FOREWORD TO ISSUE 2/2022

The digital economy has profoundly transformed in the last decades. One of the most conspicuous and influential driving forces of such a transformative process is the rise of digital platforms. The extraordinary expansion of the platform economy has reshaped business models in a variety of sectors, the market structure, and the interplay between incumbents and new entrants, between platform models and non-platform models. In such a context, the growing power of big platforms is attracting the attention of legislators, regulators and supervisors.

This issue (2/2022), *The growing power of big platforms: rethinking regulatory strategies (beyond competition law)*, is devoted to understanding, appraising, and decoding the power of big platforms and to reflecting on how to devise effective policy responses. To that end, the issue gathers contributions that address the role of big platforms in the global economy and discuss regulatory strategies aimed to counter their growing power and its implications for the digital society. Beyond the market power from a competition-law perspective, big platforms are proving to act as gatekeepers in the access to services, markets, resources, and infrastructures. The influence of large platforms goes beyond the concept of market power and, consequently, the traditional antitrust mechanisms are arguably insufficient, slow, or even inefficient. The DMA (Digital Markets Act) represents a shift of the EU regulatory strategy towards an ex-ante, preventive approach to ensure fair and contestable digital markets. It pivots on the designation of gatekeepers on the basis of a combination of quantitative and qualitative criteria and the compliance of a set of obligations aimed to rebalance the market.

Contributions to this issue aimed to address various questions raised by the platform power. How should the interplay between market power and gatekeeping potential work? Does the concept of market power need to be reconsidered in the platform economy? Should large platforms be deemed as critical infrastructures or essential facilities? How does the ex-ante regulatory approach work in a global digital economy? Will the DMA approach foster the emergence of new platforms in the European Union? Are competition and innovation effectively promoted under a preventive approach? Should very large platforms be forced to break up to reduce their power?

The issue collects studies from different perspectives that compare the competition-law approach and the ex-ante regulatory strategy, analyse the DMA’s rules and concepts, study specific cases of platform power, and dive into the interplay of the DMA
with other key legal and regulatory components of the digital economy – the DSA (Digital Services Act, big data and data governance, privacy).

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