War, Empire, and Republic in Revolutionary Europe
A Review-Interview with R. Whatmore

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Section 1: Editorials

Section 2: Articles
2. The Virtuous Physician: A New Translation of a Pseudo-Hippocratic Text and Its Implications for the History of Moral Inquiry; or, The Significance of an Insignificant Text (E. B. Martin jr.)

Subsection: Method
3. Possibilité et nécessité de pensées interdisciplinaires en temps de crise (J.-M. Servet)

Section 3: Notes
4. War, Empire, and Republic in Revolutionary Europe. A Review-Interview with R. Whatmore (M. Albertone)

Section 4: Reviews
5. Book Reviews (C. Carnino, S. Mammola, E. Pasini)

Section 5: News & Notices
Richard Whatmore’s last book provides an interdisciplinary approach in intellectual history that centers around some political and economical issues debated in the last decades of the eighteenth-century. The story of how the Genevan représentants tried to preserve the independence of their city in the face of the power of France and Britain is investigated as a case study to set out the dialectic between small and large states in the last years of the Old regime and during the revolutionary period, as well as the role of free trade in indicating the path to reorganise international relationships. Some of the main arguments and conclusions of the book are discussed here with the author: a modern republicanism and its economic foundations, tension between democracy and republicanism, a new stress on the political implications of Physiocracy, an innovative idea of empire investigated from the perspective of continental Europe. The author, Director of the Sussex Centre for Intellectual History, also discusses with us the interdisciplinary characteristics of the current main trends of intellectual history in Britain.

His first work, *Republicanism and the French Revolution: An Intellectual History of Jean-Baptiste Say’s Political Economy*¹, drew attention to an eighteenth-century French republicanism derived from economics. The book was characterised by an interdisciplinary approach to intellectual history and it gave us a new reading of the French economist, usually simply considered as the French adaptor of Smith’s free trade ideas. Consistent with this methodology, in *Against War and Empire* he offers us now an even more complex interaction between politics, religion and economics. *Against War and Empire* is the story of how some Genevan inhabitants—the représentants, who opposed the magistrats’ aristocracy in the oligarchic republic—tried to maintain their city’s independence in face of the power of France and Britain, developing an original perspective on politics and political economy, as they were aware that for small states Europe had to become peaceful, being unable to stand against the military power of large commercial monarchies. This entailed a reconsideration of the notion of empire and of international relations among states and with regard to commerce. This perspective throws a new light on the Genevan contribution to the links between politics and economics in the last decades of the Old Regime and on the presence of Genevan actors in the French revolution far beyond Bénétruy’s still useful but now outdated *Atelier de Mirabeau*².

The book is divided into four parts divided in turn into detailed chapters. Part one puts forward the general plan of the work and highlights Calvin’s legacy at Geneva, as political and moral transformation constantly implied reform to its fullest extent, which remained a strong belief within the représentants’ circles and remained constant in the author’s view. The religious frame of political and economic discussions in 1782 at Geneva among lawyers, merchants and pastors and the failure of the Genevan uprising after an invasion by foreign troops was essential in shaping the conviction that large monarchies had to be reformed polit-

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ically and economically if small states were to survive. Lord Shelburne, who was the reference of one of the most influential political circles of the latter half of the eighteenth-century, described an era of Protestantism in trade in the plan to restore peace between Britain and France, going beyond the Seven Years War and mercantilism, and in his argument was that free trade was better suited to Protestant states and that the progress of commerce and the progress of religion were intertwined. The book highlights a political international Calvinism that turns out to be a new and different version of Lüthy’s international protestant banking circles¹. Geneva was at the core of these links: Calvinism, republicanism and liberty are presented as thoroughly interconnected. Proceeding from these principles, the Genevan représentants went on to elaborate the idea that a more popular government was the sole means to preserve independence and Protestantism.

The focus of part two, “The crisis of the Republic, 1698-1786”, is represented by the second chapter, “Rousseau and Geneva”, where the author sets out a stimulating reading of Rousseau as a critic of the corporative elements of the republic of Geneva. Facing the political conflict in Geneva, the heterodox Rousseau emerges as a moderate, fearing deadly political consequences of the représentants’ opposition to the magistrates. The author of the Contrat social is depicted as radical in theory and moderate in policy, the enemy of the disputes on the ancient Genevan constitution as well as of democratic republicanism, the supporter of the stability of law and of a political authority constrained by law, even though we cannot forget that Rousseau did not cope with the issue of representation. Rousseau did not work at reforming Geneva in the traditional context, but at a new European model, and then disagreed with the représentants as their democratic government threatened to destroy the distinction between sovereignty and government. Rousseau’s need to separate theological and political elements was far from the view of the democratic circles and his separation of religion from liberty was inconsistent with Genevan political culture. Through very carefully analysis and utilizing a variety

of sources, which explain why Rousseau was not perceived by many of his contemporaries as a republican reformer, this wide-ranging chapter sheds new light on Rousseau’s selective memory.

Part three, “The crisis of the Empires, 1782-1802”, represents the core of the book, a stimulating interdisciplinary reading giving original perspectives on the history of empires, and a new contribution to the idea of a modern republicanism. Richard Whatmore has been working for many years on the dialectic between small states and large states as a key to reconsider the eighteenth-century international scene, proceeding from the links between politics and economics. Moving from different points of reference, the interdisciplinary intellectual history of the Sussex School, particularly Donald Winch’s attention to the emergence in the eighteenth-century of political economy as a modern political language, and Istvan Hont’s highlighting political elements in eighteenth-century theories of international economic rivalry, the author outlines a new path to overcome “jealousy of trade”, which is traced through a Genevan lens.

In Richard Whatmore’s analysis the original views of the exiled représentants after the uprising of 1782 consisted in convincing the commercial monarchies to abandon empire as traditionally conceived in the framework of the mercantile system. This strategy was developed from 1782 to the outbreak of the French Revolution and implied the taking of different steps: supporting commerce alliance between Britain and France, persuading Britain to become the defender of popular republics by dismantling its mercantile policies, and reforming French government. Only if Britain and France were in peace, free trade might be introduced and mitigate the drawbacks of empire and the mercantile system.

The culmination of this campaign was the Anglo-French Commercial Treaty of 1786 implying the idea that commercial empires were compatible with small state independence, that perpetual peace in Europe might be realized and that the survival of small states was vital for continental

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commerce. The Genevan exiles set out to influence the economic policies of both countries. In 1771 De Lolme’s *Constitution d’Angleterre* wanted free states to model themselves on Britain, but he envisaged a Britain limited in the size of its empire. For Du Roveray, D’Ivernois and Clavière it was clear in 1780 and after that economic prosperity was tied to liberty and that France might be persuaded to act as a cosmopolitan empire. Richard’s Whatmore’s innovative interpretation sets out the views of the radical Genevans and their cosmopolitan aspirations in working out possible new relations between Britain and France. Against the eighteenth-century tradition of concealed Anglo-French conflict, and within a passionate network linking a variety of intellectual and political milieus, from the Physiocrats and Turgot to lord Shelburne’s circle and the “atelier” of Mirabeau, the Genevans exiles played the role of important actors. The science of political economy represents the shared culture of all these different milieus and commerce is conceived as the political means to reshape the international order by the establishment of perpetual peace on the basis of a French and British alliance.

The outbreak of the French Revolution marked a split between the exiles, which is followed through the progressive detachment of Clavière from his compatriots and his engagement as a protagonist in revolutionary policy. It corresponds to the strengthening of Britain as defender of small states in the midst of growing French dominion.

The Epilogue to the fourth part focusses on Etienne Dumont’s alignment with Bentham’s position on politics and his warning against democracy as something that had brought with it all of the excesses of the French Revolution. Dumont became an enemy of French republicanism. Following Bentham he overcame the distinction between small and large states and his moderate vision became dominated by a reformed version of the British model.

To better understand the methodology and the relevance of the book, we discuss some of the main arguments and conclusions with the author:
You were trained and you teach at the University of Sussex, one of the most important centres for research in intellectual history. You are the Director of the Sussex Centre for Intellectual History and the editor of “History of European Ideas”. What are the characteristics of the Sussex interdisciplinary approach in intellectual history? And at what degree your research is marked by this or by other intellectual experiences?

John Burrow, my former colleague at Sussex, defined intellectual history as eavesdropping on the conversations of the past. What I’ve tried to do in Against War and Empire is to eavesdrop upon a radical Genevan conversation over several decades and to reconstruct it for modern readers. Reconstruction is difficult because many of our assumptions about the political and economic world have altered since the eighteenth century. Others might appear to be related but are distinctive once the eighteenth-century context is recalled. I have been very fortunate in learning my trade from some of the great intellectual historians both in Cambridge and at Sussex. As you’ve recognised in this review Donald Winch and Istvan Hont played major roles in shaping my approach, and the same can be said about John Pocock, whose deeply contextual perspective upon the past serves as a model. I’ve been very fortunate too in having conversations about Geneva and its links with European intellectual life and politics with leading intellectual historians in Italy, France, Switzerland and North America and accordingly I owe a great many authors a debt of gratitude. What I think distinguishes the Sussex approach is an eclecticism about method combined with a refusal to acknowledge disciplinary boundaries. This means that those associated with Sussex differ from the Cambridge School associated with Quentin Skinner, for example, because the history of liberty from the Sussex perspective is associated with religion, political economy and international relations; indeed, the point is that arguments about politics in the eighteenth century had to encompass all of these categories if they were to convince anyone. The insight
intellectual history gives is to take the arguments of past actors seriously. Their vision, utopian and complicated as it may have been, made sense at the time. Too many historians, on the assumption that we have access to more documents about the past, presume to know more than historical actors did and sometimes categorise them by reference to ahistorical, simplistic or anachronistic categories. An example is Robert Darnton’s famous description of Jacques-Pierre Brissot as a ‘gutter-Rousseau’¹. What being a gutter-Rousseau entailed takes some explaining and what Darnton wrote was not precise or detailed enough in my view. I always try to commence with the language used by the historical actors and work out the extent to which it can be mapped onto or differs from our own.

How can you define the tensions between democracy, republicanism and their economic foundations which mark your book?

This is a very good question and a difficult one to answer. The problem of course, following the last point above, is that the meaning of the terms republicanism and democracy have changed so much since the eighteenth century; we still make mistakes in presuming too many continuities. I used to think—in Republicanism and the French Revolution for example—that you could meaningfully talk about democracy in the 1790s and make connections between what had happened before, especially in the small states, and what happened in the revolutionary decade. Although it was clear in the case of Clavière that the democratic ideas he advocated in France were derived in part from his experience as a représentant, most of these failed and that was the central lesson for contemporaries. Democracy was not ‘made’ (as Livesey would have it) in the 1790s:

rather, it failed and confirmed long-established antagonisms. The other point to make is that democracy before the revolution in France really was about the experience of small states. Francis D’Ivernois called himself a democrat at Geneva and saw the cause of the représentants as a democratic one. But at the very outset of the Revolution in France he defended the view that democracy might make sense in little states but made no sense at all in a large state. Equality simply could not be made sense of in such conditions and would always be a mask for injustice. With other Genevans, including Du Roveray and Dumont, he defended this view for the rest of his life. Being a republican too did not mean that you supported revolutionary France—for the most part exactly the opposite happened because those who called themselves republicans before the Revolution saw what was happening in France as anti-republican, and saw this view confirmed when all of the existing republics collapsed before French arms. The point is that large-state republicanism has to be distinguished from small state republicanism. French revolutionary republicanism was both new and distinctive in consequence (and did not have much in common with that of the Federalists in North America). The point about the economic foundations of political doctrines is I think the key one. In order to convince in politics you had to show that the economy would be improved/problems resolved by the politics being advocated. Otherwise an argument would not convince. So political ideals such as republicanism were evaluated in accordance with their consequences for the economy—and as the economy was tied to international relations evaluated in this way too. Religion equally remained important because of the widespread belief that another counter-reformation would follow the advance of French arms. This is not what happened, or perhaps it did in the sense that the counter-reformation had become anti-clerical with the French Revolution. What I am saying is that we need to look at the relationship between democracy and republicanism in tandem with the visions of economic and international transformation that accompanied them and which more often than not gave substance to them.
You highlight in the Genevan exiles’ thought the role of commerce in indicating the path to reorganise international relationships between small and large states and their political structure. I guess we may intend commerce as the equivalent of economic activity, but we can’t overlook that the tension between commerce and agriculture in the eighteenth-century agrarian Europe was at the heart of the first scientific economic theory. How was the relationship between commerce and agriculture conceived in your research?

So few of the small states that the Genevans were obsessed by were agricultural that it might be supposed that they were not interested in agriculture and its future, but this is not actually the case (although I did not really discuss the issue in my book). The Genevan représentants were very proud of the regulation of the grain trade at Geneva, and felt in general that trade in necessities had to be controlled for the sake of the poor and for security. They also tended to be opposed to large farms on the physiocratic model. Equally, there were echoes of the idealization of rural life that Rousseau and others considered the foundation for republican virtue. As opponents of luxury, commerce in necessities was preferred and equated with agricultural life. But in the modern world the Genevan radicals did not believe that states could turn their backs upon advanced forms of commerce, and especially France and Britain. In the work of Brissot and Clavière of course, in the 1780s a division of labour was envisaged with North America that would allow France to develop commercially while primary products from America were exchanged for luxurious French goods. What was required, rather than accepting the primary of agricultural wealth, was to moderate luxury and the selfishness that accompanied commercial development. The Genevans drew on their knowledge of the sumptuary laws regulating Genevan mores in their vision of a moralized commercial society. Moderate wealth was the ideal to
be aspired to by everyone, and one that they shared with the members of the Shelburne circle, that of Benjamin Franklin, and a host of fellow advocates of an alternative future for the globe.

You stress physiocracy’s role in advancing free trade and peace. You also write: “perspectives on France at Geneva were influenced by the rise of physiocracy” (p. 144). In recent decades important new readings of physiocracy have been jointly offered by historians and economists, from Philippe Steiner¹ and Catherine Larrère², to Gino Longhitano³, Loïc Charles, Christine Théré⁴ and Michael Sonenscher⁵. They put a new stress on the political meaning of physiocratic discourse and some of them have emphasised the progressive implications of physiocratic political economy. You provide a further contribution with a dynamic and cosmopolitan reading of physiocracy, which until now has not attracted a great deal of investigation. This interpretation differs from your previous analyses, in which you perceived physiocracy as a theodicy, as suggested by Michael Sonenscher. How can you explain your new reading?

When I worked on Say I was aware of the critique of physiocracy that he developed from his association with Clavière and that was commonplace among Genevan représentants (incidentally, I am more convinced than ever that Say owed more to Clavière than to anyone else in his view of the world, and especially the belief that Britain was going to collapse and that a reformed France could be relied upon to moralize commerce across Europe). I was also aware that physiocratic perspectives upon European politics changed with the second and third generations, those of

Turgot and Morellet and of Dupont de Nemours and Condorcet. More particularly, things changed because of the end of the North American war and the expectation that Britain was about to change its role in the international arena (because it had declined and was economically weaker than hitherto). In such circumstances, and with an expectation that France was on the brink of becoming the greatest economic power in Europe, physiocratic attitudes to small states changed. A lot more work needs to be done with regard to the views of Quesnay, Mirabeau and others (Béla Kapossy’s project of putting online Mirabeau’s correspondence will help all of us). But the general view was that small states, like small farms, made little sense. Reading Dupont de Nemours’ early view of European politics exactly this can be discerned. But more radical opponents of empire, such as Turgot and later Condorcet, began to portray themselves as defenders of a Europe characterised by small states, and supportive of a France dedicated to ridding the world of the kinds of economic corruption associated with British mercantilism. In such conditions it was necessary to work out what the impact of physiocratic reforms would be upon the political map of Europe. The physiocrats recognised this. All that I have done to date really is to recognise that the future of small states was an issue for them.

The idea of empire in your book is very innovative and amounts to an original contribution to the current historiographic debate. Facing investigations of empires as the core of the Atlantic history, primarily the Atlantic-based British Empire, but even Spanish, French or the Portuguese Empire too, you reconsider contributions made in this field from the perspective of continental Europe. Even from the intellectual history perspective, we can oppose the unity of eighteen-century Anglo-American political thought to classical republicanism and in turn to the variety of approaches...
of your research emphasising different political traditions in continental Europe. Moreover, you reconsider Britain as an interacting part of European political culture. A clear stimulus coming from Istvan Hont’s Jealousy of Trade is present in your book, marked however by a further attention to the democratic dimension of disputes on competition among states. Among the historians of empires you are also close to David Armitage’s optimistic assessment that trade depends on liberty and that Britain might combine liberty and empire¹ (even though a distinctive idea of British empire, shaped by the Genevan exiles, emerges from your book). In this perspective your approach risks over-emphasising the role of Britain. In focussing upon the international competition between Britain and France, you sometimes over-look the role of the United States. You claim that the American Revolution provided new scenarios for radical circles, and highlight the significance of Brissot’s and Clavière’s De La France et des Etats-Unis to reconsider relations between France and America—but the new state and its new political presence do not emerge as a protagonist. In the frame of small states and large states as a key to investigate the eighteenth-century international relations, a new republic and a large state, such as the United States quickly became, represented a further and different element to be considered. Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans rejected both the British economic and political model and they looked at France, its economic culture and its revolution as a turning point. At the outbreak of the American Revolution the British colonists set out to legitimate their international image as champions of free trade against the British mercantile policy. The changed attitude of the Unites Provinces in reconsidering its international alliances gives evidence of this movement.

If there has been a flaw in recent work on empire it stems from the failure to recognise that aspirations to empire encompassed the mainland of Europe. Debates about empire were as much about the future of Europe as about anything other part of the world. Given its economic strength, political stability, and military capabilities, perhaps it is surprising that Britain did not play a greater role in contemporary European debate. My

argument is that this really did not happen until the French Revolution because so many people, including enlightenment luminaries across Britain, were convinced that Britain could not maintain itself politically or economically. The French Revolution forced the British to become involved in the fate of the small states or leave Europe to revolutionary France. As is so often the case, perceptions of necessity dictated.

I think that the point about the lack of analysis of the North American case is a valid criticism. I tend to play down the new republic in European politics, in part because it was unique in its circumstances, and in part because it had such an unstable and turbulent birth. A further point is that in looking to France Jefferson backed a failing state. Thomas Paine did likewise, and all of his predictions about the sister republics changing the world came to nothing. The transition mechanism Paine envisaged from the existing state of corruption to the new world of moderate wealth and perpetual peace was ceaseless war on Britain. The British monarchy and aristocracy had to be destroyed if reform was to be realised. I am more interested in John Adams’ argument that the British example amounted to a model for all republics, small and large. This was a claim he shared with De Lolme and others. Interestingly, such men looked to the history of Scotland to find proof that small states could thrive within the British Empire, and that the mercantile system did not do what its critics claimed it did: destroy the culture, laws, religion and politics of small states. In short, at the end of the eighteenth century there was a turn to Scottish history, law, religion and politics to provide evidence that Britain did not behave like an empire in relation to the constituent parts of the composite state: it did not homogenise, destroy, or dominate local cultures. This was crucial to those who wanted to defend Britain as a model for other states and to overcome the French-led critique that Britain was the worst empire in history because of its lust for wealth and economic dominion.
Since your book on Jean-Batiste Say you have been working at the idea of a modern republicanism, fuelled by the science of political economy. Your first book alongside with James Livesey’s Making Democracy in the French Revolution¹ attests that a “new republicanism”, centred firmly on the link between political economy and republic, particularly in relation to French economic culture and heedful of democratic participation is now an accepted branch of research. You put forward now another important contribution, strengthening an eighteenth-century idea of republic far from classical republicanism, as elaborated from John Pocock’s The Machiavellian Moment onwards². You highlight how that Geneva was nourished by a republican tradition distant from the classical model. Etienne Dumont was aware that ancient republics did not fit commercial societies. You emphasise that even the attitude of the exiles in 1782, who were determined not to sacrifice themselves, gave the illustration of the gulf between ancient republican heroism and modern manners. The break among the exiles at the outbreak of the French Revolution and the Epilogue of your book, dominated by Dumont aligning with Bentham’s position, seems to indicate that some Genevan protagonists of this cosmopolitan age didn’t resolve the tension between the Old Regime republican tradition and the modern democratic republics stemmed from the American and French Revolutions. The American colonists first rejected the existing order rooted in history and tradition, political and economic disputes in Geneva undermined, as you admirably describe, this traditional order, and they contributed to the collapse of Old Regime, which eventually occurred in France, where and when reforms were revealed to be insufficient. You mark the Genevans contribution to the French Revolution, but at the end of your book, after Clavière’s death, they appeared (embodied by Dumont’s rejecting France and embracing Britain) as unable to understand the new values of rights and popular sovereignty elaborated trough the revolutionary experience. The identity of Europe stemmed from all this mix.

These are all interesting comments and I’m grateful for them. I’ve said above that I’ve changed my mind about revolutionary France and the democracy associated with the First French Republic. I now think that the key for contemporaries was the failure of the republic, but at the same time everyone realised you could not go backwards and restore the world of 1789. Trends that had been evident throughout the eighteenth century were reaffirmed at the end of the 1790s, that all of the republican ideologies that had helped to shape and create Europe’s small states were no longer working. Small states and republics could not rely upon diplomacy, the balance of power, economic specialisation or republican manliness to defend themselves. Instead they had to choose which great power to support, and hope that the result was continued independence. The modern world was a world of large states and large markets, providing revenues for vast armies and expensive military technology. Britain represented one solution to the problem, especially in the form of its relationship with Scotland and later with Ireland. But another solution was republican confederation, the idea that had failed in the eighteenth century in the case of the Swiss and the Dutch, but that would not die and that re-emerged after the Napoleonic Wars. What I’m arguing is that there is a real break with the past in terms of political ideas during the French Revolution. The world of David Hume and Adam Smith, of Rousseau and of Montesquieu, was swept away. The new world looked ugly to Jean-Baptiste Say, because it was dominated by a Britain that ought to have collapsed. To John Adams, James Mackintosh and Sismondi, among a host of others, it was a world in which new forms of empire, evinced by Anglo-Scottish relations, might be sustainable. Accordingly I don’t think that Dumont’s perspective, outlined only in sketchy terms at the end of the book, is the end of the story. Rather we have a Europe in which Bentham, against the advice of Dumont, demands the creation of democratic republics (though which are different from the republican ideas of Jefferson or Paine), in which Britain is expected to become a new type of empire (sustaining the independence of lots of states in the hope of freely trading with them), and in which states are larger but hopes of republican confederation are renewed. The point I would make, which goes against a lot of existing literature, is that it was Britain that did the most to make this new Europe,
after the Napoleonic Wars, and that less was owed to the democratic and rights-based ideas of revolutionary France.