Italy, Belgium and Spain who wanted to interpret these signs in a positive and encouraging way and aimed at establishing a political dialogue with Moscow and those, led by the UK and France, who remained cautious, and preferred to maintain a policy of “wait and see”.\(^\text{19}\)

In April 1987 the German government issued a report on Gorbachev’s policy, which almost prophetically stated:

The path embarked by the new Soviet leadership does not afford an absolute guarantee of the Soviet Union possibly moving in the direction of Western-style democracy and pluralism, but it is the essential prerequisite of such movement. There are some signs that Gorbachev’s policy offers the Soviet Union an opportunity, perhaps the last, for achieving peaceful and gradual change. It cannot be in the West’s interest for Gorbachev to fail, unless the West prefers the developments in the Soviet Union to come to a head.\(^\text{20}\)

Although the first group of countries interpreted the common European home more as a general framework, than a real political program, they were convinced that it contained a perspective that could be used to speed up the Helsinki process, in a

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direction which could be useful to Europe and to the EC’s goals in Eastern Europe. For these reasons they exerted strong pressure on the other EC members in order to begin a political dialogue with Moscow, to be conducted through the EPC framework.

Documents show that most European skepticism dissipated in 1988, as a consequence of the improvement of US-USSR relations, of the release of Soviet political dissidents from custody and of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Agreement (INF) signed between the USA and USSR in December 1987.

From a diplomatic point of view, the rapprochement between Western Europe and the Soviet Union took place in June 1988, when a first “Common Declaration” between the EC and the CMEA was signed, thus paving the way for a series of agreements on trade and economic cooperation between the Community and the CMEA’s members.

At the European Foreign ministers meeting in Ioannina (Greece) in October 1988, the Belgian Foreign minister, Leo Tindemans, stressed the need to exploit the unique opportunity offered by history and the German Foreign minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, expressed the hope to encourage the progressive rapprochement between East and West, assessing that the EC would act as a “magnet” able to hold the remnants of the Soviet empire together.

At the Rhodes European Council, which took place two months later in December 1988, the twelve European countries seemed to have harmonized their foreign policy. They issued a declaration, stating that “1992 Europe will be a partner, not a fortress” and reaffirmed their will to develop “a political dialogue with our Eastern neighbors”, taking into account each country’s specific situation.

Such a political dialogue started with Moscow in January 1989 and was characterized by a series of political meetings organized at different levels, involving political directors, ambassadors and Foreign ministers, with the aim to promote the Helsinki process, to encourage the respect of human rights in the Soviet Union and to develop economic, scientific and technological cooperation.

5. Conclusions

The end of the Cold War took Gorbachev and the Western European political leaders by surprise, preventing Soviet politicians from substantiating their project of a European common home, which remained more a metaphor, than a real political program. The trade agreement between the USSR and the EC was signed too late,

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in December 1989, when all the Eastern European regimes had collapsed, one after the other, the CMEA was agonizing and the Kremlin was ready to accept German reunification.

The EPC mechanism, with its prudent exercise of collective reflection and lengthy discussions could not be the right framework to face the revolutionary events of 1989 and “to speak with one voice” faced with the collapse of the Soviet bloc.

However, the 1989 revolutions rooted into the European efforts to keep détente alive at the beginning of the 1980’s and were profoundly influenced by the way in which European Political Cooperation and the Community worked together.

If the different interpretations given by the European governments to Gorbachev's foreign policy delayed development of a common EC policy towards the Soviet Union, this article has highlighted how the EPC became the framework where the European governments discussed issues of great importance, such as the concept of global and indivisible détente, or how to interpret Gorbachev's foreign policy and his project of a European common home, trying to harmonize their foreign policies.

Since 1988, as demonstrated by the Declaration of the European Council of Rhodes, thanks to the action of some European politicians such as the Belgian Leo Tindemans and the German Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the Twelve gave birth to a real Ostpolitik, which combined the prudent exercise of developing a political dialogue with the Soviet Union, with the conclusion of a series of commercial agreements with the countries of Eastern Europe and with the USSR too.

Co-ordination between the two sides of the Community, the political and the economic, worked well and provided the necessary stimulus for making a reality of the consistency provisions contained in the Single European Act, which had been previously experimented in Poland.

Thanks to this strategy, the Community was able to exercise a strong attraction towards the Soviet bloc.

In conclusion, the analysis of the EPC’s evolution during the 1980’s and in particular of the changes introduced in its mechanism by the Single European Act, have thus demonstrated how the European countries coordinated their foreign policies and acted as one political actor, making the voice of Europe towards the great revolutions which took place in Eastern Europe, distinctly felt.
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Through Military Force if Necessary:
US Notes on ‘Fears’ in Eastern Europe in the Carter Years, 1977-81

Max Guderzo

Albeit rather short and ‘uncompleted’, as one-term US presidencies may seem, Jimmy Carter’s stay at the White House from January 1977 to January 1981 prompted brave and often wise choices in numerous fields of US foreign policy. It is undeniable that many mistakes, too, were made in those crucial years that included both the last wave of détente developed in the 1970s and the beginning, from the end of 1979, of the final period of hard confrontation between Washington and Moscow, due to characterize the following half decade. However, many were also the fruitful outcomes of the decisions taken by Carter that his Republican successor, Ronald Reagan, cleverly exploited to further strengthen the position of the US in the last phases of the cold war. It is not surprising, therefore, that the academic literature published on Carter and his presidency has gradually grown to a wide range of contributions, offers relevant research on many sectors of the US interaction with the international system during his term, and provides very differently nuanced assessments of its failures and successes. As George Herring has written, for example, “Carter attained some major successes. More than was appreciated at the time, he redirected U.S. foreign policy in important and enduring ways”. However, “by the end … his achievements were lost in an administration afflicted by mismanagement, burdened with unrelenting political opposition, and simply overwhelmed by events” (Herring 2008: 831).

Against the backdrop of the innovative human rights policy adopted by the administration, on which remarkable historiographical interpretations are now available (e.g. Keys 2014: 242-277; Bradley 2016: 123-127 and part 2 passim), relations between the US and Eastern Europe certainly were an important part of the overall picture. Raymond L. Garthoff (1994a: 633-634) correctly summarized in his book on Détente and Confrontation that “the Carter administration, if not consciously seeking to undermine the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, nonetheless created the impression in the minds of the Soviet leaders that the United States would be satisfied only with a fundamental change in their system”. The human rights campaign certainly built an even stronger connection between US policy towards Eastern Europe and US-Soviet relations than in the past, as Garthoff (1984) had already highlighted in his earlier study of the area in the context of Washington-Moscow relations. However, it is still acceptable his general assessment that the policy elaborated by the new administration “did not evidence...
any great change”, even though “it stressed a criterion of differentiation, under which the United States would reward Eastern European communist countries showing either greater independence from the Soviet Union or greater internal liberalization” (Garthoff 1994a: 634).

The final result of this attitude, planned in 1977 and gradually implemented throughout the presidency, was that US policy in Eastern Europe contributed to the unraveling of détente within an overall scheme that Olav Njølstad has convincingly drawn as “the mutual lack of restraint that stemmed from the zero-sum logic of Cold War geopolitics”. In fact, as he has rightly observed, the US also “tried to improve its strategic position”, besides other initiatives, “by supporting opposition groups and governments in Eastern Europe seeking independence from Moscow” (Njølstad 2011: 154). Vladislav Zubok has clearly highlighted that this happened just while “the East European regimes’ desperate need to prop up their legitimacy pushed them inexorably toward asserting their ‘national’ character as distinct from the Soviet model” (Zubok 2011: 97; based also on Rothschild and Wingfield 2000: 73). The ‘national’ factor, combined with the economic rapid decline of the Soviet empire in Central and Eastern Europe, also contributed, as Zubok (2011: 98) correctly concludes, to the fact that leaders in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) “began looking to the West in their desperate search for investments, new technology, and consumer goods”. The Carter administration, just like Western European countries through their respective Ostpolitik models, was able to take good advantage of this situation. It is true, as Nancy Mitchell has commented, that especially in the Polish case in 1980 Washington “failed to appreciate the formidable power of the doctrine – human rights – that Carter himself had proclaimed with such passion a mere three years before” and “failed to grasp the impotence of the Kremlin” (Mitchell 2001: 86). Nonetheless, at least it warned the Soviet not to invade. So, in “the bewildering complexity of international affairs in the late 1970s”, this and other challenges faced by the administration in its last year, including revolution in Iran and the war in Afghanistan, led Carter “to adopt the muscular rhetoric of Cold War and to put into motion an exploding defense budget”, a policy that Reagan would soon fully embrace. Mitchell’s overall conclusion seems applicable to Eastern Europe, too: “The irony is that, in the Cold War during the Carter years, Americans were much stronger than they, or their president, knew” (ibid.: 88).

The growing number of published and unpublished sources available for research on the Carter administration offers space for specific minor considerations against the backdrop of the established academic literature. By focusing on the leitmotiv of ‘fear’ the present contribution aims to display and comment on a small sample of documents produced by the administration in those crucial years, when the cold war was about to end but nobody could bet on it yet. It thereby tries to understand – where various nuances of that “unpleasant often strong emotion caused by anticipation or awareness of danger” (Merriam-Webster 2019) were explicitly noted and quoted by US officers – how Washington observed and interpreted fears in Eastern Europe vis-à-
vis the Soviet threat as well as, occasionally, symmetrical Soviet fears of unfavourable developments in the area\(^2\). By highlighting single episodes and events analyzed in Washington, the article certainly does not aim to demonstrate, but only to show that the most important features and good qualities of Carter’s foreign policy emerged also in the limited field selected here. These good qualities, although not necessarily in terms of US national interest, included a remarkable mix of idealism and realism. It is true, as Betty Glad (2009: 280) has observed, that Carter “embraced a morality that did not prepare him for the dilemmas and ambiguities that any head of state must confront”. However, he and his collaborators were fully aware of the complex relation between the protection of short-term concerns and the long-term strategic construction of a pivotal role of the US as *primus inter pares*, at least formally, in a future post-cold war system. Through such awareness, they were often capable of flexibly updating the schemes of wilsionian idealism, of its rooseveltian transformation and of the post-war patterns drawn by Truman, Kennedy and Johnson. Carter’s term was a special time in the history of US foreign policy, when the White House boldly aimed to find innovative ways – and radically different methods in reaction and comparison to the style of Nixon, Ford and Kissinger – to interpret the cartesian coordinates of *ethos* and *realpolitik*. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski, called them ‘power and principle’ when he titled his memoirs, meaning ethical reference points on one side and realism, pragmatism or even cynicism on the other, as they emerge in the foreign planning and action of any major or minor power\(^3\). Gled (2009: 282) correctly highlights that “not only did Carter’s moralist approach to the world make the diplomatic task of dealing with the Soviets very difficult, it also led him into actions that could only be seen as manifestations of double standards”. This was true also in Eastern Europe when, for example, relations with Romania were at stake. However, despite specific setbacks and mistakes, the administration’s approach, based on precise moral values, and just because it was rooted in them, enabled the US to effectively reach important objectives in several parts of the globe, one of which was Eastern Europe itself.

The title of this article quotes a rather predictable comment presented in a confidential document that the US Department of State prepared in the first days of February 1979, just at the middle of the Carter presidency, bearing the title “Eastern

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\(^{2}\) The article is mainly based on records of the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, Ga. (hereafter, JCL) and on documents published in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Jimmy Carter Administration, 1977-1980*, vol. 20, *Eastern Europe*, 2015 (hereafter, F and doc. no.); cf. Sitography (hereafter, S; checked on 25 Nov. 2019), a/2. The volume includes an overall section on Eastern Europe as a whole and six chapters covering Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia, besides a section on the broadcasting policy to Eastern Europe and the USSR. The attitude of the Department of State could therefore seem here more influential than it really was, even though it goes without saying that also other branches of the administration, such as the Department of Defense, the Treasury and the intelligence community, strongly contributed to define the US perception of the situation in Eastern Europe. However, the broad variety of documentary sources included in the *FRUS* series as well as the clues, offered by the White House papers, to the key debate within the US decision-making process may partly offset this possible imbalance. See also infra the final ‘Note on sources’.

Europe, the Soviet Union and Foreign Policy Autonomy” (F 30). Only ten months later, the ominous decision of invading Afghanistan taken by the Soviet leadership would trigger a shift in the global policy of the US, both in general terms and specifically in relation with the USSR, thereby creating a ‘new’ and different Carter, proto-Reaganite in his way. The document, however, still belonged to the period of a ‘pre-Kabul’ détente-builder Carter, who was actively negotiating SALT II, the second treaty for the limitation of nuclear strategic arms, and would soon sign it side by side with Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on 18 June 1979 at the imperial Hofburg in Vienna. Concluding the first section of the paper, devoted to the “Soviet/East European Political Framework”, US officials summarized: “Soviet leaders are determined to maintain overall control in East European politics, through military force if necessary”. Moscow, therefore, as one reasonably assumed in Washington, would likely use force once again to face too adverse perspectives or circumstances in the area. However, as the paper immediately added, Soviet leaders also aimed to contain and reject Eastern European “pressures for change” by partial concessions. It was predictable that the evolution of this balanced approach might prove to be a “major factor for Europe” in the following decade (F 30: 101).

The administration, therefore, clearly noted in 1979 that a key element for the future of the old continent was to be the changing mixture of two ingredients. The first one coincided with Eastern European fears of the Soviet Union, and especially of a new military intervention, be it in Poland or elsewhere, aimed to settle accounts and restore order in the imperial periphery through the usual ‘colonial’ methods. The second ingredient, also in connection with fear, consisted of the parallel willingness and ability – more or less strong, depending on the country – in both European camps to venture steps of change. Drawn and still separated by the cold war, the two camps actually shared some objectives and were certainly lumped together by the strenuous and anguished attention to Soviet moves and possible plans.

In the two previous years Carter and his administration had manoeuvred in Eastern Europe according to a certain degree of continuity with the Republican presidents in office from 1969 to 1977, Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, as Paschalis Pechlivanis has recently confirmed in his accurate study on the US and Romania in the 1970s: “Differentiation remained the keyword and the official doctrine”. Relations with the area, therefore, had remained explicitly subordinated to the main game with Moscow both at regional level – in diplomatic terms and through the communication streams set by Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and Voice of America – and with single interlocutors in bilateral patterns. In the absence of significant relations with Tirana, seven had been the governments and capital cities of reference, or better six plus one, given the particularities of the Yugoslav situation, i.e. East Berlin, Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, Sofia and Belgrade. The diverse approach to the seven, namely,

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4 The undated paper was attached to a letter sent on 7 February by Director of Policy and Planning Anthony Lake to Ronaldo Sandenberg, Special Adviser to the Ministry of External Affairs of Brazil.


6 Pechlivanis 2019: 135; cf. 116-139, on Carter and Eastern Europe.
the differentiation policy already pursued by Nixon and Ford, was confirmed on 13 September 1977 by a Presidential Directive approved by the National Security Council, PD-NSC/21 (F 16; cf. Pechlivanis 2019: 123-128). The innovative momentum came in terms of human rights, since that key element of the Carter weltanschauung had to be introduced in Eastern Europe, too. This meant that relations with those among the seven counterparts that would hopefully prove, or had already showed, to be ready to build prudent liberalization patterns at home could and should become tighter and more cooperative. Washington, however, would keep on assessing their foreign policy moves more or less subservient to Soviet interest by force, albeit partly inspired by attempts at (or false hopes of) autonomy.

In this complex and nuanced framework, enlightened by the administration’s deliberate wish to exploit at best the results reached by the Helsinki Conference in 1975, Directive no. 21 clearly explained that the relationship with the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria had to work within limited margin for manoeuvre. Relevant initiatives involving those three governments were not at stake. Washington, therefore, would just aim to protect US interests and set bilateral relations in a formal context of growing normality. Such were the projects in 1977 and such, with obvious adjustments, would prove to be the overall record checked at the end of the presidency in January 1981. On the contrary, as planned in 1977, the new administration would invest energies till the end of 1980 in the more promising relations with Hungary, Romania, Poland and Yugoslavia. In the first case, for instance, the return of the Hungarian Royal Crown to Budapest in January 1978, an idea supported by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance that Brzezinski firstly opposed but eventually endorsed, marked an important breakthrough in bilateral relations during the four-year term. “This gesture, although ceremonial, had great historical significance for the Hungarians and removed a major obstacle to expanding the U.S.-Hungarian relationship”, wrote Brzezinski (1983: 299). A bilateral trade agreement was successfully negotiated in March and a Double Taxation Treaty was signed in February 1979. As for Yugoslavia, “a special case deserving particular attention” according to the annual report prepared by the National Security Council (NSC) Staff for Eastern European Affairs at the end of 1977 (F 18), the most urgent issue was Tito’s increasing age and therefore his succession. The Department of State was persuaded that Moscow would try to take advantage of the circumstances to restore full Soviet control over Yugoslav domestic and foreign policies. This should be pre-empted since any such course would certainly work to the disadvantage of the Western bloc. Weaknesses and alarm warnings hinting at an economic and political collapse of the Federation were already detectable. Washington would therefore aim to cope with them and pave the way to cooperative relations with the future leadership, called upon to maintain the country united, strong and as autonomous as possible despite Soviet intentions and wishes (F “Preface”: xi).

Deep attention was devoted to Romania, whose momentum towards more autonomous patterns of foreign policy the US constantly tried to encourage and strengthen. In this case, the point of peak intensity was reached during President Nicolae Ceausescu’s visit to Washington in 1978. However, within the typical dilemma
between ethics and realpolitik that the administration could not escape in Europe as elsewhere, even in those days the brutality of the regime had to be taken into due account, all the more so given the pressure coming from Congress in order to impede the renewal of Romania’s most-favoured nation trading status because of repressive domestic policies. As early as February 1977, in his first weekly national security report prepared for Carter, Brzezinski had warned: “We have a stake in Romanian independence but we also have a stake in human rights”.7 Later, in January 1978, he wrote: “In the past” the country was “given very favorable consideration; there has been some slippage in importance”. It was true that “Romania’s human rights record is in need of improvement”; however, it was “the Warsaw Pact state that has clearly demonstrated the greatest degree of independence from the Soviet Union”. Hence, the administration undoubtedly “should take advantage” of Ceausescu’s next visit, “scheduled after that of Tito”, in order “to underscore our interest in Romania”.8 Aware of the dichotomy, Peçhivanis correctly highlights that “the case of Ceausescu’s Romania … is the most representative example of the drawbacks that Carter’s policy entailed given that Romania remained Washington’s prominent partner despite its rigid and far from satisfactory human rights conditions” (2019: 135; 140-171).

As for Poland, especially until 1979, Washington aimed to encourage visits of the country’s leaders to the US and other interaction patterns, with particular emphasis on the convergence of economic interests and possible financial aid that could help Warsaw improve its debt position at international level. In June 1977, forwarding an overall intelligence report on Eastern Europe to the president, Brzezinski wrote that although a Soviet military intervention could not be ruled out since Moscow had the capability to invade and occupy Poland, it was also true that in the last twenty years, along three politico-economic crises, the USSR had always chosen to endorse minor concessions made by the Polish leadership to the people (F 9). In his weekly national security report, sent that same day, Brzezinski also highlighted that Moscow knew “better than we do” that the USSR might “face an explosion in Poland. That possibility is the more likely if repression is intensified, but perhaps less likely if tensions seem to be receding”.9 Carter decided that his first major world trip at the end of that year would include Poland, “clearly the most important country in Eastern Europe”, as he told Brzezinski (Brzezinski 1983: 297). During his meetings with the authorities he “indicated a willingness to increase American commodity credits to Poland” and throughout the visit “made a point of stressing U.S. support for Polish independence and for greater ties between Poland and the West” (ibid.: 299): “For the first time a U.S. President visited an Eastern European country without first visiting the Soviet Union, while the visit to Cardinal Wyszynski by Mrs. Carter and myself underlined our support for internal pluralism”, noted Brzezinski in his weekly report to the president10. It was

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9 On Hungary see Kádár Lynn 2000. On the perception of Soviet decline in the US cf. e.g. Hatzivassiliou 2018; for an overall view, Kemp-Welch 2011, Stöver 2013.
clear to the administration that hard-currency debts to the West continued “to be a problem for Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. These debts now amount to about $40 billion. We need to be alert to both the course of that indebtedness and its political implications. (…) For several of the countries – notably Poland – foreign borrowing has provided a vital margin in meeting consumer demands, hence has direct political implications”\textsuperscript{12}. As a result, the offer of commodity assistance was implemented in 1978 and in 1979 Carter approved a total of $500 million in assistance to the country. As Brzezinski had noted in January, Poland’s economy was “in bad shape and getting worse. Further deterioration might lead to internal upheaval which could be highly adverse to our interests in Eastern Europe. Consequently, the next six months could be critical for the survival of the Gierek regime”\textsuperscript{13}. In 1980 Commodity Credit Corporation assistance was increased to $670 million in credit guarantees, reflecting the administration’s assessment that “it was in the interest of the United States to help Poland work its economic problems out on its own” (Brzezinski 1983: 299-300). In that crucial Summer, while the situation evolved rapidly, the challenge of Solidarność to the regime posed new problems also for the US.

Two were the main US objectives towards Eastern Europe pictured in September 1977 – enhancing a certain degree of autonomy in the international arena, where this was viable, and fostering internal liberalization. In order to reach them the administration would adopt relevant initiatives towards those counterparts that looked more open and promising in either direction within the scope of an overall structured goal, namely, stimulating stability, progress and security throughout the region, with special attention to the “reconciliation between both halves of Europe”, according to the final words of the presidential directive signed by Carter (F 16: 57). This attitude was in line with some suggestions Brzezinski had already given Carter in February 1976: “The abandonment of the policy of benign neglect toward Eastern Europe is desirable, for the United States ought to be at least as interested in Eastern Europe as the Soviet Union is in Latin America” (Brzezinski 1983: 150). The outcome in September 1977 confirmed the option that the Assistant to the President had strongly supported since early discussions on the matter in April, namely, “to favor those states which were somewhat liberal internally or somewhat independent of Moscow (…) encouraging ‘polycentrism’ and pluralism in the region” (\textit{ibid.}: 296-297). Later, in January 1978, in a report for the president prepared by the NSC staff on the “first year’s performance”, Brzezinski would observe that “the most important fact in our relationship with Eastern Europe now is that they understand that we do not regard them as a closed geopolitical precinct of the Soviet Union, and that, at the same time, we will shape our policy toward them in light of the treatment of their people”. It was also encouraging that “for their part, the East Europeans show every sign of a will to expand their relationship” with Washington and that “economic imperatives as well as political interests will provide continuing incentive and leverage in this direction”\textsuperscript{14}.

\textsuperscript{11} JCL, ZBDM, box 41, WNSR no. 42 cit., 13 Jan. 1978, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Ibid.}, WNSR no. 38, 2 Dec. 1977, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{13} JCL, ZBDM, box 42, WNSR no. 85, 19 Jan. 1979, pp. 3-4.
\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Ibid.}, WNSR no. 42 cit., 13 Jan. 1978, pp. 1; 11.
Against this backdrop, in 1977 and then the following year, Washington often noticed clear signals of fear in Eastern Europe towards possible Soviet moves. Part of this concern focused on the issue of dissent, which the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) carefully analyzed in September 1978. The dilemma gripping Governments in the region was how much should be allowed: according to the report, “the toleration of any measure of dissent” would remain indeed “a risky course, both for the national leaders and for their relations with the USSR” (F 26). A typical example was Romania, whose regime was considered the most repressive of the area towards its citizens. Ceausescu and his power bloc perfectly knew they could not exaggerate if they wished to maintain a special relationship with the US – which provided them also with a major asset vis-à-vis Moscow – and especially the most-favoured-nation status. However, they were afraid that dissent at home could grow. Therefore, they chose to persecute political opponents or encourage them to emigrate (F 26). On the other side, as intelligence officers had already reported in March, just the symmetrical fear of potential dissenters with respect to the Government’s repressive attitude, combined with the efficiency of the security organs and a certain degree of passivity “of the Romanian character”, was one of the main reasons why the dissent average in the country was rather low (F 193; cf. Deletant-Ionescu 2004; Watts 2012). Still about Romania, on the eve of Ceausescu’s visit to Washington in April 1978, the Department of State detected fear in Bucharest for the possibility that public debate in Budapest on the Hungarian minority in Transylvania might trigger dangerous irredentist attempts against the Trianon border settlement between the two countries (F 196). Even more interesting, however, was the synoptic overview of Romanian and Yugoslav worries proposed by Vance in a memorandum sent to Carter on 7 April, when he noticed that both countries, in pursuing autonomous foreign policy patterns, were “intermittently gripped by alternating fears of Yalta and the Cold War, of US-Soviet collusion and US-Soviet collision” (F 198).

Different nuances, as for domestic dissent, characterized the Hungarian case. In April 1977, the US Embassy in Budapest noticed that the country had to face much lighter challenges under this respect than other Eastern European governments. János Kádár had not undertaken repressive measures against a group of 34 intellectuals who had signed a petition supporting Charter 77, the manifesto prepared by the human and civil rights movement in January, symbol of Czechoslovakian dissent. Fear, in this case, stemmed from a different root: that Carter’s human rights policy might worsen US-Soviet relations and therefore oblige Hungary to deflect from the path of cooperative relations with Washington that Budapest had cultivated with extreme care especially during the last two years elapsed since the Helsinki Act (F 139). As for Yugoslavia, on the more traditional ground of security and relations with neighbours, in September 1978 the Federal Secretary for National Defence, General Ljubičić, visited Washington to return the visit to Belgrade of Harold Brown, US Secretary of Defense, in October 1977.

15 On the regime’s repressive policies cf. e.g. Bottoni 2017.
1977. During the official talks with the top military delegation Brown reaffirmed that the US meant to strengthen cooperation ties and highlighted that Greece, a NATO member, was not afraid of a military threat from a strong Yugoslavia (F 258).

Beyond Eastern Europe, looking at Moscow, Washington noticed fears in the Soviet leadership’s attitude and behaviour that were exactly symmetrical to the ones detected above in the bloc. A document prepared by the Department of State in July 1977 showed that the Soviet were deeply worried that the influence of the US and its Western European allies might destabilize Eastern Europe (F 11). According to an NSC paper of March 1978, Moscow was certainly afraid of a “political evolution” in Eastern Europe (F 21). A meeting of the GDR Interagency Group organized on 9 January 1979 pictured a scenario in which the Soviets feared the development of a “quadrilateral entente” including the US, Europe, Japan and China, and were therefore more than ever concerned about the German threat on the Western flank. Since the GDR government, too, was paranoid about any possible “infection” from the West, advantageous developments in the country’s relations with the US and its allies were heavily hampered (F 124). Two more nuances of fear emerged in this case – fear in Moscow of China’s behaviour and fear in the GDR of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

The Soviet dilemma, in February 1979, halfway of Carter’s presidency, was clear to the State Department. Moscow knew that a “gradual appeasement” of Eastern European aspirations – in economic terms as well as with regard to domestic liberalization and stronger autonomy in foreign policy – would almost inevitably feed rather than satisfy the region’s appetites. Furthermore, given the economic and likely energetic problems that worried them, the Soviets neither wished nor could reallocate scarce resources from their own domestic necessities towards Eastern European countries, which were indeed more developed and also more in need of Western than Soviet technology. These two elements, according to the Department of State, had a major impact on relations between Moscow and Eastern Europe and consequently on Western policies. In the long run the dynamic structure of those relations offered Eastern Europe a certain degree of hope, constituted a threat for strict Soviet control and implied the possibility of “occasional eruptions” when – here came the focal point – “Eastern European hopes and Soviet fears collide” (F 30: 100-101).

The case of Poland, already in 1979, was emblematic. Given the country’s strategic position, Moscow was primarily keen to preserve stability and therefore ready to look at the Polish leadership’s moves with a certain degree of tolerance. Among the partners of the Warsaw Pact, Poland had been the first to cultivate ties with countries such as France, Britain and Italy. Edward Gierek, First Secretary of the United Worker’s Party since 1970, had sent out clear signals of continuity in that policy of cooperation with the West. His leadership had showed partial moderation towards dissidents and the Catholic Church of Poland, “greatly strengthened by the accession to the Papacy of John Paul II”. The regime was pursuing a course of economic reform even in support of

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17 An interesting perspective on these aspects is offered by the essays collected in Bren-Neuburger 2012.
private land property. Warsaw reciprocated Moscow’s threatening tolerance through faithful endorsement of Soviet foreign policy and of the Kremlin’s indications in terms of Eastern European economic integration. This was also due to a specific Polish fear that had to do with the Soviet Union and the post-war European order – that Moscow might one day change attitude on the German question to the disadvantage of Poland (F 30: 104). In this case, therefore, fear had another nuance, linked to Moscow’s role as guarantor of a specific status quo both vis-à-vis the Western bloc – namely, in the relationship between Poland and the FRG – and within the Eastern one, with regard to relations between Poland and the GDR. Just the same nuance of fear that, even more complicated by the Yugoslav borderline position between the two blocs, could be checked in Albania, afraid of her neighbour for at least three reasons – since Yugoslavia was bigger and stronger, had an Albanian minority within her borders and was ideologically stigmatized by Tirana as revisionist (F 30: 108).

The issue of dissent emerged again in September 1979 in the report on the GDR focused by the Bureau of Intelligence Office of the Department of State on the “new hard line” adopted by Erich Honecker, General Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party and Chairman of the Council of State. Dissidents in the GDR criticized the regime “for prostituting Marxist ideals”, invoked a more “humanistic socialism” and therefore moved towards the spirit and theses of Western Eurocommunism. Hence the government’s fear that these arguments might reach youth, technocrats and other key sectors of the population, filtering down to the mass level and thereby paving the way to political unrest. Honecker and his collaborators also feared that frustration among East German youth might raise street violence and conflict, as in the case of the anti-police and anti-state attitudes manifested by the Alexanderplatz riots on 7 October 1977 during a rock concert (F 133).

As for new fears triggered by the invasion of Afghanistan, at the end of January 1980 the Department of State sent Brzezinski a report focusing on relations with Eastern Europe. The document highlighted that Romania was afraid of Soviet economic pressures and Yugoslavia, whose government had bravely and heavily criticized Moscow’s move in Central Asia (just in a region, one might add, that had been of specific importance for the whole non-alignment environment since the 1950s), was eager to strengthen political and military ties with the US, for example through arms purchases, as well as political and economic relations with the European Communities. Both patterns, from Belgrade’s point of view, had to do with fear of the Soviet Union (F 36). Yugoslavia, according to the NSC, was also afraid that NATO discussions of contingency plans might stimulate Warsaw Pact pressures on Belgrade (F 276). US Ambassador Lawrence Eagleburger summarized the situation in March as follows: Tito was dying and the government, maybe for fear maybe to show Moscow that it could

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18 Doc. 36 had been produced and approved by the Interagency Group on Europe on 24 Jan. with the participation of the National Security Council, the Departments of Defense, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, the CIA, the Export-Import Bank and other governmental branches. Cf. CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, memo, “Romania: A Situation Report”, 7 Apr. 1980, S/h1. See the recent contribution offered by Zaccaria 2017. On the EEC and Eastern Europe in the 1970s cf. e.g. Romano 2014.
not “be pushed around”, or for both motivations, had decided to reinforce military cooperation with Washington on a scale unseen since the 1950s, perfectly aware that the Soviets would immediately be informed of this (F 286).

A symmetrical nuance of fear, however, could be detected also on Moscow’s side. After Tito’s death in May, between Vance’s resignation and the appointment of Edmund Muskie as new Secretary, Acting Secretary of State Warren Christopher wrote Vice President Walter Mondale, on departure to attend the funeral, that the USSR had underestimated what had proved to be a very intense world reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan. Moscow was therefore unlikely to make new moves of such scope and impact just for fear of further retaliation (F 288). In September, Brzezinski, Muskie and Brown discussed the military supply role the US might play if the Soviets increased pressure “or attempt to intervene” in Yugoslavia, but decided to postpone further specific approaches to the Yugoslavs until after the presidential election19. Some months later, in December, Eagleburger suggested that Belgrade should be reassured that, if Moscow decided to invade Poland, the US would provide early and very clear warning to the Soviets lest they be tempted, in the turmoil and fear raised by the new intervention, to guess that a post-Tito Yugoslavia might be beyond the reach of Western assistance like Warsaw (F 300) 20. Finally, in January 1981, just as Carter was leaving the White House to Ronald Reagan, the ambassador observed that two parallel debates had emerged after Tito’s death, one political and the other economic, between “reformers”, who accepted the need for change, and “conservatives”, who feared it (F 301).

An NSC document on East-West relations sent to Brzezinski in September by his Military Assistant, Gen. William Odom, highlighted that the Soviets were deeply afraid of a Western united economic front. Since Moscow and Eastern Europe however had willy-nilly to look to the West in order to relieve their economic pains, this would make room for conditioned assistance in exchange for rigorous and measurable political engagements. According to the NSC staff it was indeed “time to reduce the spheres of Soviet influence” for large were the opportunities. “We already have a policy for East Europe of encouraging its autonomy vis-à-vis the USSR”, added Odom, and “we must help Poland consolidate recent gains”. In his view, the Soviet Union, “however militarily strong it is becoming, suffers enormous centrifugal political forces. A shock could bring surprising developments within the USSR, just as we have seen occurring in Poland”. In conclusion, since “the dissolution of the Soviet Empire is not a wholly fanciful prediction for later in this century”, Washington “should sight on that strategic goal for the longer run” (F 39: 138-140).

In the GDR, in October, fear raised by events in Poland was “palpable” according to a US diplomat who had collected the opinions expressed by his contacts – lawyers, academics, intellectuals but also some workers, all endowed with political awareness

and able to faithfully reflect the mood of their professional circles and communities as well as an overall “East German popular mood”. Everybody feared that the deterioration of East-West relations triggered by the Polish issue might even lead to war. Most contacts were persuaded that Moscow would likely use military force against Warsaw. In such case, it was out of question that the GDR would find itself void of any decision-making autonomy on the front line, albeit in the shadow of the USSR, and that the Polish would resist at any price, as in 1939, thereby at the very least determining the breakdown of détente for decades and at most a general war. Fears in Moscow and East Berlin of destabilization within the bloc due to the situation in Poland would also freeze inner-German relations. The courage and audacity shown by the workers were admirable but the diplomat’s contacts were afraid that lack of self-control and realism in their movement might eventually provoke Soviet intervention (F 135)\(^21\). Another nuance of fear emerged in this case – those who had the possibility and bravery of daring in Poland what could not be dared in the GDR were admired but the impact of their audacity was at the same time deemed dangerous and worrisome. A report sent from the US Embassy in Prague in November highlighted that the overall impression of Czechoslovakia in those days was, as it had been for more than a decade after the “Spring”, of “an apathetic, disengaged population ruled by a nervous, unselfconfident regime”. The 1968 trauma still kept the government fearful of any innovation that might foster Moscow’s negative reactions. Which, according to US observers, also contributed to the stagnation of the economy (F 116). In the same weeks, in Hungary, another kind of “genuine fear” troubled the Kádár government, namely, that the Polish example might become a political alternative and therefore a dangerous challenge to the ruling party. The population seemed impressed that the Polish workers had by then “got away with it” by organizing their own unions and base of power. Both the people and the leadership still suffered from the 1956 scar and many believed that the Soviets could not tolerate the Polish new position towards Communist ideology and control. According to the US Embassy in Budapest, the longer the experiment lasted, the greater the Polish example would influence attitudes and behaviours in Hungary (F 175)\(^22\).

In October, writing an assessment of foreign policy consequences that the electoral victory of Reagan could trigger, Brzezinski had noted that in Eastern Europe “there would be great fear that the United States is again writing Eastern Europe off (the Sonnenfeldt doctrine) and this would be particularly felt in Poland”. As for the USSR, “the Soviets would have no alternative but to conclude that American-Soviet relations have become one-dimensional, focused entirely on the arms race, with SALT in effect abandoned; a Soviet move against Poland in that context would become somewhat more probable”\(^23\). Furthermore, given the Afghan precedent, one could actually fear that Moscow would sooner or later yield to the temptation of military intervention. So, on 3 December, while an alert memorandum prepared by CIA analysts detected “preparations for an imminent unscheduled joint service exercise involving Soviet, East


\(^{22}\) Cf. Borhi 2016, esp. ch. 8.

German, Polish and possibly Czechoslovak forces”\(^{24}\), Carter publicly stated that the US was “watching with growing concern the unprecedented building of Soviet forces along the Polish border” and concluded that “the attitude and future policies of the United States toward the Soviet Union would be directly and very adversely affected by any Soviet use of force in Poland”\(^{25}\).

At the same time, as noted by Pechlivanis (2017: 134), he assured Brezhnev “via a ‘hot line’ message that the United States did not intend to exploit the crisis to upset the current balance of power in Eastern Europe”. However, as Carter wrote in his diary on 8 December, “the Soviets have not denied our public statement, and Brezhnev has not answered my hot-line message. This is the first time that has occurred”\(^{26}\). Three days later, on the 11\(^{th}\), as we know from the transcripts of the Soviet Politburo meeting published by Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne (2007: 167-168, doc. 25), the Kremlin decided that a military action could be postponed while the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party, Stanisław Kania, tried to handle the situation by “taking to heart the advice” which had been “offered to him by the other alliance leaders” in a crucial Warsaw Pact leadership meeting taken in Moscow on the 5\(^{th}\)\(^{27}\). Meanwhile, as Helene Sjursen has effectively summarized in her book on the West vis-à-vis the Polish crisis, the NATO allies took “concrete steps (…) to ensure a unified response if the Soviet Union did intervene” during the meetings of the Defence Planning Committee on 10 December and of the Foreign Ministers on 11-12 December. By the end of the year, therefore, “the West had started to implement its principal measures in response to events in Poland. There was a clear effort to signal that the West was not indifferent to the situation and that Soviet interference would not be taken lightly” (Sjursen 2003: 44-45).

On 12 December Brzezinski wrote to Carter that thanks to “a seemingly reliable account of what transpired in Moscow, based on a debrief by the Polish Foreign Minister who attended”, the situation was “consistent with the position that we have adopted: that an intervention is ready but that the final decision to launch it may not have been made, and thus there is a chance that we can perhaps help to deter it”. He noted that the US attitude and statements “should help Kania and Walesa to calm the situation in Poland while the good progress made on generating Allied solidarity should give Moscow further cause to reassess the potential results of intervention”\(^{28}\).

A week later, Brzezinski could observe with some satisfaction that, according to “the same Soviet clandestine source who provided the report detailing Soviet invasion plans”, the invasion had been “postponed for the ‘indefinite future’. The principal reason for the postponement, according to the sources, was the effectiveness of the Western counter propaganda campaign”. Even though invasion forces remained “in

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26 Quoted in Carter 1995: 594; however, the entry for the same day in Carter 2010: 492 does not include these lines.
a high state of readiness” and might “move into Poland at any time”, that campaign had clearly “convinced the Kremlin the West would retaliate ‘massively’ with political and economic sanctions”²⁹. So, as Glad (2009: 240-241) has rightly concluded, the US had successfully “provided the backing that would make a military intervention potentially costly for the Soviet Union”. According to Sargent (2015: 295), the Polish crisis “sharpened Cold War tensions” but also “augured the Cold War’s resolution on the terms that Brzezinski predicted: not in a military confrontation but with the Soviet Union’s assimilation to an integrating world order … This was more or less how things turned out in the 1980s”. Therefore, Sargent comments, “Carter’s misfortune, it would appear in retrospect, was his timing; the moment for a post-Cold War foreign policy had in the late 1970s not yet arrived”.

In those weeks, the Department of State had begun to prepare a draft paper on the policy response the US should adopt in Eastern Europe in the event that Moscow opted for a military intervention in Poland. In a section devoted to Hungary the paper observed that the country, together with Romania, would likely prove to be the least enthusiastic supporter of a potential invasion of Poland. Budapest had certainly been pressured by the East Germans, the Soviets and the Czechoslovaks to take a harder and more outspoken position on the issue and formally would go along with any kind of initiative launched by the Warsaw Pact. However, as the report highlighted, the Hungarians’ heart would certainly not beat for the endeavour and they would greatly fear for the image of Hungary as a country adhering “only formalistically, where possible” to the alliance with the USSR, an image that they rightly deemed “increasing beneficial”. Indeed, as the analysts of the Department of State concluded, the US had made more progress in relations with Budapest over the last few years than with any other country in Eastern Europe (F 44)³⁰. However, notwithstanding these progress steps in relations with Hungary and some other countries in the area, the US and Western Europe, due to residual cold war constraints, were not yet in a position to provide Eastern Europe with “freedom from fear and want”, according to the ambitious task defined forty years earlier by the Atlantic Charter formula. Only Moscow had that power. The old leadership, however, was not far-sighted enough to take real advantage of Carter’s enlightened openings and to choose substantial détente rather than confrontation for the sake of the Soviet empire. Eastern Europe, therefore, as a key periphery of that empire, had to wait and tremble for some years more. Eventually, from 1985 on, Mikhail Gorbachev and his new élite of collaborators set in motion powerful liberalization processes and elicited fresh responses from the

²⁹ FRUS, 1977-1980, vol. 6, WNSR no. 161, 19 Dec. 1980, p. 921 (the words about “the Soviet clandestine source”, not declassified in the published doc., may be read in JCL, ZBDM, box 42). Cf. Pechlivanis 2019: 134. A year later, in another crucial meeting of the Soviet Politburo on 10 December 1981, three days before the declaration of martial law in Poland, the Kremlin decided that “under no circumstances” Soviet troops were “to be introduced”. Paczkowski and Byrne (2007: 446-453, doc. 81) rightly highlight that this “seemingly unequivocal stance would have shocked most observers, particularly in the United States, where the unshakable assumption was that Moscow would never allow control of Poland to slip through their grasp”.

US and its Atlantic allies. Those processes would emancipate Europe from fear in the second half of the decade and pave the way, since 1989, not only to the unification of Germany but also to a promising – alas unexploited – opportunity of political unification of the two halves of Europe itself.

The short comments proposed in this article are certainly not sufficient to demonstrate the thesis which, despite many different assessments spread in the academic literature, still persuades the author, namely, that the above-mentioned mix of idealism and realism of the Carter presidency was, if not the best, a very good way to fight the cold war in the late 1970s. That mix prepared the moral and substantial ground, vis-à-vis the Afghan challenge, to adequately face Moscow’s dangerous initiatives in 1980 and later to give a fresh start to détente from a position of strength and authority. During his first term Reagan walked the war path. During the second one, thanks to Gorbachev’s brave policies, he could shift to the peace pattern and rapidly march towards a previously unconceivable consensual end of the cold war. The division of Germany and the division of Europe had obviously been two of the more evident manifestations of the long and risky tension between Washington and Moscow. The ability of the Carter administration to interpret and prudently encourage the signs of change both in the Western part of the continent – where the integration process, as in the past, was reaching new goals that were not necessarily in line with the US national interest – and in the Eastern one was a strong contribution to eventually overcome those divisions.

Brzezinski wrote in his memoirs that he “felt strongly that for the United States to respond effectively to opportunities to promote change in Eastern Europe, we should not treat the Soviet bloc either as a monolithic adversary or simply as a group of uniformly friendly neighbors. Greater diversity in Eastern Europe was clearly desirable”. The administration, in his view, “sought to make careful decisions to advance the larger goal of gradually transforming the Soviet bloc into a more pluralistic and diversified entity”. This policy, he concluded, was in the “long-range interest” of the US since it offered “a better way of dealing with the Soviet challenge” (1983: 300-301). Therefore, he listed the policy of differentiation chosen in Eastern Europe, the development of relations not only with countries in that area that “defied Soviet foreign policy” but also with those that “engaged in quiet domestic liberalization”, and the deterrence of a possible Soviet invasion of Poland in 1980 among the foremost accomplishments of the administration (ibid.: 528). The reader will decide whether the view from Washington of fears spread in Eastern Europe in the Carter years – on which this article has aimed to focus while leaving aside many other important elements of the bilateral and multilateral interactions between the US and that area – may show some interesting details of this picture or whether that view was just a minor factor in the construction of the US decision-making process in a very complex phase of the cold war.

Paschalis Pechlivanis has concluded that US policies towards Eastern Europe “brought to the surface one of the biggest weaknesses of a universalist policy based on moral ideals such as human rights” that may “clash with strategic, economic and other
political priorities”, so that “the need for exceptions in the name of the national interest paves the way to the criticism of inconsistency and double standards” (Pechlivanis 2019: 135; cf. Keys 2014: 256-259). Furthermore, about criticism, as Odd Arne Westad has remarked in his more recent book on the cold war, the Carter administration had to constantly face “a growing public opinion at home that thought the Soviet Union was taking advantage of America’s weakness” (Westad 2017: 486). This was certainly true concerning US relations also with Eastern European countries and contributed to nullify the possibility of a second term. “Most Americans – Westad rightly concludes – were simply not willing to tolerate that the United States could have an equal in international affairs, in the 1970s or ever. And they elected Ronald Reagan president to make sure that such a devaluation of the American purpose would not happen again” (ibid.: 500). However, the analysis offered in this article may contribute to support a more balanced assessment of the administration’s record in historiographical perspective than the one which led the public’s choice in 1980. Using Betty Glad’s persuasive words, “whatever problems Carter had in balancing US interests with his moral goals, he also undertook major efforts to promote world peace, arms limitation, and a new moral order”; in this framework he “pursued a foreign policy that was in the old ‘city on the hill’ tradition, sharing some of its virtues as well as its flaws” (Glad 2009: 285). The US notes on fears in Eastern Europe presented here suggest that the way he interpreted that tradition certainly had a strong impact beyond the Atlantic and beyond the Berlin Wall as well as in other parts of the rapidly changing world of the 1970s and 1980s.
Note on sources

Declassification of US sources useful to study the broader picture behind the subject chosen for this brief contribution has already reached an advanced stage, especially at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library in Atlanta and the National Archives at College Park: cf. infra the ‘Sitography’ for the finding aids and the digital collections made available by the Carter Library (S/b1) and the “Oral Histories” series (S/b2). See also the National Archives catalog (S/c) and the useful browsing tool offered by Wikileaks (S/d). As for published documents of the Carter series in the Foreign Relations of the United States collection, one may rely by now on the twentieth volume, on Eastern Europe, as well as on the sixth volume, devoted to the USSR, whereas the volumes intended to illustrate relations with Western Europe and Poland are still under declassification review: cf. S/a2 for details of the FRUS documents quoted in the article; see S/a1 for vol. 6, Soviet Union (2013); vol. 7, Poland, 1977-81; vol. 27, Western Europe.

Key Soviet and Eastern European sources on the Polish crisis have been available since 1998 thanks to the well-known Cold War International History Project launched by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the website of which keeps maintaining and expanding an excellent rate and quality of publication of new sources in its Digital Archive: cf. Ostermann 1998, esp. 3-133, “New Evidence on the Polish Crisis, 1980-1982”; see also S/e1. Important documents on the Warsaw Pact, its choices and inner mechanisms were published in the book A Cardboard Castle, edited by Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne in 2006 in the context of the crucial Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security, and in the volume on the Polish crisis written by Byrne and Andrzej Paczkowski the following year: Mastny-Byrne 2006, esp. 402-445; Paczkowski-Byrne 2007; cf. the digital collections on the Warsaw Pact made available by the Parallel History Project, S/f1. A remarkable task has been accomplished for many years by the National Security Archive in Washington to offer researchers an inexhaustible wealth of material through its action in the framework of the Freedom of Information Act and beyond: cf. S/g1; see e.g. sections of The Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, S/g2.

Memoirs were offered soon after the end of the presidency by Jimmy Carter, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski (Carter 1995, Vance 1983, Brzezinski 1983; see also Carter 2010 and 2015). Subsequent contributions include the book written in the new century by Raymond Garthoff, US Ambassador to Bulgaria in 1977-79, who added his personal viewpoint to the two major studies previously devoted to US-Soviet relations from the Nixon presidency to the end of the Cold War (Garthoff 2001; 1994a, esp. 623-1121; and 1994b). In 2010 also Vice President Walter Mondale published his memoirs (Mondale 2010). Stuart Eizenstat, Executive Director of the White House Domestic Policy Staff and Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and Policy, has recently written a very interesting account of his own experience (Eizenstat 2018).
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Book Reviews
One of the most important novelties of the last decades concerning the international organization (IO) process is its parliamentarization, which has its most advanced example in the European Parliament. Although the first Inter-Parliamentary Institution (IPI) – the Inter-Parliamentary Union – was established as early as 1889, the proliferation of IPIs within or outside official regional international organizations (RIOs) accelerated dramatically since the 1990s.

Literature is increasingly recognizing the importance of this phenomenon, which however still remains amongst the most neglected in the study of international relations, especially considering the extensive literature on regionalism available today.

This book by Andrea Cofelice contributes to filling this gap, providing a comprehensive analysis of 22 IPIs from European, African and Latin American RIOs. In particular, it aims at describing, assessing and explaining the empowerment of these institutions, which are very heterogeneous in terms of competences, composition and roles.

After a critical review of the literature on parliamentary empowerment and a presentation of the theoretical argument aimed at explaining it, drawing upon new institutionalism and comparative regionalism approaches (chapter 1), the central part of the book discusses and assesses IPIs’ institutional features, powers and functions. While chapter 2 is aimed at explaining how they are established, organized and legitimized, chapter 3 deals with the implementation of the main functions of such institutions – consultative, oversight, appointment, legislative and budgetary – in order to assess the degree of influence that they are able to exert over RIOs’ decision-making process. Finally, chapter 4 is devoted to the identification of the structural conditions and the causal mechanisms that may favour or hamper IPIs’ empowerment.

Two methodological choices made by the author represent an added value to this book. The first one is the comparative approach, i.e. the most successful option to grasp a world-wide phenomenon which on the one hand is fuelled by global and “systemic” factors, and on the other includes the development of very heterogenous institutions, driven by specific domestic (national and regional) factors. Furthermore, this approach makes it possible to overcome Eurocentrism affecting most of the literature on this topic, which is caused by the fact that the European Union, together with the European Parliament, is the most advanced laboratory of supranational
democracy in the world. The second choice is the combination of a theoretical and empirical analysis, which allows the author to go much beyond the formal provisions of official documents, in order to assess and measure the effective powers of these institutions in the framework of their respective organizations through a specific “parliamentary power index”.

Since the 1990s the promise of “people-centredness” and “people-drivenness” has been increasingly included, more or less explicitly, among the fundamental principles and objectives of many RIOs. To a variable extent, a rhetoric-reality gap affects most of them in this respect, however. Through this thorough study of IPIs functions and powers, Andrea Cofelice provides a valuable contribution to the scientific debate on the assessment of IOs’ democratic features, which attracts growing interest among scholars in various disciplines.
Studioso da tempo impegnato nell’analisi dell’Unione Europea, delle sue strutture e delle sue politiche, Sergio Fabbrini affronta in questo volume la grave crisi in cui le istituzioni comunitarie si dibattono da almeno un decennio e indica una via per provare a rilanciare l’UE su basi rinnovate.
Tale compito viene onorato a partire da un *excursus* storico, dal quale emerge un’interpretazione di lungo periodo del processo di integrazione europea. Fino a Maastricht, secondo l’A., le Comunità funzionaliste sarebbero state espressione di una logica sovranazionale, che il Trattato avrebbe incrinato erigendo due nuovi pilastri schiettamente intergovernativi. Questa lettura – che sorvola sulla complessità della natura originaria delle prime Comunità, nonché sulle concrete difficoltà con cui esse storicamente si scontrarono per attualizzare le potenzialità previste dai loro Trattati istitutivi – è precisata dallo stesso Fabbrini laddove più puntualmente si riferisce a «un’interazione tra istituzioni sovranazionali e intergovernative» mantenutasi fino agli anni Ottanta (p. 29).
Resta non di meno assodata l’asimmetria dell’architettura di Maastricht, solo apparentemente superata a Lisbona con l’abolizione dei pilastri. Nella ricostruzione di Fabbrini, infatti, il Trattato del 2007 ha viceversa formalizzato, all’interno dell’UE, la compresenza di due «costituzioni», l’una votata alla sovranazionalità, assicurata dal «triangolo» formato da Commissione, Consiglio e Parlamento europeo, che governa efficacemente il mercato unico e la dimensione monetaria dell’UEM; l’altra, invece, arroccata sull’ortodossia intergovernativa custodita dal Consiglio europeo, che coordina l’azione europea nei versanti della politica estera, degli affari interni e della politica economica.
Proprio in quest’ultima costituzione, afferma Fabbrini nel secondo capitolo, va ricercato l’epicentro delle crisi «multiple» che hanno recentemente colpito l’UE. La prima delle quali – quella di ordine economico-finanziario esplosa nel 2008 e proseguita negli anni successivi, fino a coinvolgere i debiti sovrani di alcuni Stati e a paventare il crollo dell’Eurozona – assume valore paradigmatico, utile a comprendere anche gli effetti innescati dai focolai successivi (la crisi migratoria e la Brexit). La risposta europea allo *shock* economico e monetario ha favorito, di fatto, la nascita di una specifica «unione intergovernativa» che si premura di vigilare sui bilanci e sulle politiche finanziarie dei paesi membri, svolgendo tale mansione alla luce di un approccio largamente amministrativo, focalizzato sull’istituzione e sul consolidamento di...
strumenti giuridici e automatismi che prescindono da qualsiasi valutazione politica. Ne deriva un modello che sconta un palese deficit di legittimità, figlio dell’illusione di implementare l’integrazione trascurandone la democratizzazione, e che nel contempo – come sottolinea l’A. – rischia anche di rivelarsi scarsamente efficiente, alimentando nell’opinione pubblica istanze volte a rinazionalizzare numerose politiche europee. Giunto a questo punto, nel terzo capitolo il volume non può esimersi dal richiamare le principali linee di frattura che indirizzano la discussione interna all’UE e le impediscono di fronteggiare adeguatamente le crisi del nostro tempo. In certa misura, tali contrasti si sviluppano lungo direttrici geografico-territoriali, esplicitando la contrapposizione fra l’Europa settentrionale e quella mediterranea – specialmente in materia di cultura economico-sociale – e contenendo, per il momento, la larvata rivalità tra Francia e Germania, portatrici di tradizioni non sovrapponibili e di visioni tendenzialmente alternative sul futuro dell’UE. È in questo ambito che, a giudizio di Fabbrini, occorre sciogliere il nodo decisivo per rendere praticabile un rilancio autentico del processo di integrazione. E per farlo non è sufficiente prendere atto del solco che separa gli Stati che, pragmaticamente, lo identificano con un progetto esclusivamente economico, dai partner persuasi che esso possa sopravvivere e prosperare solo a patto di rompere gli indugi verso una vera unione politica. La gravità del momento, infatti, impone una scelta definitiva circa assetto e finalità dell’edificio politico da realizzare. Avviandosi su questa strada, il libro non può che censurare immediatamente l’abitudine di tamponare le falle dell’integrazione con aggiustamenti contingenti e disorganici, che mancano di un disegno complessivo o ne celano uno di impronta fondamentalmente confederale, come quello che l’Autore attribuisce – forse ingenerosamente – ad Angela Merkel. Tale scomunica si combina con l’invito a rispolverare i principi generali della dottrina costituzionale, della scienza politica, del pensiero politico-istituzionale, liberandosi dalla tentazione di considerare l’UE un attore inevitabilmente sui generis e sforzandosi invece di trarre dalla teoria democratica gli insegnamenti necessari a rimuovere le ambiguità che contraddistinguono la costruzione europea. La tesi centrale del quarto capitolo – tanto rilevante da costituire probabilmente l’elemento di maggiore interesse del volume – prende le mosse dalla constatazione che il dibattito sull’UE risponde per lo più a un paradigma «statalista» (p. 122), in cui l’idea di federalismo non può che tradursi nella forma concreta dello «stato federale», ossia – nel lessico di Fabbrini – il modello nato dalla disaggregazione di uno stato unitario o centralistico, eventualità ben nota alla storia d’Europa ma di scarsa utilità per i destini dell’integrazione sovranazionale. Essa dovrebbe viceversa volgere lo sguardo verso l’«unione federale», locuzione con cui il politologo italiano designa il risultato dell’aggregazione di stati precedentemente indipendenti, come accaduto nel percorso di fondazione degli Stati Uniti. Dal richiamo al caso americano discende l’esaltazione dei suoi due cardini fondamentali: la distinzione «verticale» tra una federazione, sovrana in taluni ambiti, e gli stati federati, che si riservano competenze esclusive in tutti gli altri settori, alla luce di una concezione della sovranità che ne postula la divisione su almeno due livelli, nessuno dei quali
investito di un potere di ultima istanza tale da oscurare le prerogative dell’altro; la separazione «orizzontale» dei poteri legislativo, esecutivo e giudiziario, tanto sul piano federale quanto su quello statale. Dal canto loro, gli europei prediligono soluzioni differenti su entrambi i fronti. Da un lato, prigionieri del pregiudizio statalista, essi faticano ad accettare l’idea che la sovranità possa subire frantumazioni, verticali o orizzontali che siano. Dall’altro lato, anche laddove dichiarano di accogliere la lezione liberal-costituzionale sulla separazione dei poteri, nella pratica ne tradiscono lo spirito, provocando – attraverso il parlamentarismo – un cortocircuito fra legislativo ed esecutivo che è in qualche modo tollerato dai sistemi democratici nazionali, ma viene costantemente rigettato a livello UE.

In definitiva, l’unione politica immaginata da Fabbrini presuppone di abbandonare il modello parlamentare a favore di quello presidenziale, di ispirazione statunitense, ma con opportuni adattamenti. Esso si reggerebbe su una costituzione chiamata a sancire una rigida demarcazione fra potere legislativo ed esecutivo, il primo affidato – in omaggio a una logica bicamerale – a Parlamento europeo e Consiglio, garantendo a quest’ultimo una composizione più stabile di quella basata sulla rotazione dei ministri; il secondo, invece, appaltato alla strana coppia composta dalla Commissione (sempre priva di rapporto di fiducia con il Parlamento, per scongiurare la confusione dei poteri tipica dei regimi parlamentari) e dal Consiglio europeo, il cui presidente sarebbe eletto e legittimato dai cittadini europei tramite un sistema analogo a quello americano, con la scelta fra due candidati designati dai capi di Stato e di governo.

Fabbrini è convinto che tale proposta sia in grado di riuscire dove ha finora fallito la lotta euro-federalista classica, impiantata sul Parlamento europeo come chiave di volta della costruzione e del funzionamento di una democrazia parlamentare sovranazionale, la cui realizzazione implica l’esistenza di un autentico demos europeo, che l’A. tuttavia non scorge all’orizzonte. A questa professione di realismo si associa, infine, la consapevolezza che difficilmente l’unione politica raccoglierà consensi unanimi fra gli stati membri. Dovranno essere dunque i componenti dell’Eurozona – o almeno i sei fondatori, fra cui l’Italia, cui è dedicato l’ultimo capitolo – ad assumere l’onore e l’onere di patrocinare una riforma aperta a tutti i paesi disponibili a condividere un destino politico comune, offrendo agli altri l’adesione a una comunità economica ridotta in sostanza a puro mercato, mutilato della moneta e di quei fondi strutturali che hanno tradizionalmente costituito una delle grandi opportunità insite nell’integrazione funzionalista.
Book Recommendations

Il recente volume di Simone Paoli si occupa di un tema di grande attualità, affrontato attraverso una ricostruzione storica a partire dal 14 giugno 1985, quando cinque dei sei paesi fondatori delle Comunità europee si incontrarono a Schengen per dare avvio a un «processo destinato a trasformare il significato stesso di frontiera europea e il modo in cui questa era stata storicamente concepita e organizzata». Collocata nel contesto della realizzazione del Mercato Unico Europeo, la libera circolazione delle persone avrebbe dovuto aggiungersi a quella di beni, servizi e capitali nella prospettiva di una più efficiente allocazione dei fattori produttivi su scala europea; ma già allora fu chiaro che l’incontro non mirava solo a liberalizzare i controlli ai confini interni, ma anche a creare un ambizioso sistema di cooperazione su temi cruciali per la sicurezza e per la gestione dei fenomeni migratori. La grande esclusa era l’Italia, che pagava le resistenze di Parigi, timorosa dell’assenza di una vera politica italiana di controllo sull’immigrazione e, conseguentemente, preoccupata della prospettiva che in assenza di controlli alle frontiere comuni la Penisola potesse diventare un comodo varco di accesso all’Europa Centro-Settentrionale per gli immigrati illegali provenienti dai Balcani, dal Medio Oriente e dall’Africa Settentrionale e Sub-Sahariana.

Si tratta di un volume interessante, che consente di comprendere come la situazione di oggi debba essere affrontata alla luce della storia del Mediterraneo e dell’Europa.
Abstracts and Keywords
Looking to Each Other: Russian-European Relations among Hostility and Fear

Lara Piccardo

The article deals about the historical relation between Tsarist Russia/USSR and Western Europe/Integrated Europe. Since the beginning of the European construction process, by focusing on the ideological prophecies of capitalist contradictions, communist authorities did not understand the potential significance of the efforts of people like Jean Monnet, directed at economic, financial, and cultural integration. Although the Soviet bloc economy needed economic relations with Western Europe, its political rulers rejected the idea of any European federation or confederation on the old continent. Even before the birth of the Soviet Union, Europe and Russia had always looked to each other with diffidence or fear. Specifically, the geographical and identity location of Russia has always suffered because of the ambiguity of being a border between East and West, between Asia and Europe. Nevertheless, it would be misleading to measure the Russian swing between East and West by the yardstick of its greater or lesser Europeanization: this view would presuppose an implicit hierarchical relationship between Europe and Russia, of which historians should "estimate" progress or involution taking "Russia's Europeanisation" as a single unit of measure. On the contrary, the relationship between Europe – understood in different historical moments as a geographical reality and/or as European Community/Union – and Russia has from time to time been expressed by the Russians in a complex reception of European or non-European models. Moreover, Russia looks at this relationship with the ambition to be an autonomous driving force because of belief to identify itself as the center of the world and not as a periphery. So it is important to analyzes how Western Europe and Russia, being located within a common geographical area, have historically created a web of relationships characterized by attraction and repulsion, conditioned for centuries by ideology and power logic and often degenerated into contradictions and incompatibility.

Keywords: Tsarist Russia, USSR, Western Europe, European Communities, Identities

L’articolo si occupa del rapporto storico tra Russia zarista/URSS ed Europa occidentale/Europa integrata. Sin dall’inizio del processo di costruzione comunitaria, concentrandosi sulle profezie ideologiche delle contraddizioni capitaliste, le autorità comuniste non compresero il potenziale significato degli sforzi di persone come Jean Monnet, orientate all’integrazione economica, finanziaria e culturale. Sebbene l’economia del blocco sovietico avesse bisogno di relazioni con l’Europa occidentale, i leader politici di Mosca respinsero l’idea di una federazione o confederazione europea. Anche prima della nascita dell’Unione Sovietica, Europa e Russia si erano sempre guardate l’un l’altra con diffidenza o paura. Nello specifico, la posizione geografica e identitaria della Russia ha sempre sofferto dell’ambiguità di essere un confine tra Oriente e Occidente, tra Asia ed Europa. Tuttavia, sarebbe fuorviante misurare l’oscillazione russa tra Est e Ovest con il metro della sua maggiore o minore europeizzazione: questa visione presupporrebbe un’implicita relazione gerarchica tra Europa e Russia, di cui gli storici dovrebbero “stimare” il progresso o l’involuzione dell’europeizzazione della Russia. Al contrario, il rapporto tra Europa - intesa in diversi momenti storici come realtà geografica e/o come Comunità/Unione Europea - e la Russia è stata di volta in volta espressa dai russi in una ricezione complessa di modelli europei o non europei. Inoltre, la Russia guarda a questa relazione con l’ambizione di essere una forza motrice autonoma perché vuole identificarsi come il centro del mondo e non come una periferia. Quindi è importante analizzare in quale modo l’Europa occidentale e la Russia, essendo situate all’interno di un’area geografica comune, abbiano storicamente creato una rete di relazioni caratterizzate da attrazione e repulsione, condizionate per secoli dall’ideologia e dalla logica del potere e spesso degenerate in contraddizioni e incompatibilità.

Parole chiave: Russia zarista, URSS, Europa occidentale, Comunità europee, identità
The Russia of Yeltsin Looks to Europe
Elena Dundovich

As never before since the days of the October Revolution, Russia underwent radical and profound transformations between 1991 and the beginning of the second decade of the 2000s, both from the point of view of domestic politics and that of its international projection. In this respect, Yeltsin decided to continue the “new course” inaugurated by Gorbachev aimed at improving relations with the USA and Europe. In doing so, a major role was played by the will of the oligarchs who wanted to have close relations with the West in order to obtain financing and new opportunities for profit. Between 1991 and 1996, with Andrey Kozyrev as Minister of Foreign Affairs, the pro-Western policy of the Federation expressed itself with greater conviction until approval of the enlargement of the EU to Central and Eastern European countries. It was not so much for this reason that relations began to enter a period of crisis as the decision to expand NATO in that direction, a choice that aroused harsh criticism in a large part of Russian public opinion and brought Yevgeny Primakov, promoter of a less Western-centred policy, to the fore as the new foreign minister.

Keywords: Russia, Yeltsin, Primakov, Kozyrev, European Union

Come mai prima dei tempi della Rivoluzione d’Ottobre, la Russia ha subito trasformazioni radicali e profonde tra il 1991 e l’inizio della seconda decade degli anni 2000, sia dal punto di vista della politica interna che della sua proiezione internazionale. A questo riguardo, Eltsin ha deciso di continuare il “nuovo corso” inaugurato da Gorbaciov al fine di migliorare i rapporti con gli Stati Uniti e l’Europa. In tal modo, un ruolo importante è stato svolto dalla volontà degli oligarchi per avere stretti rapporti con l’Occidente al fine di ottenere finanziamenti e nuove opportunità di profitto. Tra il 1991 e il 1996, con Andrej Kozyrev quale ministro degli Affari esteri, la politica filo-occidentale della Federazione si è espressa con maggiore convinzione fino all’approvazione dell’allargamento dell’UE ai paesi dell’Europa centrale e orientale. Non era tanto per questa ragione che le relazioni iniziarono ad entrare in un periodo di crisi come la decisione di espandere la NATO in quella direzione, una scelta che suscitò aspre critiche in gran parte dell’opinione pubblica russa e portò Evgenij Primakov, promotore di un Politica centrata sull’occidente, in primo piano come nuovo ministro degli Esteri.

Parole chiave: Russia, Yeltsin, Primakov, Kozyrev, Unione Europea
EU-Russia Security Relations: Old Problems in a New International System
Sara Tavani

Since the Cold War ending, relations between Europe and Russia have progressively lost their sense of direction and experienced an ever more complicated phase, especially worrisome in the security field. In the unstable international system which followed the end of bipolarism, Euro-Russian security relations failed to be institutionalised and the European Union continued to refer to NATO as its primary security guarantee. This article argues that the current East-West European security dialogue raises difficulties already faced during the Cold War years, as the CSCE negotiation knots demonstrate. Specifically, the central issue remains the unbalanced strategic relationship between the European countries and Russia, which still lies unresolved due to the continue lack of a major European political and military integration.

Keywords: European Union, Russia, security, unbalanced strategic relationship, integration

Dalla fine della Guerra fredda, le relazioni tra Europa e Russia hanno progressivamente perso il loro senso di direzione e sono entrate in una fase sempre più complicata, preoccupante soprattutto nel settore della sicurezza. Nell’instabile sistema internazionale seguito alla fine del bipolarismo, le relazioni di sicurezza euro-russe non sono state istituzionalizzate e l’Unione Europea ha continuato a fare riferimento alla NATO come prima garanzia di sicurezza. Questo articolo evidenzia come l’attuale dialogo Est-Ovest sulla sicurezza europea sollevi difficoltà già affrontate durante gli anni della guerra fredda, come dimostrano i nodi negoziali della CSCE. In particolare, il problema centrale continua a risiedere nello squilibrio strategico tra paesi europei e Russia, il quale rimane irrisolto a causa della continua mancanza di una sostanziale integrazione politico-militare europea.

Parole chiave: Unione Europea, Russia, sicurezza, squilibrio strategico, integrazione
The charge of Russophobia has been made increasingly frequently against Western critics of Russia in the last few years. Much of this criticism has been made by Russian media and commentators rather than by high officials of the Russian state. There have been several studies of this media use of accusations of Russophobia and it has generally been asserted that the charge of Russophobia is part of a concerted propaganda effort by the Russian state. There has, however, been little examination of the use of Russophobia by top Russian politicians. This article examines the use of Russophobia by President Vladimir Putin as well as by top officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in communiques of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It finds that there has been only minor changes in the allegations of Russophobia by senior Russian politicians. The article looks at why Russophobia became a more prevalent accusation in Russian politics generally and at why there has been a difference in the accusations of Russophobia made by the media and in official political discourse.

Keywords: Russophobia, Russian foreign policy, Putin, official Russian political discourse

Negli ultimi anni l'accusa di russofobia è stata assunta sempre più frequentemente contro i critici occidentali della Russia. Gran parte di questa critica è stata formulata dai media e dai commentatori russi piuttosto che dagli alti funzionari dello Stato russo. Ci sono stati diversi studi sull'uso da parte dei media delle accuse di russofobia ed è stato generalmente affermato che l'accusa di russofobia fa parte di uno sforzo di propaganda concertato da parte dello Stato russo. C'è stato, tuttavia, un piccolo esame dell'uso della russofobia da parte dei migliori politici russi. Questo articolo esamina l'uso della russofobia da parte del presidente Vladimir Putin, nonché da alti funzionari del Ministero degli Affari esteri e nei comunicati di questo dicastero. Si ritiene che ci siano stati solo piccoli cambiamenti nelle accuse di russofobia da parte di alti politici russi. L'articolo esamina il motivo per cui la russofobia è diventata un'accusa più diffusa nella politica russa in generale e perché c'è stata una differenza nelle accuse della russofobia avanzate dai media e nel discorso politico ufficiale russo.

Parole chiave: Russofobia, politica estera russa, Putin, discorso politico ufficiale russo
The Fears of Jean Monnet and of Wolfgang Schäuble
Daniela Preda

The article proposes a re-reading of two important men for an integrated Europe, men who, in salient moments in the history of European integration, have proposed reflections and actions for the progress of the joint construction, fearful not only of possible external threats, but also of how a “non-integration” was detrimental to Europe.

**Keywords:** Fears, Jean Monnet, Wolfgang Schäuble, European Union, European integration

L’articolo propone una rilettura di due uomini importanti per l’Europa integrata, uomini che, in momenti salienti della storia dell’integrazione europea hanno proposto riflessioni e azioni per il procedere della costruzione comunitaria, timorosi non solo di eventuali minacce esterne, ma anche di quanto una “non integrazione” fosse di danno all’Europa.

**Parole chiave:** paure, Jean Monnet, Wolfgang Schäuble, Unione Europea, integrazione europea
“Keeping Détente Alive”: European Political Cooperation and East-West Dialogue during the 1980s
Maria Eleonora Guasconi

The aim of this article is to investigate on the European efforts to keep détente alive during the 1980’s, focusing in particular on the relations with the Soviet Union. The European policy will be analysed from the peculiar perspective of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), the mechanism of coordination of the European Community (EC) member states foreign policies, which anticipated the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) established by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.

The article is divided in two parts: after a short description of the EPC’s functioning and of its main achievements during the 1970’s, the first part addresses the European interest in revitalizing détente in the first half of the 1980’s, focusing in particular on the Polish case in 1981. The second part deals with the issue of the relationship between the EC and Soviet Union after the Single European Act (SEA) signature in 1986. Although the Single European Act was not originally designed to deal with foreign policy issues, as its main goal was to complete the Single market, it represented a significant stage also for the development of a European foreign policy. For the first time it included the scope of a common foreign policy, linking the EC procedures, in a single legal instrument to the EPC. The article will deal with the issue of “consistency”, or, in other words, the increasing recourse made by EPC to EC instruments (and vice-versa) as sanctions or the use of conditionality in economic assistance, in order to further EC’s policies. In particular the article will investigate if the completion of the Single market and the revival of European integration in the second half of the 1980’s affected USSR policy, wondering in particular if it influenced the development of Gorbachev’s project of a European common home.

Keywords: Détente, European Political Cooperation, European Single Market, Consistency, Mikhail Gorbacëv, European Common Home

L’articolo descrive gli sforzi delle nazioni europee di mantenere in vita il processo di distensione tra i due blocchi durante la prima metà degli anni Ottanta, analizzando in particolare le relazioni tra la Cee e l’Unione Sovietica. La politica europea verrà ricostruita attraverso la prospettiva della Cooperazione Politica Europea (CPE), il meccanismo di coordinamento delle politiche estere dei paesi membri della CEE, che ha preceduto la PESC, creata con il Trattato di Maastricht del 1992.

L’articolo è diviso in due parti: dopo una sintetica descrizione della CPE, del suo funzionamento e dei suoi principali successi nel corso degli anni Settanta, la prima parte ricostruisce le principali iniziative delle nazioni europee tese a rivitalizzare la distensione nella prima metà degli anni Ottanta, analizzando in particolare il caso della Polonia nel 1981.

La seconda parte ricostruisce invece le relazioni tra la Cee e l’Unione Sovietica dopo la firma dell’Atto Unico Europeo nel 1986.

Sebbene l’Atto Unico Europeo sia soprattutto ricordato per avere completato e dato vita al mercato unico, esso rappresentò un importante momento di svolta anche per lo sviluppo di una politica estera europea. Finalmente la CPE veniva inserita e diventava parte integrante dei Trattati. L’articolo si sofferma in particolare sull’importanza del principio di “coerenza” tra le dichiarazioni politiche adottate dai governi con la CPE e il crescente ricorso da parte della CEE a forme di assistenza economica condizionata o a sanzioni economiche. In particolare, l’articolo cercherà di comprendere se il completamento del mercato unico e il rilancio dell’integrazione europea nella seconda metà degli anni Ottanta influenzarono la politica estera dell’URSS e il progetto di Casa Comune europea di Gorbacëv.

Parole chiave: Détente, Cooperazione politica europea, Mercato commune europeo, principio di coerenza, Mikhail Gorbacëv, Casa comune europea
The article displays some nuances of ‘fear’ in Eastern Europe traceable in US diplomatic correspondence and key decision-making documents produced during the presidency of Jimmy Carter, 1977-81. Washington’s view of the region and its countries – including the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania – is observed against the backdrop of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in a phase of the Cold War heavily marked by the invasion of Afghanistan and by the ongoing threat of Soviet use of military force to restore Moscow’s full control over its Eastern European bloc.

**Keywords:** Fear, Eastern Europe, US foreign policy, Soviet Union, Cold War

Ricorrendo alla corrispondenza diplomatica e ad altri documenti rilevanti per l’interpretazione del processo decisionale statunitense, l’articolo ricostruisce alcune sfumature di ‘paura’ diffuse in Europa Orientale durante la presidenza di Jimmy Carter tra il 1977 e il 1981. Si osserva il punto di vista di Washington sulla regione nel suo complesso e su alcuni Paesi - in particolare, la Repubblica democratica tedesca (Rdt), la Polonia, la Cecoslovacchia, l’Ungheria, la Romania, la Bulgaria, la Jugoslavia e l’Albania - sullo sfondo delle relazioni tra gli Stati Uniti e l’Unione Sovietica, in una fase della guerra fredda segnata in profondità dall’invasione dell’Afghanistan e dalla minaccia permanente dell’uso della forza militare da parte di Mosca per recuperare il pieno controllo del suo blocco in Europa orientale.

**Parole chiave:** Paura, Europa orientale, politica estera statunitense, Unione Sovietica, guerra fredda