Values in European Union-Latin America and Mercosur-Pacific Alliance convergence. Do European shared values promote convergence?

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1. Introduction

The question if shared values between Europe and Latin America can foster convergence between them is tied to the question of how to overcome the present fragmented status of Latin America because intra-regional fragmentation represents an obstacle to inter-regional convergence and questions the role of shared values in the region. The subject has attracted special attention after the signing of the 2019 European Union (EU) -Southern Common Market (Mercosur) association treaty. This has been hailed as developing a level playing field between Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance (PA) because both groups’ members have made deeper concessions on technical norms, investment, intellectual property, etc., in their treaties with the EU than to each other (Bartesaghi and Melgar 2018; Bartesaghi 2020; Pucheta and Alvarez 2019). Meanwhile, European literature puts more faith in EU “shared values” than in technical regulations as the cornerstone of convergence. We argue that values play a role in convergence between EU, Mercosur, and PA, but they are not the key element as divergence over economic principles prevails. Thus, adapting some EU economic principles (and practices) may be more important than EU promoted values in fostering inter-regional convergence; but we doubt that they will have a similar effect between Mercosur and PA convergence.

In the Maastricht Treaty (1992) convergence assumed the form of economic conditions (control over inflation and public debt, etc.) that the EU has been able to coordinate since its foundation and that other European states must fulfil to enter the group. In external relations, the concept has a wider strategic meaning as values are expected to promote key common objectives and interests with other regions or countries “regarding long-term developments in world politics” (Braekus and Overland 2007, 42). In parallel, the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA/ALADI 1980) understands convergence as the progressive multilateralization of partial economic agreements by means of periodical renegotiations between members (Caichiolo 2019, 248). Recently, the literature on regional integration pays attention to normative/regulatory convergence connoting the elimination not only of barriers at the border (tariffs) but also of technical and phytosanitary regulations, etc² among subregional groups.

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1 Mercosur-PA “convergence in diversity” was proposed in 2014 by former presidents Lula Da Silva (Brazil) and Ricardo Lagos (Chile) to deepen both groups economic interdependence by simplifying or eliminating non-tariff barriers without implying macroeconomic policy changes or absorption of one by the other (Aranda and Riquelme 2015). Negotiations between both groups stalled in 2018.

2 Normative convergence is defined as the elimination of differences to create a low common normative denominator acceptable to all parts rather than new regulations. For economists, convergence means to level up economic growth indicators among nations (see Velde 2011).
To assess if the values promoted by the EU foster interregional and intraregional convergence in Latin America and acknowledge changes in European and Latin American actors and in the international order, we review, first, the literature on EU values and associated concepts such as principles, and practices to establish their influence on Mercosur and PA. Then, we compare the values, principles, and practices of the three regional groups; and, in the final section, we discuss if those values foster convergence between EU-Latin America and between Mercosur-PA or if they ought to take in consideration changes in the EU, Latin America, and the international system.

We combine discourse analysis of official documents and declarations of the EU, Mercosur, and PA with historical comparative analysis and a rational choice approach to motivation through a revision of published literature on EU shared values and EU-Latin American relations. Our starting methodological proposition is that looking at the narrative of a regional organization provides information about their ideas and motivations (to exert influence on others, to defend themselves in a hostile environment, etc.) (Miskimmon et al. (2017), which agrees with the discursive institutionalism approach (Schmidt 2010, 3).

2. Values and their role in EU’s influence on Mercosur and PA

A summary review of the literature on EU values shows, first, that its domestic political use by EU officials responds to different motivations -- to compensate the “democratic deficit” or “legitimacy crisis” of EU authorities or to combat EU-scepticism, for example -- while EU citizens use them to stress the liberal notions that differentiate them from “other” groups (new immigrants, etc.) (Dratwa 2014) or to challenge the shortcomings of the EU political and economic system. This variety has led Calligaro et al. (2016, 6) to conclude that there are several versions of EU values. In this article we do not look at the causality, motivation, domestic acceptance, or results in the EU of the official use of shared values, but at their influence in inter-regional convergence with Latin America.

Following Ivic (2019), we separate the analysis of the substantive content of values from their official political content by focusing on published EU documents and political discourse. Our emphasis is on EU politically constructed values that fulfill EU objectives abroad and that the Maastricht Treaty (1992) summarizes stating that the common foreign and security policy has the aim of "safeguarding the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union". In the 2000s, Spain Foreign Relations minister Ana Palacio (2003) characterized the EU as a “living organism” reacting to daily questions and considered that values were not self-contained because interdependence needed that the international system be restructured in a democratic way. Benita Ferrero-Waldner (EU Commissioner for External Relations) (2005) also mentioned “core” EU values as the axis of those relations.

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3 Through J-stor, we reviewed the literature in English and Spanish employing the keywords European Union and shared values in all fields between 2000 and 2020; we did the same for the key words EU-Latin American relations. After reviewing those documents, we looked at additional titles in their bibliographies. For Mercosur we relied mostly on documents published since the year 2000. For PA, we reviewed all summit meetings declarations in its web page.
EU values may be considered universal because human dignity, freedom, justice, prosperity, equality, solidarity, etc., often appear in United Nations declarations (Hemeren 2008, 379). But also, Hemeren (2008) claims that in the EU those values may be placed in a different ranking than in other regions and nations, e.g., human dignity, solidarity, equality, and social justice may be prioritized over other values. This means that the EU may choose to promote some values or partners over others in external relations, and that choice may change overtime, as reflected in the assertion that the EU and the United States (U.S.) are “the world’s natural home of freedom and democracy” made during the negotiation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (Calligaro et al. 2016, 12). A few years later Ruhlig (2018) would claim that the EU was the only defender of the international liberal order because the US Trump administration had forfeited that goal.

Akaliyski et al. (2021) define “shared values” as the values that the EU propagates and identify them as personal freedom, individual autonomy, social solidarity, ethnic tolerance, civic honesty, gender equality and liberal democracy. According to Oshri, Sheafer, and Shenhav (2016), democratic values are an important facet of the EU identity. In fact, the recently approved Neighbourhood, Development, and International Cooperation Instrument dedicated to external action aims at “defending and promoting the values and interests of the [European] Union throughout the world” (quoted in Altrogge 2021, 9). For Altrogge (2021, 22) the Euro-Latin American cooperation must be based on partnership because the EU has a comparative advantage – “the sense of belonging to a community of shared values” – and “the region [Latin America] demands EU’s experience in the application of public policy models”. This statement links the existence of shared values and the fact that the EU also provides a set of practices that has become a role model for other groups. But Borrell (2020) (vice president of the European Commission) recently stated that “the whole point of the EU is to defend European values and interests by means of a united front...”. His emphasis on the need to defend values in the international arena suggests that the EU may be facing challenges in the international landscape.

In the literature, values are employed together with terms such as ethical beliefs, legal principles, etc., a fact that makes it necessary to differentiate what we understand as values, beliefs, principles, practices. An attempt to do this is in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000) where Ivic (2014, 111-112) notices a distinction between “values” (freedom, equality, human dignity, solidarity) and “principles” (democracy, the rule of law) (Ivic 2014, 111-112), i.e., values signal desirable conditions for actions, and principles translate them into commands about specific actions (Williams 2009). Figuratively, values are horizons of behaviour and principles the routes leading to them.

Regional groups like any other institution contain a set of stable values and principles, but they are not immutable. Though values and principles provide stability and permanence along time, they may change due to crisis, external conditions, socialization, or other historical situations. The literature on culture portrays values as stable general preferences “that reproduce themselves with the socialization of each
new generation", but they, as any other cultural influence, “are dynamic and situational rather than stable and general… as people increasingly span multiple cultures” (Morris et al. 2015, 1). Empirical evidence also confirms that values change with economic conditions — economic growth hastened a movement toward individualist values in western Europe, and economic decline, a movement toward collectivist values in former East Europe communist countries (Morris et al. 2015, 2) —. If values (horizons) change, the routes leading to them may change as well.

Mader (2018, 137) finds a shift from “foundational principles” (that he defines as “beliefs converted into legal principles”) to “shared values” (ethical convictions) in the Maastricht and Lisbon treaties to show that the EU rests “on deeper roots than only the goals related to successful economic integration, legal approximation or a strong internal market”. Therefore, he adds beliefs to the pool of terms employed while discussing values⁴. In the same way that beliefs in the individual are born from their life experiences (Romanell 2020), beliefs in regional groups spring from their specific histories, conditions, and experiences. According to Mader (2018), the shift in the EU narrative about values does not alter principles such as trade liberalisation and free capital movement. He also claims that we may appreciate beliefs through the principles into which they are incorporated, so in this article we use the term principles instead of the more subjective beliefs⁵.

A final comment on beliefs is that, for Morris et al. (2015, 1), values and beliefs are associated into models usually seen as stable cultural patterns or structures, so structuralist perspectives tend to highlight differences as fixed factors and seem to ignore that models can change because, if they are akin to value systems, they are not immutable. Regional integration models do not imply fixed packages of principles, regulations, or practices, but repeated exposure to them “induces the perception of these being familiar and typical” and morally superior to others when the fact is that they do not contain moral factors (Morris et al. 2015). Also, most international divergence derives not so much from differences over values than from differences in beliefs/principles about the way to fulfil values (Morris et al. 2015). In Latin America, though Mercosur and PA share values like development and democracy, they diverge in their view of regional integration models. Supporters of a State-led model of integration consider the State able and necessary to produce an equalitarian and fair distribution of public regional goods (Börzel 2015). Those who disagree think that the Latin American State is affected by institutional malfunctions (Mecham 2003, 382) and bureaucratic inefficiencies which limit its capacity to create and redistribute public goods.

Another term associated with values is norms. Katzenstein (1996, 5, in Dratwa 2014, 95) defines them as standards “of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’, assuming then the existence of an identity substratum that provides sub-

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⁴ A belief is defined as an idea “that we hold to be true” regardless of any evidence to support it (Garret et al. 2016). It is usually employed in association with religion, but its meaning is wider.

⁵ Abroad, the EU has continued to ensure that these principles are incorporated by the multilateral system and other regional blocs (Santander 2005), as seen in the 1995 Framework Agreement EU-Mercosur that stresses the desire to uphold and strengthen free trade and open regionalism (Nolte and Ribeiro 2021, 91).
stance to norms and, therefore, adds weight to them (Dratwa 2014). But, in general, norms can be understood as the translation into legal frameworks of desirable directives for actions (i.e., values), so we prefer the general term practices (rules of behaviour). Laursen (2008) sees practices as institutional choices because they result from an agreement among members of regional organizations to give a specific shape to a formal institution, but also as the practical application of a principle -- i.e., democracy needs specific ways in which to perform elections, and regional economic integration may go through different stages --. They are key factors because whenever institutional choices replicate practices of the EU, they may be assumed to result from EU influence. In short, if Mercosur and PA replicate or do not replicate EU-like institutions, it may be inferred that the EU represents a positive or non-positive role model for them.

With this summary definition background, let us look at EU’s influence in Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay⁶, 1991) and PA (Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, 2012) to find if that influence played a role in fostering the adoption of EU values, principles, and practices. Thus, we deal with the consequences of influence upon convergence rather than the mechanisms through which the EU attempts to diffuse its values abroad.

From a diffusion perspective, EU’s influence in Mercosur has been called a process of “spurred emulation” in which “policy-makers emulate EU institutional models under conditions of uncertainty” but also because “EU-oriented domestic actors” and the EU promote that model (Lenz 2012, 156). As a result, though Mercosur started as a pragmatic gradual process, it soon developed EU-like institutions and attempted to follow EU stages (free trade area, custom union, etc.). Emulation was due to the need to solve cooperation problems (rational choice) and obtain legitimacy by identifying with a successful model. It was also fostered by the EU’s active involvement⁷ and reinforced by domestic epistemic communities⁸, but did not affect Mercosur economic principles (only some of its market-building objectives and dispute settlement procedures, Lenz 2012, 157). Accordingly, practices rather than values were the basis for emulation.

Consequently, Mercosur adopted part of the EU institutional model but did not give up national sovereignty as shown by its individual governments’ insistence in the principle of non-intervention in other members’ internal affairs. Even now Mercosur internal bodies function under the leadership of their countries’ presidents (Caichiolo 2019, 250) and, instead of being a platform for insertion into the global economy, like the EU, Mercosur is a protectionist arrangement, sheltering members economies from external competition (Caichiolo 2019, 254). In short, Mercosur accepted EU institutional practices but maintained different economic and political principles.

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⁶Venezuela entered the group in 2012 but was suspended from active participation in 2017; Bolivia is accepted as a member but has not finished its process of accession.

⁷Between 1992 and 1994 the EU offered 24 million euros in cooperation projects to support Mercosur’s institutionalization (Lenz 2012, 166) and promised to negotiate a bloc-to-bloc trade agreement.

⁸In the 1990s, Southern Cone legal experts, “many of whom had studied in Europe”, advocated a Mercosur Court of Justice and its creation copied Art 177 of the Treaty of Rome, but protecting national sovereignty (Lenz 2012, 173-174).
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From the beginning the EU provided technical, financial, and diplomatic support to Mercosur with the expressed goals of concluding a political, commercial, and co-operation region–to–region agreement, and fulfilling its self-assumed role as an “external federator” for other regional experiences (Santander 2005). EU influence resulted from observation of its economic and political progress and actions (emulation) and produced efforts to advance Mercosur institutionalization along EU lines. But results were minimal, and, though the Ouro Preto Protocol (1994) granted Mercosur legal personality and its norms became international laws requiring national action, low implementation and high non-compliance have remained the rule (Fabbrini 2009).

Though in the 2000s Mercosur incorporated social and political elements (Neto 2016; Olmos 2017), the institutional format of the agreement suffered little change. Mercosur political values mirroring the EU ones are included in its 1992 summit meeting declaration that states that democratic institutions were (Novak 2012, 107), later confirmed by the Ushuaia Protocol (1998) (commitment to democracy) and the Political Declaration of Mercosur, Bolivia, and Chile as a Zone of Peace (1999). The trend became stronger after the Brazilian currency crisis (1999) and the Argentine default (2001-2002) affected trade and investment within Mercosur (Neto 2016). Finally, the Buenos Aires Consensus (2003) gave the group an explicit social and political dimension.

However, the EU incorporation of social and political aspects responded to the problems created by its increasing economic modernization and global insertion, while Mercosur’s emphasis on social and political goals in the 2000s led to abandon efforts to modernize its productive system and deepen its international insertion (Caichiolo 2019, 256; see also Bouzas et al. 2002; Medeiros and Dri 2013). After 2001, the commodity export boom led by Chinese demand contributed to both the stagnation of EU-Mercosur trade negotiation and convergence processes. They were restarted in the 2010s when the EU world trade declined after the 2008 crisis and for a short time Mercosur seemed to have weathered the crisis better (Nolte and Ribeiro 2021, 104).

While in the 2000s Mercosur adopted European values regarding social justice, the fight against poverty, inequality, hunger and illiteracy, civil society participation, and reduction of internal asymmetries (Neto 2016: 608), simultaneously, Brazil attempted to widen the agreement to the rest of South America. Mercosur became part of the Brazilian government strategy to stress relations with South American countries and strengthen Brazil’s capacity to act in global fora (Brazil. Presidency. “Balance sheet for 2003-2010” quoted in Neto 2016, 610). So, the adoption by Mercosur of EU values in the 2000s may be attributed to internal changes in Brazil and in the Brazilian perception of the EU. Thus, when President Lula Da Silva stated in 2003 that “the EU is not just a partner but a source of inspiration […] we admire the determination to shape a new pole of development,” he looked at the EU as a counterweight to the U.S. in a multipolar global system in which Brazil expected to play a key role and needed supporters (Moxon-Browne 2014, 289). But looking at the EU as a potential partner for achieving Brazilian global objectives in a context of multiple trade negotiations (Doha Round,
Free Trade Agreement of the Americas is different from considering it a role model for Mercosur. If EU’s influence promoted the adoption of EU values by Mercosur in the 2000s, that adoption coincided with strategic objectives of the Brazilian government. When that government changed in 2016, did not change but previous compromises were un-fulfilled, especially on environmental protection (see Prusa and Smith 2020).

In conclusion, EU and Mercosur documents support the same values, but both groups hold conflicting economic principles. And, though Mercosur applies practices of EU integration like the Structural Convergence Fund (FOCEN), they are not a reflection of the EU (Moxon-Browne, 2014), as identically named institutions in different regional settings do not mean that they are based on the same values. According to Moxon-Browne (2014, 284), the EU assumes that Latin American society holds the same values than Europe (a notion also supported by EU documents quoted in Altrøkke 2021), but values may get lost in translation. Let us add that, without values becoming meaningfully incorporated in economic principles and practices, it is difficult to achieve convergence.

However, change is possible as Colombia and Peru, PA members that also belong to the Andean Groups established in 1969 by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru⁹, have proved. In 1969, Europe was a model for regional integration based on the rationalist premises that functional pressures, interdependence, and the participation of State and non-State actors would move the process forward through stages (Breslin et al. 2003). Though the Andean group replicated EU practices, its goals were different because their governments aimed at promoting industrialization by import substitution, granting the State an enhanced role in the economy, and retaining their sovereignty (Alter et al. 2012, 641). Like in Mercosur, European practices were incorporated but based on a divergent set of economic principles.

When in 2011 Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru formed the PA, the international context was not the same and the governments of Colombia and Peru have changed their economic principles. Colombia and Peru had already signed trade agreements with the EU and weakened their allegiance to Andean integration because Venezuela’s exit (2006) had reduced the intra-regional market, while internal ideological polarization had practically split the group –Bolivia and Ecuador entered the Venezuelan State project Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA), while the Colombian and Peruvian governments looked for allies supporting free trade and an export-led economic development model – (Giocalone 2010). At that time, the other PA members (Chile, Mexico) also enjoyed an improved self-image because they had maintained economic growth and political stability for more than a decade and had trade treaties with the EU, United States, and Chile even with China.

After the 2008 financial crisis, the shift of the global trade axis from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and the slackening of Chinese demand of commodities, the governments of Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru were uncertain about the future and willing to form a new group (Nolte 2016). When they established the PA, its format was

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⁹ Venezuela did not enter until 1973, and in 1976 Chile moved out due to changes in economic policy under the military regime.
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closer to the South-eastern ASEAN model [consensual decision-making, no regional secretariat, etc.\(^{10}\)] than to the EU one. ASEAN members’ economic success in the 2000s probably influenced the PA like the European Economic Community/EU success had influenced the formation of the Andean Group and Mercosur in the twentieth century. In both cases, emulation may be correlated with the perception of the economic success of a regional group rather than with its values.

Despite not following EU practices, PA maintains a consistent positive approach to Europe as an economic partner and its economic principles do not clash with EU values or principles. In 2019, the PA presidential summit stressed the group’s support for democracy and human rights, free trade, multilateralism, and sustainable development. PA and EU signed a Joint Declaration establishing a partnership to 'enhance solid, productive and lasting ties' based on the principles of democracy, human rights and rule of law and 'a shared vision on the importance of promoting multilateralism and a rules-based order’\(^{11}\). Its core elements are economic and financial integration, investment, development, education mobility, digital strategies, among others, and the document was hailed as resulting from EU’s excellent relations with PA members and aimed at reinforcing the development of a 'more global' PA by the 2030s (Tvevad 2020, 26-27). A review of their summit declarations shows that EU shared values are considered positive and do not collide with their members support for open regionalism economic principles.

PA formation illustrates the role of changes in the international system in interregional relations because by 2011 growing unilateralism, trade tensions and the stagnation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) reaffirmed the need of PA member governments to ally among themselves in support of their economic and political positions. By that time, the EU international position had changed as new global (China) and regional actors (ASEAN, Brazil) had risen. Thus, PA members began simultaneous trade negotiations with China, Mercosur, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Singapore (to incorporate them as PA associate members, Tvevad 2020, 11), and Chile, Mexico, and Peru signed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Transpacific Partnership (CPTTP) with eight Asian Pacific nations.

Summarizing, both emulation and EU open support for Mercosur explain the institutional choices made by the group in the twentieth century. By 2011-2012, however, in South-eastern Asia, ASEAN was achieving high marks in economic and human development indices (OECD Report 2011; Hill and Menon 2010), while the external projection of the EU model and its economic importance have been weakened by internal problems (financial crisis, widening to Eastern European nations). Since then, the invasion of Crimea by Russia, the migration crisis, and the United Kingdom secession further eroded EU influence abroad. But that did not prevent the signing of the EU-Mercosur trade agreement (2019), with concessions on investments, technical

\(^{10}\) ASEAN did not have a regional secretariat until 1974. For more detail, see Camroux (2008); Beeson (2009).

\(^{11}\) Visión Estratégica de la Alianza del Pacífico al Año 2030 (2019). Available at https://alianzapacifico.net/wp-content/uploads/V-final-ALIANZA-DEL-PACIFICO-V2030-version-final-julio-24.pdf. The document is a good example of how the terms values and principles (sometimes even beliefs) are employed to refer to a desirable international order.
barriers, norms of origin, etc., that Mercosur seems unwilling to grant to PA in parallel negotiations (Bartesaghi 2020, 9, 14).

3. Shared values in EU-Mercosur-PA

For Hermeren (2008, 377), more important than listing values mentioned in EU declarations is to explicit relations between values (can economic growth foster democracy?) and order them in a ranking (which values are first steps toward others?) because “in all societies, trade-offs between values take place” when situation or context change. Therefore, some values may be “sacrificed to preserve others”, and the same values may exist outside the EU in a different ranking, and, if ranking orders are relative to issues or situations, they are “temporal and will have to be revised if, and when… the situation changes” (Hermeren 2008, 378). A dialogue leading to convergence needs actors not only to explicit their values rankings, as Hemeren (2008, 384) claims, but also that they be prepared to make concessions and adaptations according to changes in context or negotiating actors.

For Mader (2018), however, in the EU ranking, democracy, human rights, and rule of law consistently appear as the top three (Mader 2018). He gives as examples articles 2 and 6 (1) of the Lisbon Treaty (2007) as the former includes respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights; and the latter mentions that the Treaty is founded on “human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity”, and based on “the principles of democracy and the rule of law”. In its external relations (Art. 21.1), the EU promotes democracy, the rule of law, and human rights together with fundamental freedoms and respect for the United Nations Charter and international law. Mader (2018, 136-137) also recognizes that values appear in the treaty in an “aleatory and unstructured” way¹², that he attributes to the need to provide legal economic and political principles with values to justify the transfer of competence and powers from European nations to union authorities. But the external projection of EU was already incorporated in documents and declarations like a Romano Prodi (2000) speech as European Commission president, when he said that “Europe needs to project its model of society into the wider world” because it offers “a civilization deeply rooted in religious and civic values” (Prodi 2000, in Crookes 2013, 647).

The main original Mercosur objective was to accelerate economic development with social justice, an objective congruent with the aim of its members of maintaining their recently regained democracy after two decades of military regimes in the Southern Cone¹³. This pragmatic objective was based on economic principles developed by its members since the failure of the export development model in 1930, principles that included import-substitution industrialization by

¹² When attempting to rank values in each group’s official documents, we found the same problem, so we settled for listing the most repeated ones in Table 1. Calligaro et al (2016, 26) suggest that inconsistency may signal institutional incapacity to substantiate values content.

means of tariff protection, and establishment of strategic sectors, credits, and subsidies by the State (Korol and Sabato 1990). But Mercosur foundational agreement (1991) mentioned other economic objectives: “to promote a common space that generates business and investment opportunities through the competitive integration of national economies into the international market”¹⁴. Presently, its webpage claims that since its origins, “Mercosur has been based on the principles of democracy and economic development”, and it has added agreements on migration, labour, cultural, and social matters¹⁵ to improve the quality of life of its citizens (Novak 2012). Though these official declarations look like EU declarations on values, Mercosur remains inter-governmental, its level of implementation is low, and internal disagreements about economic principles have increased (Council on Foreign Relations 2021).

Changes in the EU and global context can be seen in both groups’ declarations about the EU-Mercosur agreement. In 2019, Mercosur representatives characterized the agreement as providing “an institutional seal” of support and permanence to the strategic relation between the blocs by guaranteeing “transparency, predictability, and clear rules for economic actors”¹⁶ [i.e., the agreement was supported due to pragmatic reasons]. Meanwhile, EU representatives declared that it was a political association that respected and preserved the European environment, labour, and consumers rights by incorporating sustainable development, among other aspects¹⁷. Both groups’ declarations aimed at counteracting domestic criticism of the agreement, but they make clear that Mercosur’s concerns are economic, and the EU ones are focused on other matters. For our argument, this means that, even if they share values, this is a matter of less relevance than their economic principles and institutional practices.

Mercosur discourse about the agreement downplays values because, though the agreement has arrived late and has less impact than it would have had twenty years ago when negotiations started, it is still economically important for Mercosur because between 20 and 25 % of its exports go to the EU (Bartesaghi and Rios 2020). But the EU-Mercosur agreement is important for the EU in geopolitical terms because it reaffirms European presence in Latin America despite US trade unilateralism, the participation of Latin American nations in Asia-Pacific mega-trade deals, and negotiations with China, and helps disseminate EU regulations and set international standards (Nolte and Ribeiro 2021, 108).

¹⁷ In an informal meeting in Berlin, EU high level representatives stated that the agreement should be implemented focusing on areas of concern for European public opinion. See EU-Mercosur statement on Sustainable Development at EU27-LAC Informal Ministerial Meeting (2020) Berlin, December 14. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_20_2424.
From the beginning PA documents emphasized the open integration orientation of the group and its similarities with the economic principles of the EU (free trade, etc.), even when establishing decisions on the harmonization of regulations for the health sector (to facilitate and speed up the registration of medicines) and on scholarship exchange programs (which favour technical education students)\(^\text{18}\). The preamble of its constitutive document (2012) describes regional integration as an instrument to advance economic and social development, improve the quality of life of its population, and help solve poverty, exclusion, and social inequality. By 2016 sustained economic growth justified the incorporation of environmental protection. The PA 2017 summit meeting declaration stated that the group promotes the free movement of persons, goods, services, and capitals, and “strengthens growth and sustainable development” with the aim, among others, to face “regional and global risks and challenges”\(^\text{19}\). It specifically mentions the shared conviction to promote a “green growth strategy” in view of climate change challenges\(^\text{20}\), and to incorporate a gender perspective in programs and activities. Accordingly, its closeness to EU values and principles is high.

However, the practices simultaneously adopted by the PA from the South-eastern model of regional integration [no secretariat, consensual decision-making, etc.] signal that some shared principles may not result from EU influence but from its governments’ open economic orientation that differentiates them from Mercosur governments. Also, some PA mentions of values and principles are linked to its governments legitimizing efforts at the national level. In Chilean official discourse, for example, the projection of its economic model to Latin America is necessary to counter the negative vision of the region in the global economy (Muñoz 2016). In Mexico, the underlying notion is that the PA provides a means of self-affirmation vis-à-vis the U.S. In Colombia, legitimizing big business’ role as intermediaries between their nation and Asia Pacific is an important factor. In Peru, discourse emphasizes the integration of peripheral regions to the core economy to spread and legitimize the benefits of international insertion (Giacalone 2019).

Table 1 summarizes values, principles, and practices of the three groups to highlight that divergence between Mercosur-PA and Mercosur-EU is based on economic principles rather than values, while EU-PA diverge more in practices than principles.

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\(^{19}\) See Declaración de presidentes XII Cumbre de la Alianza del Pacífico, Cali, Colombia: 30 de junio, 2017. Available at https://alianzapacifico.net/declaracion-de-cali/.

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| EU | Values (ethical convictions) | Table 1. Values, principles, and practices in the EU, Mercosur, and PA |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Democracy; Human rights;        | Values, principles, and practices in the EU, Mercosur, and PA |
| Environment protection and Fundamental freedoms; Sustainable development | Principles (beliefs converted into legal norms) |
| The rule of law; Respect for human dignity equality and solidarity; The UN Charter, and international law; Trade liberalisation and open economy; Environmental and labour norms, and rights of European consumers | Practices (institutional choices) |
| Mix of supranational and inter-governmental institutions |
| Mercosur | Democracy; Human rights; Economic development with social justice; Quality of life | Non-intervention in internal affairs; State industrial promotion and sectorial preferences (e.g., automotive sector) |
| Inter-governmental institutions and EU-like format (Mercosur passeport, etc.) |
| PA | Democracy; Human rights; Sustainable economic and social development to improve the quality of life of its population | The rule of law and respect of international law; Free trade “in a rules-based multilateral system” |
| Inter-governmental institutions without EU-like format and intraregional cooperation measures |

Source: Compiled by the Author.

Findings in this section are that the adoption of the same practices by different organizations (institutional isomorphism) does not mean that the adopting organization has also adopted values and principles of the other or that it is willing to do so (Simmons and Martin 2012, 340). Mentioning the same values in official declarations does not mean that their content is the same or that each value occupies the same place in the value ranking of different regional organizations. The EU, Mercosur, and PA mention the same [or quite similar] values, but the first two are mutually closer in practices and EU and PA, in economic principles. In Mercosur-PA, there is the biggest divergence as practices and principles move in opposite directions highlighting the importance of historical factors (i.e., their economic history, the different outlook of the international order in 1991 and 2011) and now the different political orientation of their governments. Then, presently, the main obstacle to convergence between Mercosur and PA is, according to Turzi (2014, 81), that though the two groups are not “incompatible or antinomic”, their governments have taken the political decision to turn their singularities into “irreconcilable differences.” For us, this polarized divergence is at the root of the fragmentation of Latin American regional integration and affects the possibility of EU “shared values” to foster convergence with Latin America.
4. Discussion and Conclusion

In this article we looked at EU “shared values” as a political construction and explored the way that concept is applied in EU relations with Latin America to establish if EU shared values play a role in convergence between the EU and Latin America and between the latter subregional groups. We did not concern ourselves with the political motivations of the concept, its historical, cultural, or contextual roots, process of domestic diffusion, or acceptance by European society, which are the main lines of inquiry in the European literature. Our focus has been on answering two questions: do EU shared values foster convergence between EU and Latin America? And can they foster convergence between Mercosur and PA considering the persistence of divergent economic principles and practices?

To answer them, we identified first how values and associated concepts (beliefs/principles, practices/norms) are defined in the literature, and we contrasted European influence in the genesis and format of Latin American regional agreements (Mercosur) in the 20th century and (PA) in the second decade of the 21st century. The comparison showed that though the former has incorporated EU values and practices, it still diverges from the EU in economic principles. The PA incorporates values but no EU-like practices, even if its economic principles are closer to those of the EU than to Mercosur’s principles.

We conclude that the fact that EU “shared values” are incorporated in the three regional groups may play a role in fostering relations between them, but that economic principles are more important factors for convergence or divergence. Principles -- defined as “beliefs incorporated into legal norms” that have developed through history -- can be harder to change and adapt than values, but they are not immutable. They are prone to change or experience a revision after crisis situations (wars, natural catastrophes, financial defaults, etc), changes in domestic and/or external context or emergence of new ideas. This suggests that EU “shared values” would have a bigger influence in fostering convergence with Latin America if they were accompanied by the adaptation of some of its economic principles and practices to changes in the EU, Latin America, and the international order since the 20th century.

Regarding the second question, the EU-Mercosur agreement bred the expectation that because Mercosur and PA have made deeper regulatory concessions to the EU than those mutually made, it will help develop a more level playing field between Mercosur and PA. Empirical evidence about the South-eastern Asia regional experience points in the opposite direction: all ASEAN members have made deeper regulatory concessions in their bilateral treaties with Japan, the US, and China, than among themselves, and until recently there were no individual or collective ASEAN efforts to spread those concessions to each other (Severino 2004; Beeson 2009). Now both the negotiations of the CPTPP, sponsored by the US (and later by Japan), and of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, promoted by China, impinged on regulatory convergence, especially by reducing red tape and simplifying norms of origin, but they are expected to take at least a couple of decades for their benefits to materialize (Deutsche Welles 2021) Accordingly, the answer to the second question is inconclusive.
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For Mercosur-PA convergence this means that, though concessions made to the EU by Mercosur may look like the concessions made by PA members in their bilateral agreements with the EU, that does not mean *per se* that they will be mutually extended between Mercosur and PA. The difference in economic principles between the two groups is compounded by the lack of political will of their governments to take the leap into convergence after the end of their negotiations in 2018. Probably, political divergence will have to be resolved first, but it will take time.

If the EU wants to diffuse Latin American fragmentation and negotiate international strategic values with the region, a starting point may be to rethink the meaning and orientation of “shared values” in the EU’s outward projection. In short, while Latin Americans sort out the problems affecting convergence between their regional groups, Europeans may have to reflect more about its projection of “shared values”, and the possibility of performing a trade-off of in economic principles and practices to accommodate the needs and demands of a changing international order.

This idea has been supported by authors like Crookes (2013) who considers that it would be better to base EU interregional foreign policy on the intersecting interests of actors, but previously the EU should define what are its core external interests (global governance? trade and investment? political or social change? or a case-by-case combination of them? In the same line, Mayer and Vogt (2006, 5 quoted in Moxon-Browne 2014, 276-277) think that the assumption that “…what is good for Europe must be good for the world” needs to be rephrased as “what is good for the world is …good for Europe”.

The “Laeken declaration on the future of the EU” (European Council 2001, 2 quoted in Martins 2011) characterized the EU as

... a power wanting to change the course of world affairs in such a way as to benefit not just the rich countries but also the poorest. A power seeking to set globalisation within a moral framework, in other words to anchor it in solidarity and sustainable development.

If that characterization still holds true, it may be necessary for the EU to be more attentive to the consequences of its economic principles and practices abroad because reorienting them will open more opportunities for cooperation and convergence between EU and Latin America. Official declarations about the EU-Mercosur agreement (2019) may be paradigmatic of changes in the perception of the EU for developing nations. The EU’s support of agricultural subsidies in the Doha Round, financial and migration crisis, inability to stand up to Russia in Ukraine, secession of the United Kingdom, and internal criticism about its democratic deficit have affected developing nations confidence in the EU, but they are still interested in it as an economic partner.

In this sense, Bruszt and Langbein (2020, 1007-1008) distinguish between the EU deep integration strategy applied to prospective Eastern European members and the shallow integration strategy applied to negotiate the association of other developing nations and regions. With the latter, the EU does not pay attention to the developmental cost of implementing European principles and practices, so, if they fail, the
cost of failure is absorbed by developing nations. In the XXI century, their governments need to ensure that they will benefit from a closer association with the EU and that agreements will include mechanisms to alleviate and anticipate the issues involved. But so far, the EU does not offer any prospect of helping reduce the cost of potential failures. Bruszt and Langbein (2020) summarize the problem saying that, though the EU aims at using values to play an external federator role regarding other regional groups, it does not assume the transaction cost of developing nations willing to follow its lead. And this becomes a key question when new international actors (e.g., China) offer alternative options.

Empirical research shows that the EU has been willing to accommodate principles and practices before, albeit for a short time. This was the case in 2007 when at the Lisbon summit meeting between the EU and Mercosur the European Commission announced the beginning of negotiations towards establishing a strategic partnership with Brazil, deviating from its practice of negotiating group to group. According to Ceia (2008, 82), EU’s objectives at that time were: 1) to ease the tensions with Brazil over differences on European agricultural subsidies in the Doha Round (where Brazil was leading the group of nations that opposed those subsidies), and 2) help Brazil exercised a leadership role in South America to counter the spread of Venezuelan authoritarian populism²¹.

The EU Commission document announcing its willingness to negotiate with Brazil incorporated values (protection of human rights, etc.) (Telò 2014) and economic interests, elements that support the statement that “trade has always been the EU’s most powerful external policy instrument” and “a channel to promote its interests and values vis-à-vis the Third World” (del Biondo et al. 2008, 111). Telò (2014, 22) stresses the combination of values and interests saying that the EU can use its material power to alter and influence external decisions by other actors through positive or negative measures, but it has not used that potential in a consistent way.

Let us add that if EU trade and economic power still provide a motivation for developing nations to accept EU influence, it may be time for reconsidering some adaptation of its principles and practices to the needs and demands of those nations. Analysis of declarations by EU, Mercosur and PA confirm that there are shared values among them, but if the EU wants to foster inter-regional convergence with Latin America it may need to adjust itself to changes in the international system to be more effective. The outcome may depend on the EU willingness to adjust practices like agricultural subsidies because, despite the geopolitical importance of the EU-Mercosur agreement, EU position on subsidies can still derail European ratification due to a clash between regional collective aspirations towards convergence and the practices of individual nations and interest groups (Nolte and Ribeiro 2021, 109)²².

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²¹ However, the EU refused to accept the inclusion of Brazilian ethanol in the WTO list of environmental goods and services eligible for accelerated liberalization due to concerns about deforestation (Ceia 2008: 88).

²² European non-ratification of the EU-Mercosur agreement contrasts with Mercosur’s decision to let member countries implement the agreement on a bilateral basis before ratification by all members (Gaens et al. 2020, 14).
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The EU non ratification may also affect the possibility of future economic negotiations because it generalizes the perception of the growing irrelevance of Latin America (Schenoni and Malamud 2021) for European governments. Altrogge (2021, 22) also points out that the reduction in the EU budget for cooperation with Latin America (2021-2027) clashes with the objective of building “a partnership based on shared values in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, multilateralism and regional integration”. Meanwhile, in EU external relations with China a change from values towards a more pragmatic policy has been advocated after the failure of previous efforts to strengthen liberal values in China (Ruhlig 2018, 91). Obviously, Latin America is not as economically powerful as China, but granted that Mercosur and PA have already adopted more EU values than China, why not make a similar pragmatic effort towards them?

To the second question, if EU shared values help promote Mercosur-PA convergence, it is more difficult to give a positive answer though both groups are practically based on the same values. On the one hand, differences in economic principles affect Mercosur-PA convergence, even if internal support for them has been eroded in Mercosur because Uruguay and Paraguay have developed more open economies than Argentina and Brazil. On the other, the present political polarization between Brazil and Mexico (Gomes and Costa 2021; Alcantara 2018), key economic actors of Mercosur and PA, does not help the negotiation of economic principles—or even of practices implied in normative/regulatory convergence.

Hermeren (2008) offers an alternative answer to the second question because he states that, if context (national, regional, and international circumstances), situation (the relative position of actors vis-à-vis context), and specific problems impinge on values, it makes sense that in a situation of regional fracture (political polarization), and external economic uncertainty (global crisis and pandemics), regional groups have incentives to modify or mutually adapt their values. We may still question if all those factors will impinge on economic principles to make them more convergent.

In conclusion, EU shared values matter in inter-regional convergence though the EU could contribute to the process by adjusting some principles and practices to changes in its relative position, Latin America, and the global system. Between Mercosur and PA other factors (such as political polarization) will have to be sorted out before achieving convergence. Though our answers are inconclusive, we hope the article has posed questions that may open the opportunity for a deeper debate of the relative weight of values and principles in regional agreements, the persistence of the EU struggle between collective values favouring external convergence and the defence of national economic principles, among other subjects.
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