Not a schema: notes on the anxiety of mapping
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Perhaps maps make fun of us – should we trust them? Not trust them?
Or: we must be able to look at them with irony.

Louise Bourgeois

Schema

A map has multiple entryways, as opposed to the tracing, which always comes back “to the same.” The map has to do with performance, whereas the tracing always involves an alleged “competence.”

Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari

A collective consideration of schema across the different fields and disciplines that intersect philosophy and architecture comes, inevitably it seems, to address also “map” and its making, as if an overlap and identity of “schema” and “map” might be not only possible but indeed obvious. Map and schema normally coincide. But do they? And if they do, how and when? And what are the tensions at stake in this supposed coincidence?

The purpose of this text is to undo this presupposition, by exposing – through undoing – the complexity of the map, its ambiguous relation with becoming, and its state of intentional and necessary imperfection, to argue that the map is not a schema.

The declaration of intent that invited contributions to cross-disciplinary conversations around schema in a series of seminars, proposed itself as a trigger of «coincidences, misunderstandings, overlaps» (SCHEMA 2018) on the topic, with the aim to make of all the different takes «a map that will trace the semantic regions of the word “schema” in a hyper textual form». The larger project was therefore the production of a map – rather than a dictionary or indeed a schema – of schema. Interesting. Why a map?

The conceptual randomness of the dictionary’s alphabetical order presents a linear sequence that does not directly and visually make connections. Links are not constructed or structured, but only suggested by cross-references and possibly by etymologies. In a dictionary words remain loose, and a possible syntax is (re)constructed and reinvented each time by happenstance, curiosity, or research. The dictionary becomes a site of imagination and flight.

For the sake of comprehension and transmission, a schema edits down information to the essentials. It often simplifies and ossifies elements to their relations. It reduces complexities, shading alternatives, mistakes, digressions and hesitations. It pushes out time. Incomplete and timeless, it is there to be fleshed out and reactivated each time. Schema suggests, but it does so in a prescriptive way, and therefore it can be followed and complied with, or transgressed from (or within). Thus, a new schema is generated, and so forth. Schema is prescriptive and normative, a set of instructions that inform a reality, or the understanding and the construction of one.

What is “map” then – that complex flat (but now also three- and four-dimensional), representation which registers, also, time, and whose complexity remains unresolved, undecided and reworkable? If schema can be «included among the most complex and obscure notions conceived by the Western philosophical thought» (SCHEMA 2018), the only way to understand it and display it, and to con-tain (hold together) its multiple takes and configurations, is to make a map of it. Schema cannot be de-scribed or de-fined, but it can be mapped. The
uncertainty of the map can con-tain it, as it can hold together also its unknowns, the yet-to-bes of schema. The map brings time to the schema, and thus dissolves it into a multiplicity.

Reality is complex and relational, obscure and opaque. Schema, through conventions, makes of it a «model, simplified compared to the more complex reality of a problem, a phenomenon, an object, a mechanism or a process» (SCHEMA 2018). Schema produces a simplification of reality that aims to produce knowledge of such reality. It replaces reality with a form that grasps and reproduces of reality only a few elements, a selection of features. The unknown (part of it) becomes unknowable in order to produce a coded and partial knowledge, of that which the scheme makes scheme of. By applying the same simplification, and by deduction, schema could then describe, encode, in-form (put into the form defined by the schema) also its surroundings. Schema is both a form and a method.

The map instead, while it needs to make simplifications in order to be able to communicate, aims to retain and embed its unknown, as well as the conventions, references and information that make the map. It is this complexity – the dualities of reduction and thoroughness, concealment and display, figuration and imagination – that produces the tension of the map.

In her discussion of the presence and relevance of maps in 17th century Dutch painting, Svetlana Alpers has observed that descriptio «was one of the most common terms used to designate the mapping enterprise. Mapmakers or publishers were referred to as “world describers” and their maps or atlases as the world described» (Alpers 1983, 122). 6 Descriptio combines words – a narrative, a discourse – and images – forms, figures – in constantly changing mutual relations. The map documents what is known and familiar, but it also constructs and projects on a surface possibility for the yet unknown. Descriptio is both narration and inscription: it is a writing, a text, a narrative; it is also the recording of information and speculations on a surface. As such the map is not only representation of what is known or absent, but also the evocation and enactment of that which is not, or not yet. That is, the map combines given knowledge with the codes and the distance of a form of representation that «allow[s] to see something that [is] otherwise invisible» (Alpers 1983, 122); it also speculates, projects (sets forward) and narrates that which is not yet. In so doing the map maps, also, time. The map conceives of «the picture as a flat working surface, unframed, on which the world is inscribed», and the resulting image appears as «seen essentially from within or being surveyed» (Alpers 1983, 122). Yet here the «viewer’s position or positions are included within the territory he has surveyed, present on and not external to the surface on which is laid out an assemblage of the world» (Alpers 1983, 133). The map maps time and records with it the presence and the agency of its author and reader.

Power and Time

[The map] is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real. The map does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself; it constructs the unconscious. It fosters connections between fields. [...] The map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions: it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can

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6 Alpers continues: «[Dutch painters] too employed words with their images. Like the mappers, they made additive works that could not be taken in from a single viewing point. Theirs was not a window on the Italian model of art but rather, like a map, a surface on which is laid out an assemblage of the world» (Alpers 1983, 122).
The abstraction, simplification and instruction of the schema, even if expressed with the multiple figures of the tracing, are, still, not a map. They cannot “make map”. But then, what is a map? What is the difference between making, reading, and using a map?

The map is never only a representation of reality, as it produces a new reality every time that it is defined, redefined, entered, used. Never complete, polysemic, operative and multiple, the map remains open, and continues to approximate a referent which is simultaneously both internal and external to it, and which it therefore continuously produces.

Mapping is a representation that is at once partial and excessive to its object and contains many (and often contradictory) possible projects: it offers the possibility for the partial understanding of a space, and at the same time it provides the grounds for the production of other from it. It condenses movements, events, transformations, and their narratives.

It is in this unresolved combination of insufficiency and redundancy of otherness that the map comes into being. As it refuses absolutes, the map always contains subjectivities, it is always already compromised, implicated with its maker-user, and therefore with change. Mapping then is not a fixed documentation of a site and a container of information; it does not reproduce the real, but it constructs one. Always an incomplete and insufficient description, in its incompleteness it remains open to the condensation of multiple and different possibilities. As it produces both lack and excess to a given, mapping projects (i.e., casts forward) the possibility of change. We can manipulate maps, play with them, question their truthfulness and the nature and reliability of their informative content.

The work of British artist Cornelia Parker 3 (b. 1956) is in constant pursue of extracting truths from given representations and cultural constructs. These she probes and challenges by exploding the objects and the contexts of her projects, often literally so. Since the late 1990s Parker has been working on a series of projects on meteorites. Meteorites bring to earth the other, the alien, the external unknown, marking their arrival with powerful explosions that leave on the ground the scars of their occurrence. Their suddenness and violence bring different worlds to converge in a specific point in space and time, as if for an instant they could stop everything and short-circuit the universe. In Parker’s intentions, the series of her meteorite projects should culminate with the launch of a meteorite into space. An early instalment in the series had restaged a meteorite explosion in reverse, with a fireworks display set off from the roof of Birmingham’s landmark Rotunda building, in which the pyrotechnic mixture contained pulverized meteorite fragments that had fallen to earth in China in the 16th century (see Parker 2002). Meteorite Landing and Moon Landing firework displays, such as the one staged at Jupiter Artland near Edinburgh on the full moon night of May 2009, have simulated the placing of a Martian meteorite on the Moon, and of a piece of the Moon on Mars. On Earth, the meteorite is an alien object from space, it embodies the fear of the unknown and

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3 For recent monographs on the work of Cornelia Parker see Cornelia Parker (2015) and Iwona Blazwick (2013).
of the unpredictable; only its aftereffects can be mapped. Parker has used fragments of meteorites to simulate their impact on the territory through the manipulation of maps: the meteorite is heated and then placed on an enlarged map, scorching it, erasing it, piercing through it.

For the first of this series of meteorite maps, produced at the threshold of the millennium, Parker concentrated on London, and used the most conventional of London maps — the *A-Z London Map* based on Phyllis Pearsall’s *London Street Atlas*. (see Gross 1938). A heated Gibeon Meteorite found in Namibia in 1836 was used to char enlarged sections of the London A-Z, obliterating part of them. But the meteorite impacts “recorded” on these maps are not “accidental” ones: hit and literally erased from the map are important city and national landmarks. Far from unexpected, the damages here, both on the territory and on the map, are in fact the results of “aimed” critical and political tools. A Meteorite Lands on the Houses of Parliament (1998), another on Buckingham Palace, one on HM Prison Wormwood Scrubs, one on Saint Paul’s Cathedral, and one the Millennium Dome. These meteorites are not random occurrences, but weapons that target sites and symbols of power. By aiming at monuments, they also dissect the map, removing from the conventional London street atlas those elements that are both geographical points of reference and historical milestones in the value system of the city. Making room, they expose the “minor” fabric of the city and its connective networks. The use of the canonical road atlas, devised for clarity of navigation and movement rather that for formal and scalar congruence with the physical city, is significative. Critical, partial, polemical, political, the mapped fictional meteorite craters question and transform the relations of power that the map embeds and represents, preparing the ground for another map, of another city and of a different society.

Parker then expands the series to the territorial scale, using maps of the United States of America, and selectively scorching them with a heated 400-year-old iron meteorite which had fallen on Namibia. For *Meteorite Lands in the Middle of Nowhere: The American Series* (see Parker 2002) she selects six places that may be in the middle of an American “nowhere”, but whose names have obvious associations with “hits” that were clearly manmade: Paris Texas, Bagdad Louisiana, and Bethlehem North Carolina. The small Texan town immortalised by Wim Wenders’s film, not the former home of Saddam Hussein, and not the birthplace of Jesus are hit by Parker’s meteorite, while a Meteorite Misses Waco, Texas, where 75 members of the religious sect of Branch Davidians died in a raid by the US Defence Department. Also missed by the mapping meteorite are Roswell, New Mexico where a UFO allegedly crashed in 1947, and Truth or Consequences, New Mexico, thus renamed in 1950 after a famous TV quiz show.
The impossibility of the map

Queequeg was a native of Kokovoko, an island far away to the west and south. It is not down in any map: true places never are.

Hermann Melville

The map is not only as a system of representation; its making is an intellectual and political project of space. While the map represents a reality, it also always represents itself. In fact, the reality that the map renders is represented more in the intentionality of the map than in the image it produces. While the figure of the map gives us information on the lie of the land – its situatedness and layout – and of the activities that the land sustains, the lie of the map – its fabrications, conjectures, falsifications – describes the invisibles that rule society, govern a territory, organize its economies.

As a “project” – the production of a never-neutral critical space –, always partial, never co-extensive with that which it maps, mapping establishes a relation of both difference and excess with the territory it (re)presents. The map is therefore a cultural project: a generative system capable of producing and incorporating those interpretations, intentions and transformations that may not be evident in the territory.

The map does not simplify the real, but with the real it is co(im)plicated: folded and refolded over, it conceals more than it reveals, it folds in itself potentialities of discovery of the unknown (the yet to be known) and the futurable (the yet to be). Both of these are endless, and the map too is endless in its scope, and infinite by definition, even before it engages in its relation of tension with the real. The map aims to be rich, thorough, “exhaustive”, but while it projects the real, interprets it and expands on it, it can never quite contain those “true places” of memory and identification that allow us to engage with it. In fact, if mapping succeeds in this intent, the map fails its representative role. The map, that is, inhabits its own intrinsic contradiction.

Jorge Luis Borges’s short story On Exactitude in Science 8 imagines an empire where cartography aims for such perfection that to-scale maps become unacceptable. Eventually, only a 1:1 scale map of the empire becomes acceptable, and «the Cartographers Guilds struck a Map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and which coincided point for point with it» (Borges 1946). The ultimate map, the perfect map is the useless map. As it comes to coincide with the territory it represents, the map is no longer a representation, and becomes a simulacrum; the territory here is a reverse simulacrum. In Borges’s story the perfection of the map, the exhaustiveness of its knowledge, proves self-destructive. The useless map annihilates the discipline of mapmaking and «in all the Land there is no other Relic of the Disciplines of Geography» (Borges 1946).

In Simulations (1983), Jean Baudrillard examines the relationships between reality, symbols and society, opening with a reference to Borges’s short story to explain the problematic of the second-order simulacra. As mapping reaches its limits and renders itself “only” material, and the discipline of mapmaking,
having lost its abstractions and conventions, becomes unusable, what remains of both are shreds of the object-map, «Tattered Ruins of that Map, inhabited by Animals and Beggars» (Borges 1946). Un-coded, the shreds become territory (again). The artefact then becomes accessible through other forms of inhabitation, by those who cannot decipher the codes of the map, which the map has already lost anyway – abstraction, codification, distance, scale.

Then it is perhaps possible to reconsider Baudrillard’s argument not as a reversal of Borges’s story, but as its fulfilment. Actually, falling into pieces here is the empire’s territory, and the empire with it, and the shreds of the representation represent something that is not, or not anymore. In fact, the «liquidation of all referentials» (Baudrillard 1983) here brings the representation to collapse (literally) onto its referent.

The success of simulation introduces what Baudrillard calls «second order simulacra» (Baudrillard 1983, 1). Here simulacra «are copies of things that no longer have an original (or never had one to begin an & Papson 2011). For Baudrillard (1983, 2): «Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map, nor survives it. Henceforth, it is the map that precedes the territory – PRECESSION OF SIMULACRA – it is the map that engenders the territory».

What to make then of those shreds of the map that remain lying on the territory. No longer representative but accessible and inhabitable in other ways, they suggest that the operation of simulation is not a representation, but becomes generative of a new real: «nuclear and genetic, and no longer specular and discursive [...] genetic miniaturisation is the dimension of simulation. The real is produced from miniaturised units, from matrices, memory banks and command models – and with these it can be reproduced an indefinite number of times» (Baudrillard 1983, 3). This is a map that can produce a territory, it is the territory itself.

_The Bellman himself they all praised to the skies [...]_
_He had bought a large map representing the sea._
_Without the least vestige of land:_
_And the crew were much pleased when they found it to be_
_A map they could all understand._

Lewis Carroll (see 2019)

Between the impossibility of documenting “true places” (Melville) and the self-annihilation of perfect cartography (Borges) can be found a dynamic key for the survival, and indeed the true _raison d’être_ of the map: the possibility of a dynamic, repeated but never identical engagement with it – a form of dynamic mapping the preludes the current development of dynamic, immersive, interactive mapping.

A crucial artifice that allows us to recognize the map – in the sense of identifying, siting and experiencing the places that the map represents – is the definition and location of its perimeter, which transforms the subject of the cartographic representation into an “object”. While we experience reality in
fragments of space and time, the map records of it a synthesis that is both arbitrary (the authorship of the cartographer, for instance) and recognizable (the correspondence with reality). The delimitation of the map helps us recognize known elements, thanks to our memory of forms, physical contours, routes and connections.

An extreme example of this process of selection is the ‘Map of the Ocean’ drawn by Henry Holiday for Lewis Carroll’s “nonsense poem” The Hunting of the Snark (see 2019). Blank and empty, the map enables an experience of space, allowing the «improbable crew» 10 (Crutch 1979, 90) searching for the imaginary animal to concentrate their attention on the contents that are delimited by the perimeter. Cleared of geographical signs, conventions, toponyms, lines, contours, coordinates, of everything that might even vaguely suggest a measured description, the real world is pushed out of this blank frame and its territory becomes available to discovery. «A perfect and absolute blank!» (Carroll 2019, 13) becomes the perfect tool for the impossible hunt of an inconceivable creature, and perhaps the only possible entry point into this spatial and narrative dimension.

This non-map, apparently the opposite of Borges’s map of the Empire, is in fact a faithful representation of the formless and dynamic nature of the sea, the space of the smooth that more than anything/anywhere else shows the difficulties of mapping. The map here needs to be reconceived as a live (and alive) mutable tool, more akin to a diagram than to a drawing. The true map of the sea dispenses with grids, coordinates, lines, striations, centres, and reference points. As such, the ‘Map of the Ocean’ is the perfect map of the smooth, as it can only be: an anti-figure but not an anti-map.

The anxiety of mapmaking

Samuel Beckett

As it produces both lack and excess in relation to a given, mapping projects the possibility of change, both of itself and of its object. Operative and multiple, the map produces a reality every time that it is defined or reactivated. Open, the map continues to approximate a referent which is simultaneously both external and internal to itself, and is therefore continuously re-produced.

Mapping is able to contain, or rather con-dense, movement, events, changes, narration. Much more than a recording and an imitation of reality, the map attempts to connect us to reality through fragments of space and time that need to be, each time, both identified and experienced. 11

Mapping offers the possibility for the partial understanding of a space and at the same time it provides the grounds for the production of “other” from it. Always an incomplete and insufficient description, in its incompleteness mapping remains open to the condensation of multiple possibilities. Far from simply presenting a reality and its relations, the map enables them.

10 «[...] with infinite humour the impossible voyage of an improbable crew to find an inconceivable creature» (Crutch 1979, 90).

11 I have discussed the dynamic notion of the map in relation to the “project” in architecture in Teresa Stoppani (2004). In the article I argue that mapping is the descriptive and generative tool that is capable to produce and accommodate together the many and different possible unfoldings of the project(s). While the architectural drawing offers a set of instructions for both the understanding and the making of space, mapping – I
In the collection of essays *Mappings*, Denis Cosgrove opens his introduction observing that «[a]s a graphic register of correspondence between two spaces, whose explicit outcome is a space of representation, mapping is a deceptively simple activity» (Cosgrove 1999, 1). “Deceptively” indeed. A whole universe of interpretations, imagination, mis-understandings and potentialities inhabits the space of the correspondence that mapping constructs between reality and imagination, territory and projection (the act of mapping), and creates in the space of the map – the representation of the correspondence itself. What is it then that is to be mapped? How does mapping define its object, if the objects of its representation, investigation, critique, projection are not spaces, but the (many possible) correspondence(s) between spaces? The task is potentially endless, and never exhaustive. It is perhaps this irresolution that makes Cosgrove declare, only a few lines below in his text, that «[a]cts of mapping are creative, sometimes anxious, moments in coming to knowledge of the world …» (Cosgrove 1999, 2).

More than just “sometimes”, acts of mapping are always anxious, because they are intrinsically so:

«[T]heir apparent stability and their aesthetics of closure and finality dissolve with but a little reflection into recognition of their partiality and provisionality, their embodiment of intention, their imaginative and creative capacities, their mythical qualities, their appeal to reverie, their ability to record and stimulate anxiety». (Cosgrove 1999, 2)

Anxiety again. And this is not only in the making of the map, but it finds expression also in the map’s configuration. Maps record anxiety in the representation of the territory. The unknown is feared. In ancient maps it is populated by fantastic creatures and mythical beings: the still inaccessible opens up spaces for the imagination and becomes a site of invention. Later, the unmeasurable and uncontrollable areas of blank spaces on the map «generate and reflect aesthetic and epistemological anxiety; they are thus the favoured space of cartouches, scales, keys and other technical, textual or decorative devices» (Cosgrove 1999, 10). But they only conceal and in fact highlight the spots of anxiety. Not unlike Cornelia Parker’s fictional meteorite hits and misses, they construct an anxiety map.

If, as Cosgrove suggests, the «map’s pretence to stable, uniform and smoothly mobile knowledge depends upon inherently unstable, uneven, fragmentary, specifically positioned and haphazardly transferred information» (Cosgrove 1999, 11-12), when is the map to be considered complete, exhaustive? When is the work of the mapmaker finished? Never of course. That is the true nature of the map: a work in progress, not because of its ongoing attempts to approximate an external reality, but because of that reality (which is itself indeed always changing) the map is not a representation, but a critical mirror, able to reveal and evidence also the invisibles, those ‘true places’ (Melville) of identification and memory that never actually make it on the map, and those that from the map ‘make fun of us’ (Bourgeois).

Nor should the anxiety be fended off. It needs to be occupied, and indeed mapped. Make map of the anxiety. And this can only be achieved by iteration.
The repetition of the mapmaker’s gestures is a collective action of repetition that produces always provisional results. But this is not in vain. At each of the iterations a pause of critical reconsideration occurs, where mapping re-maps itself. This is an important moment that remains all too often submerged in the seamless operations of digital interactive mapping, as it performs decisions that are no longer directly representational but are more and more concerned with the selection of data that are to be fed to a performing algorithm. It is in the pause of critical reconsideration that the anxiety of mapping, far from failing, becomes productive and (re)generative.

In Over and Over, Again and Again (2010), Emma Cocker observes that «More than a model of endless or interrupted continuation of action, a Sisyphean practice operates according to a cycle of failure and repetition, of non-attainment and replay: it is a punctuated performance. A rule is drawn. An action is required. An attempt is made. Over and over, again and again – a task is set, the task fails and the task is repeated. Ad infinitum». (Cocker 2010, 154)

Cocker’s text discusses the use of failure in conceptual and post-conceptual art practice since the 1960s, but the productive reading of failure, as originally framed by Albert Camus in The Myth of Sisyphus (1942) can be applied also to the dynamics that regulate and define mapmaking, its intrinsic need to fail, and the inevitable and constructive state of anxiety that accompanies it.

In different artists’ takes and in diverse art forms and projects, and in Cocker’s analysis of them, the intentional and choreographed failure connected with repetition can be linked to the Sisyphean myth «as a way of revealing porosity and flexibility within even the most rigid framework of inhabitation» (Cocker 2010, 155). Cocker suggest that beyond models of resignation, resistance, critical refusal, and absurdist readings of the Sisyphean paradigm, it is possible to see instead that:

«the Sisyphean loop of repeated failure is actively performed within the work itself as part of a generative or productive force, where it functions as a device for deferring closure or completion, or can be understood as a mode of resistance through which to challenge or even refuse the pressures of dominant goal oriented doctrines». (Cocker 2010, 155)

Can this consideration be applied also to mapping, if we see it as an ongoing attempt to grasp and represent (i.e. share and communicate) «an unintelligible world? » (Cocker 2010, 155).

«Sisyphean failure thus becomes double-edged – the gap between one iterance and the next produces pause for thought, the space of thinking» (Cocker 2010, 155).

Perhaps the map is not a schema, if schema ‘indicates the conventional model, simplified compared to the more complex reality of a problem, a phenomenon, an object, a mechanism or a process that we are used to employ as means of “understanding of the surrounding world” (see SCHEMA 2018). Mapping continues to tend to an-other reality, constructing in fact an alternative one as it interprets and represents the given (or what is apparently presented as such). As it attempts to represent an “understanding of the surrounding world”, mapping produces at the same time an-other one, again, and again. It needs to be repeated, trans-formed, adapted, to approximate (get close); but it never coincides with.
Making a map of schema reveals that the two do not coincide. Schema is many (schemata). Map is intrinsically multiple, «a thinking space for nascent imaginings, for repeated attempts and inevitable irresolution» (Cocker 2010, 161). Perhaps the map is the possibility of the impossibility of the schema.
Bibliography


