Starting by pointing out the deep interconnections between temporality and passivity within phenomenology, the present paper intends to contribute with a reconstruction of Husserl’s “first glimpses” into the sphere of passivity and its genesis based on the Beranuer Manuscripts on Time-Consciousness (1917-18). To do so, it will follow a disposition in four stages: after a brief introduction, section I will display the emergence of the genetic methodology and its functional position within the broader context of the architectonic system of phenomenology. After that, section II will follow the development of the notion of “absolute consciousness” by clarifying the constitutive problematic of time-consciousness and the related problem of an infinite regress (that threatened Husserl’s thought for many years). Section III will expose the first genetic model of time-consciousness as developed in the Bernauer paying particular attention to the discover of a transcendental realm of passivity and pre-egoic constitution. Finally, section IV will provide a translation of Eugen Fink’s disposition draft for the edition of Husserl’s Bernauer Manuscripts, as he and Husserl planned it around 1930. Those documents can provide a deep understanding of Husserl’s texts, of the problems related to consciousness self-constitution and its relation with the questions concerning a phenomenology of passivity and passive synthesis.
Introduction

In the famous paragraph §81 concerning phenomenological time and consciousness of time of his *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology* (1913), wherewith the so-called transcendental turn of phenomenology was established, Husserl claimed that the transcendental “absolute” that had been «brought about by the reductions, is, in truth, not what is ultimate; it is something that constitutes itself in a certain profound and completely peculiar sense of its own, and that has its primal source in what is ultimately and truly absolute» (Husserl 1983, 193). Hence, the region of pure consciousness and its universal structures, this phenomenological residuum which the *Ideas* profoundly investigated and, first of all, opened up as transcendental field of research, had to be considered not only as constituting 1 but also as constituted «in a certain profound and completely peculiar sense of its own». This means that the process of consciousness self-constitution cannot be thought as equal to the constitutive process of objects and realities in general within absolute consciousness itself. Moreover, this fundamental problem involves (in a still unclear manner) some “other” absolute, as “its primal source”.

Aware both of the incomplete character of his first book of the *Ideas*, and of the methodological necessity of leaving «out of account the enigma of consciousness of time in [...] preliminary analyses without endangering their rigor» (1983, 194), in the following years Husserl undertook several attempts to sink, by means of transcendental reflection, into this “ultimately and truly phenomenological absolute”, as his research manuscripts and his academic activity clearly demonstrate. 2 Considered as one of the most interesting attempts to deal with the problem of time, the *Beranuer Manuscripts on Time-Consciousness* 3 represent the second great atlas of a phenomenology of time, yield by Husserl after the famous *Lectures on the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time* of 1905 (Husserl 1991) and more than ten years before the famous *C-Manuscripts on time and time-constitution* (2006), written during the 1930s and where he examined the question concerning the ultimate mode-of-being of the transcendental subjectivity – which is the same, as Held (1966, vii) already specified, to question the vitality [Lebendigkeit] of life in its experiencing connection with the world. In particular, the Bernauer are resulting from the philosophical effort of someone who “for decades did not speculate about a new Atlantis but instead actually journeyed in the trackless wilderness of a new continent and undertook the virgin cultivation of some of its areas”, and thereby did not excuses himself

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1 As Husserl (1983) states: «in its essence it is independent of all worldly, all natural Being; nor does it need any worldly Being for its existence. The existence of a Nature cannot be the condition for the existence of consciousness, since Nature itself turns out to be a correlate of consciousness: Nature is only as being-constituted in regular concatenations of consciousness» (116).

2 Cf. in this sense his Vorwort zum Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, Nr. 2, 1916 (Husserl 1987, 65-66); the Freiburger Antrittsrede of 1917 on Phenomenology, its research field and its method (Husserl 1987, 68-81), and the planned but never published essays on Phänomenologie und Psychologie and Phänomenologie und Erkenntnistheorie, both from 1917 (Husserl 1987, 82-205). See also the lectures on Natur und Geist from 1919 (Husserl 2001b).

3 All the following quotations from this work and from all the writings listed in the references which are not in English have been translated, when necessary, by the author. To facilitate the intra-linguistic comprehensibility of the texts and avoid confusion between terms, I opted to keep the german word “Erlebnis” (experience, experiencing as mental process) into English translations.
«from the pain of undertaking travels in the new land» (Husserl 1989, 422) and exploring this sort of unknown continent. Written mainly during two different sojourns in the small village of Bernau in the Black Forest during 1917 and 1918, they have been considered for many years by Husserl himself his magnum opus. As Husserl wrote to Heidegger in 1918: «A great work is growing up for me here in the quiet high valley – time and individuation, a renewal of a rational metaphysics from its principles. Here in Bernau I was immediately, from the first day on, the ‘other’, my counter-ego, the better I, the ‘feathered soul’, to speak with the Phaidros» (1994, 130). On April the fifth of the same year, as Roman Ingarden later recalled (Husserl 1968, 152-155), during a visit in Freiburg Husserl told him that he was very busy, even ten hours a day in the silent solitude of the valley, «dealing with the immense attempt of a final clarification of the deepest problems of phenomenological constitution, and of their relationship with the consciousness of time» (153).

In fact the Bernauer represent one of the most comprehensive accounts coming from the period immediately after the publication of the Ideas of the phenomenological problems related to the self-constitution of the absolute consciousness and its original temporal flow. In this work Husserl explores in detail and for the first time (Cf. Niel 2010; 2013) the realm of primal-phenomenality: the passive genesis, the pre-categorical and ante-predicative foundation of consciousness’ life, that is: the hidden and anonymous counterpart of consciousness’ activity, what he calls «the nameless above all comprehensible, that which is above all, not standing, not floating, not existing, but functioning» (Husserl, 2001, 278). By virtue of this plunge into the constitutive depths of transcendental subjectivity and its historicity, this texts are one of the most important, but also less studied documents proposing a new genetic approach to the “enigma of time”: that of transcendental temporality, the synthetic (self-) constitution of transcendental consciousness (or primal flow), and its hyletic levels of passivity and affectivity. The emergence of a phenomenological genetic method, which has proven its great importance both for the development of Husserl’s thought during the 1920s and for its final configuration in the 1930s, is clearly documented by two main aspects: 1) a somehow “new”, surely for Husserl at that time “innovative” theory of the temporality in genetic consideration (2001, 273-288); and 2) a new constitutive model of time-consciousness that could satisfactorily and properly explain also the peculiar sense of the self-constitution process. In this regard, Husserl was dealing since his Lectures (1991) with the threat of an infinite regress, caused by the fact that consciousness constitutive acts are constantly requiring new and deeper levels of activity in order to explain their constitution, which should be based upon this subjacent levels of the stream of consciousness. To escape this paradox in the Bernauer Manuscripts Husserl even developed the notion of some kind of primal flow of consciousness that should be nor constituted nor constituting any sort of objectiveness or of upper consciousness levels. To avoid the regressus ad infinitum regarding consciousness constitution, he tried to conceive the presence, at the bottom of the temporal consciousness, of a mere flow of original hyletic data – which had to be, in itself, unconscious. Phenomenologically it may be conceived as a mere potentiality of possible perception, for which it would be enough an original process, such as an original process of sensory data flowing-off, fading-away, etc. which in itself, however, is not a time-constituting process, but that becomes one, and can at any time become one, only through a subsequent and collateral “apprehension” [...] This process, just hypothetically considered, should not be constitutive for an immanent Erlebnis of first level. On the other hand, it should itself be a process of Erlebnis or “consciousness” (2001, 188).
Thus the essential character of this flow of hyletic data at the bottom of consciousness life would be precisely their lack of constitution, their “not-yet being constituted” as individual temporal objectivities. As Husserl writes: their «esse does not coincide with their percipi» (2001, 191), they are without being perceived. But then, Husserl wonders, in this case to is it still possible to speak of phenomenological data within the sphere of the original hyletic flow, if they’re not perceived, end thus do not appear at all? Can a «process of primal life be without really being a process of consciousness? And can a process of consciousness be without being conscious of itself as a process?» (188). And finally, does the hypothetical assumption of a nor constituting nor constituted primary flow really shields the investigation from am infinite regression into more and more levels of non-constituted flows and intentional darkness? «Are we really well protected from the dangers of a infinite regress by the assumption of ‘unconscious’, unintentional, ‘non-constituted’ processes, and is this assumption conceivable at all?» (200). Since every apprehension [Auffassung] of some content [Inhalt] requires a lower constitutive level, from which the apprehensive act arises, even admitting that some king of grasping could have the ability to establish a connection with some kind of not-intentional flow of hyletic data, the resulting consciousness of constituted objectivities and of their temporal succession cannot derive from the mere succession of consciousness phases. In this case a time-consciousness would then be impossible, because – as Husserl established since his Lectures of 1905 – a mere (conscious) succession of consciousness phases does not ensure the consciousness of the succession itself, i.e. consciousness of time. Consequently Husserl had to face the challenge of transforming and deepening his reductive inquiry into a previously unexplored «pre-egoic sphere», i.e. the sphere where the original sensuality [ursprüngliche Sensualität] lies, and where protention and retention – those fundamental mechanisms of consciousness’ life – are to be considered as «completely egoless sensual tendencies» (völlig ichlose sinnliche Tendenzen) (2001, 276).

On the basis of these premises, this shift towards original sensuality and the pre-egoic sphere corresponds precisely to the development of Husserl’s thought in the following years, and more precisely to what he set in motion at the beginning of the 1920s with his Analysen zur passiven Synthesis (1966). These lectures, firstly given in 1920/21 and then repeatedly readjusted in 1923 and 1925/26, offer an examination of a highly diverse and rich field of research: that of «transcendental logic» – as Husserl firstly entitled them – or of «primal constitution» (1966, xiv). The discoverer of passive syntheses provided Husserl with the (possible) conception of a passive genesis that embraces a wide range of phenomena of association, such as affection, irritation effects on the ego, and all those passive experience-processes, according to which consciousness flow has to be considered, in itself (i.e. an sich), as a multi-layer structure of constitutive performances, actively and passively fulfilled. All those associative forms of passivity and genetic constitution are detailed in Husserl’s text of the mentioned lectures. But the specific attention to a phenomenology of passivity corresponds also – and therefore is in complete harmony with – to the later results of the wide-ranging, systematic and architectural reflection on phenomenology as a whole philosophical system and on its different levels of implementation, which was the focus of the collaboration and joint-enterprise between Husserl and Fink in the 1930s. The planned book on the System of Phenomenological Philosophy, on which Fink and Husserl worked together at the beginning of the 1930s, was thought to produce an overall systematization of

5 In this regard my interpretation is not in accordance with Zahavi’s position, for whom Fink ‘failed
the most diverse phenomenological analyses and their mutual relations, clearly according to a multi-levels structure that corresponded to a multi-levels theory of Being (Fink 1989, 8). Accordingly, the section where “primal intentionality” was discussed had to provide a theory on the

Phenomenology of ‘Instincts’ […] The primal intentionality still undifferentiated: successful constitution of Being as good; formation of the spaces of play [Spießräume] for the bodily perceptive movements [Kinaesthesen]; the intentional finality of the primal drives [Urtriebe], the problem of the “unconscious” […] Phenomenology of primal association: the pre-ontic formation of units within hyletic fields, phenomena of merging and differentiation within the primal passive sphere (Fink, 1988b, 8).

Hence, by pointing out the relation between temporality and passivity, the present paper intends to contribute with a reconstruction of Husserl’s “first glimpses” into the sphere of the so called “ultimate absolute” and into its genesis at the most deeper level: the one of passivity, of sensuality and stimuli.

I. Static and Genetic Phenomenology

For Husserl the only absolute Being is the “subjectivity” of consciousness, in which takes place the primal constitution (time-constitution or Zeitigung) of consciousness itself and of the universe of transcendent objects (i.e. nature in general). For obvious reasons of space, let us leave aside the question if this Cartesian starting point of Husserl’s thinking – the apodicity of the cogito – had to necessarily block him the access to the ultimate character of transcendental consciousness – as Fink pointed out (2008, 37, 182-183) – or even produced an incapacity to establish the sense of the sum belonging to this cogito, i.e. the mode-of-being of that subjectivity, the constituting pole of what is constituted – as Heidegger’s critique had shown in the early 1920s (Heidegger, 1994). From an immanent point of view, Husserl had basically two different possibilities to phenomenologically conceive consciousness primal flow: one that thinks it as a necessary process of constitution, that is, a process that generates the constitution of temporal objects in the immanent time according to the idetic law of esse est percipi; and a second one – as mentioned above – that proposes to consider constitution and intentional objectiveness as the exclusive domain of reflection, i.e. of a reflection that succeeds in annexing itself to a primal flow of hyletic data that would be (somehow) sufficient for the constitution of primordial hyletic units, but in need of some grasping (or apprehensions) for a real and proper constitution of objectivities. More importantly, according to Husserl both possibilities refer to the question of whether «the life of the ego is a constant process of constitution of (primary) phenomenological time and of immanent objects in it, or not» (2001, 204), whereas must be conceded that the ego somehow always makes experience «of this temporality all the time, [and] therefore one can also speak of a temporal stream of Erlebnisse that, however, are not at all what is ultimate» (204). So, if the deepest (“ultimate” or “original”) level of the stream of consciousness is not the stream of the Erlebnisse, with its noetic and noematic structures and continua, what is consciousness in radical sense? Husserl sought answers to these questions already in a text to perceive the true extent of the transformation that Husserl’s thinking underwent in the last period of his life (1994, 3), and more in line with the proposal of Bruzina (2004), whose approach to both Husserl’s philosophy in the 1930s and Fink’s early philosophy as idialectical interplay between two philosophical thinkers (3) is not only strongly proven by Husserl’s philosophical writings and correspondence, but also by Fink’s own material, which is currently being published in his Gesamtausgabe (especially in the volumes 3.1 – 3.4).
from 1908 (now published as text Nr. 4 of *Husserliana* XXXVI, where he writes that consciousness must be

the root and – with another image – the source of everything that ‘Being’ means and can mean.

It is the root: it carries every other individual Being, be it immanent, be it transcendent. If Being is individual Being, that lasts and in its duration changing and not changing, is temporal being, then consciousness is no being. It is the carrier of time, but not temporal itself and not being temporal, which does not prevent it from finding a filling into time through ‘subjectivation’ (a certain kind of objectification) and then ‘shaped’ into something that lasts, into a temporal object. But in itself it is not temporal (2003, 70).

Quite interesting is the fact that here Husserl is already trying to think the transcendental (or pure) consciousness, the core or root of all constitution, as something that is “no being”, and that is defined as “non-Being” and “not being temporal” because it is the carrier of time. Ten years later, in the *Bernauer Manuscripts*, we find Husserl trying to clarify the same question about the mentioned type, or modalities, of consciousness “subjectivation”. This is one of the first observations of consciousness primal flow that can be described as *genetic*. Husserl’s description proceeds here as it where a descent into the transcendental and innermost history of the ego, a regression deep down into the primal phenomenal sphere of subjectivity and its appearing: the primal-ego and its (self-)temporalizing life.

The identical, not an objective being, and not-temporal I as functioning pole (primal state) *[Urstand]* of the flow of *Erlebnisse*, the I as identical pole for every *Erlebnis* and for everything that is included in the intentionality of the *Erlebnisse* (e.g. nature as intended nature) is the pole for all the time series and, as such, necessarily ‘supra’-temporal: the I, for which time constitutes itself, for which there is temporality and individual and singular objectivity in the intentionality of the *Erlebnis*-sphere, but which is in itself not temporal. Hence in this sense it’s also not a ‘being’ but counterpart of all being, not an object *[Gegenstand]* but primal state *[Urstand]* for all objectivity. [...] It’s the nameless above all comprehensible, that which is above all, not standing, not floating, not existing, but functioning (2001, 277–8.)

The two different points of view on what consciousness ultimately is, exemplified by these two quotations, correspond to the distinction developed by Husserl between static and genetic phenomenology within the transcendental field of experience already discovered in the *Ideas*. In fact, in 1921 Husserl explicitly dedicated some pages to the analysis of static and genetic phenomenological methodology. They are found in the fundamental manuscript B III 10 with the title *Static and genetic Method*, partially published in the mentioned volume of the *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis* (1966, 336–345). This text is important not only because of the lucidity of the exposition and the attempt to systematize the phenomenological methodology by clarifying its different directions and its operational terminology, but above all – as it frequently happens in phenomenological practice – because of all the hesitations, deviations, evolutions and reshaping that it contains. Generally speaking, Husserl distinguishes here at least three different and main levels of phenomenology: «1) universal phenomenology of the general consciousness structures; 2) constitutive phenomenology; 3) phenomenology of the genesis» (1966, 340). If Husserl at first sight contrasts static or descriptive phenomenology with genetic phenomenology, and distinguishes from both of them the so-called constitutive phenomenology (that initially seemed to be part of the static, or an extreme fraction of descriptive phenomenology), later
however he considers constitutive phenomenology as more than just a bridge between the two spheres of methodological influence, and more than a simple link between the different phenomenological regions. In fact there is «another 'constitutive' phenomenology, the one of genesis, which tracks back the history, the necessary history of objectification and thus the history of the object itself as an object of a possible realization» (345). Static phenomenology is the universal phenomenology of the general structures of consciousness, i.e. a phenomenology of the eidetic forms of pure consciousness – regardless of their formation process or origin – investigated according to their teleological direction and noetic-noematic order within immanence. This research program, which traces the general structures of consciousness starting with the description of their mode of givenness within intuition, represents just a first-level phenomenology: it schematizes the intentional structures according to the three moments of ego – cogito – cogitatum. It is also called by Husserl analytical phenomenology, as it’s an universal theory of consciousness, universal theory of perceptions and so of every possible objectivity according to its categorical variations. That is to say, static phenomenology describes the correlation between objectivity that appears as it appears for a consciousness and the subject (the consciousness activity) for which it appears. Through it, phenomenology has already set for itself the task of explaining those apriori structural forms which are essential for experience, and of analyzing the transcendental subjectivity that functions within them. Producing a “fixed typology”, i.e. a general study of essential types and structures (eida) of the experienced world and of the experiential correlation between the subject and the world (cf. Husserl 1991b, 87), phenomenology has already prefigured the following stage of investigation. In fact, the static description of an intentional experience through the analysis of the correlation complex of noesis and noema, which constitutes the fundamental differentiation within consciousness intentionality, provides a transcendental guide to the study of this a priori correlation, which consequently leads into other, completely new paths of transcendental research. Since the thematic area of the transcendental phenomenology is the transcendental consciousness and its constitutive activity, the theory of transcendental constitution is one of the first main pieces of the intentional-constitutive enlightenment of the world-experiencing subjectivity and its correlative structures. The most fundamental activity of the transcendental ego is therefore the origination of meaning [Sinnstiftung], also called formation of meaning [Sinnbildung]. This creative, constitutive activity is, as Van Breda already in 1946 during the IV Congrès des Sociétés de Philosophie de Langue Française pointed out, “absolutely free”, since it is «the direct and immediate expression of radical autonomy and thus of the inalienable freedom of the spirit as such» (Van Breda 1973, 280).

But at this point phenomenology has to deal with the following question: how has been generated this whole system of transcendental freedom? How it has come into Being, how it’s been constituted? It is precisely the question of the genesis: the constitutive becoming, the realization of intentional experiences within consciousness immanence according to fixed laws and operations, among which Husserl considers synthesis and temporalization to be fundamental. The genetic constitution analysis shows that every intentional act, and every intentional object of this act, are the result of some intentional performances: «all intentional units are from an intentional genesis, are constituted units, and everywhere one can examine the finished units according to their constitution, according to their entire genesis» (Husserl 1974, 216). The main problem for genetic analyses on constitution and on the intentional synthesis and temporalization will be to figure out what kind of role does the
ego actively plays in all this (cf. Almeida 1972). At this point, before approaching the problematic of genesis and entering the realm of passivity which is involved in it, we need to briefly clarify the relation between the pure, or absolute consciousness and the constitution (and self-constitution) processes.

II. Absolute Consciousness and Constitution.

Providing a general account on the possible forms of objectivation within consciousness immanence, Husserl introduced the notion of absolute consciousness during winter semester 1906/07 in his Lectures on ethics and the theory of knowledge (1984), however without explicitly connecting the concept of absolute consciousness to the analysis of time-consciousness. This fundamental step took place around 1909, and is documented in the text Nr. 39 of the Husserliana X, where he writes:

What is given as unity, and, as we presuppose here, is adequately given as individual and thus temporal Being, is not really immanently given in the last absolute sense, namely not given as part of the absolute consciousness. [...] Whatever is perceived, whatever is self-given as an individual object, is given as a unit of an absolute non-given multiplicity. [...] To a certain extent, absolute consciousness lies before all unification, i.e. all objectivation. Unity is the unity of objectivation, and objectivation is objectifying, but not objectified. All non-objectified objectivation belongs to the sphere of absolute consciousness (1969, 283).

Another text from the lectures of 1909, published in the Husserliana XXIII as text Nr. 8 (1980, 265-269), shows clearly not only attempt to reconsider the notion of absolute consciousness, but also to overcome the model that guided Husserl’s constitution analyses since the Logical Investigations, which was based on the operating of an apprehension-act over an apprehension-content. The sphere of absolute consciousness, inasmuch as it is pure experience of an object that is actually immanent in intentional consciousness, must be itself constituent of it. The character proper to the constitution that takes place in absolute consciousness is identified by Husserl in the notion of double intentionality (1969, 269). According to this theory, initially referred by Husserl especially to the operating of retention, to every intention belongs a double intentional-reference: the immanent temporal object (as unity of meaning) has to be constituted together with the unity of the consciousness flow which is conscious of that (now constituted) objectuality. On the basis of this theory of double intentionality Husserl can therefore affirm that the absolute flow of consciousness provides the original self-constitution, since the self-consciousness of the flow does not require an additional level of consciousness, but instead constitutes itself within and together every phase of consciousness and every object of consciousness. Moreover, each phase that makes up the absolute flow of consciousness possesses intentional reference to the phases of an immanent object, or of a plurality of objects, which are synthetically unified in a single Erlebnis. The double intentional reference presupposes a double intentional directedness for every ecstatic intention that forms the original horizon of consciousness life: i.e. for retention, protention and primal presentation. Husserl, however, in his Lectures of 1905 focuses almost exclusively on the precise determination of the retentional function, since it’s fundamental for the constitution of the past and of the horizon of past events. To conclude, it can be noted that since the 1909 lectures, as a consequence of the researches conducted on the immanence of temporal objects, absolute consciousness is conceived as pure intentional and constituent consciousness, in the sense of an letting-something-appear process.
that cannot be totally reduced to the immanence of that appearance. And it is only when the absolute consciousness goes from being a sort of pure and totally transparent Erlebniss (as in the first texts form 1906/07) to being an intentional constituent consciousness that absolute consciousness has to be also self-constituent consciousness, in order to avoid the well known problems related to the infinite regress and the model apprehension/apprehension content. But now the challenge lies in the explanation of this kind of absolute self-constitution and its genetic development.

III. Genetic Self-constitution: the Discover of Passivity and Pre-egoic Sphere.

As we’ve seen, according to Husserl’s belief it is not possible to find a solution for the problem of infinite regress by postulating a non-constituted primary flow, composed only of hyletic data. Then, it remains only one possibility to escape this sort of “bad infinity” (Hegel) that endangers the phenomenological theory of constitution and self-constitution of absolute consciousness. If it is not phenomenologically correct to assume any kind of unconscious consciousness, then the primal flow of absolute consciousness constituting the immanent object of the first level should not only be a self-constituting process, i.e. a process that is itself perceived, ‘internally conscious’, but also in such a way that it would have to be in itself, without demanding new processes, conscious of itself, a process constituted for itself: thus a last primal process, whose Being would be consciousness and consciousness of itself and its temporality. How is this possible? (Husserl 2001, 191).

The only way to find a possible solution for the fundamental aporia of temporal analytics, to establishing the basic structure of time-consciousness and so to solve the problem of infinite regress, is therefore to think about self-constitution essentially as a movement of self-relatedness [Selbstbezogenheit] of the primal flow towards itself, and precisely a self-relatedness that is both constitutive and self-conscious. To achieve this goal Husserl’s analysis need to move on two fronts: first of all they have to follow the constitution of the immanent objects, also called events of first level; at the same time to explain also the constitution of the secondary level, i.e. of the process itself. Therefore, to clarify how the double directness of intentional constitution can actually take place, in the Bernauer Husserl tries for the first time to develop a new approach, taking into account the role of protention.

The protention is that ecstatic directness of consciousness that finds its fulfillment [Erfüllung] in the being-conscious of the imminent, upcoming primary presentation. Protentional intentionality, stretched out towards future horizon as original consciousness of what is coming up from there, finds its fulfillment when that what was “about to happen” has become present in the consciousness as something present. Therefore, in the case of retention, the fulfillment process involves a coincidence between “where-to” of intentional directedness and the “where-from” of original presentation – technically called by Husserl Gegenwärtigung. This peculiar coincidence of anticipating the meaning of something individual with its (possible but not necessary) being-present implies a consciousness directedness which refers, in its “being stretched towards something”, to a previous “where-to” of the intention. In fact, when an original protention reaches its fulfillment, that is to say, it is filled in the course of the conscious process and the aimed object is constituted as being-present, what appears to Husserl’s micrologic dissection of the whole phase...
of consciousness is, first of all, an empty, unfilled intentionality. This empty anticipation of what is to come, of what can come from the horizon of future, can turn into a consciousness-of-something as being present which has the character of the fulfillment.

The self-relatedness of the different phases of consciousness in the primary flow, i.e. the immanent primary phases and the phases of the flow itself – which is the keystone for the solution of the whole constitutive problematic – is connected, context of the *Bernauer Manuscripts*, with with the topic of intentional fulfillment. But as the self-constitution of the primary flow has been previously qualified as a process of double constitution, i.e. the constitution of primary and secondary objectualities (cf. Moran & Embree 2004, 29), then also the fulfillment within absolute consciousness must reveal a double intentional directedness. In the same way as the intentional constitutive directness of absolute consciousness, firstly identified in the Lectures on the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time, had been distinguished in the double direction of longitudinal and transverse intentionality ([Langsintentionalität and Querintentionalität] (Husserl 1991a, 85-86) – where the first refers to the flow intending itself in its flowing and the second to the intending of immanent objects that are enduring in immanent time –, the fulfillment process and its phenomenological results had to be investigated also according to two opposite but integrated constitutive functions: 1) the constitution of immanent time and of the objectualities that appear in it, and 2) the constitution of the original flow as such. Accordingly, Husserl distinguishes a general fulfillment, by which the self-constitution of the primal flow can happen, and a particular fulfillment, that synthetically generates a first level of immanent temporal objects.

Given that, after a comprehensive analysis of the general and particular fulfillment and after a preliminary consideration of protention and retention from a genetic perspective, Husserl has finally set the stage for a genetic inquiry into time consciousness and constitution. This is reflected by Husserl’s emphasis on the dynamic and historical, almost teleological character of the fundamental structures of time consciousness, and its constitutive performance, constantly directed towards Being as primal constitutive result (Husserl 2004, 289-309). Later Fink called it *Urnoematisierung*, that is: the ontification process by which absolute, transcendentally conscious becomes worldly or human consciousness «in the deepest constitutive apprehension of itself» (Fink 2006, 43). Of course it involves a peculiar genetic temporalization of consciousness itself, whereby first of all it constitutes its own Being and perceives its own constitution as being. That is why it’s called ontification. The main point here is that this innermost constitutive functioning of consciousness, and its teleological directness towards Being, presupposes retention and protention as indissoluble intentional interweaving. Therefore, Husserl is not only considering the interlace of intentional and protential intentionality in relation with the other ecstatic directedness that originally concurs to forms the temporal field, i.e. original presentation (2004, 3-19), and the graduality of the fulfillment process that takes place within every consciousness phase (2004, 20-49) from a genetical point of view, but consequently he’s also making the effort to conceive retention as motivation for protention, and the latter as an inverted retention. But then, Husserl asks, how is it possible to imagine the beginning of such a process of mutual and genetically interdependent relations of protention, retention and primary presentation? How could be the beginning of the primary flow phenomenologically given? It’s necessary to take a sort of step back, and execute a regressive inquiry into the history of this constitution, into the sedimentations and different strata of consciousness.
ontification process.

Genetically the task would be to make understandable how even before the completed formation of a constitutive process, i.e. before the being-conscious of a temporal object, can and must be formed a consciousness, and a constitutive process. In other words, clarification of the idea of the awakening I, of an I, whose life begins, and how it necessarily had to become a life of consciousness (2004, 13-14).

To examine the genetic beginnings of consciousness life, as life of an awaken I, will bring Husserl in the following years to deal intensively with the problems concerning the borders of phenomenality and with the questions regarding e.g. intentionality in the mode of wakefulness and in the mode of being-asleep, a phenomenology of instincts and of affectivity (Husserl, 2014). A systematic preliminary delineation of all those fields of study and phenomenological research – which Husserl understood as an infinitely ongoing philosophical joint work between generations serving as first maps of unknown lands to subsequently fix through phenomenological proofs undreamt-of discoveries of the transcendental continent – had to ground itself on a previous explanation of how “a real beginning of the constitution of the ego and of the immanent hyletic, and in general of the inner temporal field must look like, which is presupposed for the universal constitution of the primordial and of the completely objective world of experience of this ego” (Husserl, 2002, 469). But the role that the Ego plays in all this as functioning pole, or primal state [Urstand], of every imaginable and constitute flow of Erlebnisse, that necessarily has in it its principle of unity and motivaion, is not immediately apparent in Husserl’s analysis of the Bernau Manuscripts. Only the texts Nr. 14 and 15 (2004, 274-286) are explicitly dedicated to a genetic consideration of the correlation between the flow of Erlebnisse, the I, and the domain of “pre ego” which, since the Ideas I, could not trivially reduced to a mere formal pole of identity for the multiplicity of phenomena. This movement of regressive inquiry towards the primordial phenomenon, the original field of experience for transcendental phenomenology relies on a special phenomenological reduction, which has been – as Husserl says – until now implicitly performed. The regression towards the «absolute primordium», that Husserl will later in the 1930s call the «flowing present of the transcendental world-consciousness» (2006, 132), goes together with a peculiar reduction to the «original sensuality» (2004, 275).

In fact, as we enter the realm of pure subjectivity through phenomenological reduction, on, it becomes clear that we have to distinguish two different things here. The reduction that gives us an a priori and necessary structure is the abstraction from the ego and from everything that is ego-related – which is a mere abstraction of course, but an important one. And then, in the first immanent time level, we have sensory data and sensual feelings (2004, 275-6).

This hidden sphere is called by Husserl the realm of original sensuality, where the sensual tendencies that are absolutely ego-independent lie. And he divides further this transcendental region in two sectors. 1) If the reduction to pure sensuality is not carried out completely, what is revealed is the sphere of irritability: the transcendental empiricism affections and reactions to affections, to sensory stimuli, in which the ego plays a passive role. Affections are there for an ego that suffers them – and reactions do not arise voluntarily from ego’s free will, on the contrary everything proceeds as involuntary reactions, not proper “actions”. This is the region of pure stimuli, and of the re-actions to them. 2) A second moment of this reductive inquiry reveals the
**intellectus agens**: the area where the ego is active, where acts come voluntarily from the ego itself. Within this sphere a further distinction is possible: on the one hand, the ego’s active moment in which it directs itself toward an object, from which it has been affected, in the manner of attention and grasping; on the other hand there are spontaneous acts in the strict sense of the term, which do not presuppose any previous affection to be produced.

But how is then possible to grasp within consciousness, and thanks to transcendental reflection, this ego while being passive? After all, to grasp something means to have it as object of the grasping, i.e. as object of reflection:

<something> is given with an irritating character (stimulus, i.e. irritating whistle) or with a character of “formation”, of some demanding, and it’s now pointing regressively to a correlate, something existing together, that lies in a new dimension, precisely the “I do this”, “I achieve the action”, and here we encounter the pole, something identical, that is not itself temporal (2004, 278).

This egoic pole, this “something” identical and not itself temporal (as immanent time of constituted unities) can be accessed only by way of its actions. It’s localized temporally by its acts and states. Hence, the “I do this”, “I achieve the action”, i.e. action and affection and their constitutive process have to be distinguished from the process by which sensory contents can become present, i.e. from the presentation of immanent temporal objects, to which Husserl has so far dedicated himself. The original egoic pole, which is not temporal or quasi-temporal, is essentially determined by the actions of an original praxis: the necessary correlate of the stimuli – originally given within the sphere of irritability – is the agent of all actions, the identical pole to which they all refer, the pure ego. The pure ego is the identical, practical reference for all experiences, that “something existing together” the process their genetic constitution. Promptly Husserl can return to the problem of infinite regress, reformulating the question in terms of affection and action, that is to say: with the terminology that pertains to the domain of the pure ego. Here he describes the difference between an event that has been grasped by the ego and an event that has not been grasped, but still has been constituted withing absolute flow of consciousness, and therefore that is potentially graspable. This possibility produces an affection on the ego, and the potentiality involved in it the realization of it leads the ego to turn his attention (his active grasping) to what is affecting him, that is: leads to an intentional grasping of the event.

However, the whole mechanism turns into a problem as both the affection and the (possible following) intentional grasping are considered themselves as Erlebnisse, that of course can be intentionally grasped and upon which can be phenomenological reflected. In fact,

for all the affective tendencies (the impulse, the appeal to the ego to react by turning towards it) that I grasp as something noticeable in the reflection [...] one could ask whether they are something that necessary pertain tho the background. But then all those tendencies (as a noticeable ones) must not carry with them tendencies of a new level, these again and so in infinitum? (2004, 285).

If affection belongs to the not noted and not grasped, but always graspable sphere, which lies, so to speak, in the background of consciousness, then every affection must necessarily be accompanied by an affective tendency of second order that could “call” the ego to attention, and signal the object that is liable to turn attentive, ensuring the observability of the firstly not-grasped affection of first level. And so, the discover of
a genetically constitutive sphere of tendencies of affection and original sensuality, i.e. the first glimpses into the sphere of passive genesis and passive syntheses – which affect the Ego and nonetheless, in this passivity, are essential for the constitution process of a coherent world of experience – will concretely open up the curtain on a multiplicity of Arbeitsprobleme, whose complexity and – in a certain sense – extra-phenomenality will rather make more difficult the comprehension of the phenomenological «ultimately and truly absolute» (1983, 193). The obscurity surrounding «the nameless above all comprehensible, that which is above all, not standing, not floating, not existing, but functioning» (2001, 278) will still remain a dilemma for Husserl, as the whole collaboration with Fink (Giubilato 2017, 232-239) and even the later work on the C-Manuscripts (Husserl 2006, 300-376) clearly show.

IV. Eugen Fink’s disposition draft for the edition of Husserl’s Bernauer Manuscripts (1930).

As Roman Ingarden visited Husserl in Freiburg in 1927, the discussion between the two inevitably fell on the phenomenology of time, and especially on Husserl’s Lectures of 1905, which at the time were being edited by Heidegger – and were finally published in 1928. But during the conversation suddenly Husserl invited Ingarden to come back the next day, as he wanted to show him something «something much more important» (Husserl 1968, 155). In fact, the following day Husserl showed Ingarden a large folder containing manuscripts – about 600 pages of stenography – from his stays in Bernau in 1917 and 1918 and asked Ingarden to prepare them for a publication. Despite his grateful emotion, Ingarden had to refuse, knowing that he could not complete what he called an almost impossible undertaking, and that only Husserl himself could have completed it. As a result, Husserl entrusted the manuscripts to his new assistant Eugen Fink. The fact that Fink began working on them already in the early months of his time as Husserl’s student and assistant is demonstrated by the numerous notes in his personal notes (Fink 2006; 2008). But the familiarity with this material is documented even more significantly by the observations, including criticism, made during the drafting of a summary index (dated December the Third, 1928, cf. Fink 2006, 251) and also by an attempt to arrange the manuscripts, compiled together with the sketch of a premise (cf. Fink 2006, 378). Fink’s disposition drafts for the publication (planned together with Husserl around 1930) of the Bernauer Zeitmanuskripte were collected by Fink himself together with some other materials of the time – specifically, those relating to the concomitant project to elaborate and write a System of phenomenological Philosophy – and delivered in 1969 to the Husserl Archive in Louvain, where they are now catalogued as L I and L II (Bruzina 1993; 1994). The following text, translation of Eugen Fink’s original disposition draft for the publication of the manuscripts, has been published in: Fink (2008, 347-356).

E. Fink’s disposition draft for the publication of the Bernauer Zeitmanuskripte from the first period of editing – i.e. before the complete new editing and the new book manuscript Zeit und Zeitkonstitution, which contained only a few manuscript texts by Husserl.

Disposition draft for Edmund Husserl’s Investigations on the Phenomenology of Transcendental Time.
Introduction

The problem of transcendental time: in these treatises fundamentally within the egological reduction. Connection with the *Ideas* (cf. Husserl 1976): the reduction carried out there as reduction of the first stage; characterization of the exposition of the transcendental time problem in the *Ideas* and in the “lectures” (cf. Husserl 1969). New presentation of the phenomenological reduction and articulation of the phenomenological problem of constitution. Layout of the treatise.

1. Section: Analysis of immanent time: (Intentional analyses of perception, memory, a detailed analysis of recollection. - The immanent time as a multi-dimensionality of times, demonstration of the descriptive differences between temporality of acts and time of hyletic data, of the time of immanent apriorities (eidetic relations analysis of consciousness of succession).

2. Section: The constitution of immanent time: (The acts as units in the phase manifolds of the inner time consciousness; time and time modality, objectivity of the time modalities, apprehension and apprehension-content, problem of immanent perception; analysis of the time intentionality, preention and retention, determination of the “phenomenological” character of the “fading-away”, discussion of apparently possible interpretations. - The whole section deals in extenso with the problem of individuation, however, in the immanence; plots of a temporal noematic!)


Approximate disposition of the manuscripts: 6

Introduction: various manuscript beginnings, but above all parts from <the> manuscript “Zur Lehre von den Zeitmodalitäten” (see infra).

1. Section:

1. „Erinnerung als Voraussetzung der Vergleichung und Identifizierung” (= HA L I 11/9-10, Hua XXXIII, Beil. XIX; HA L 111/11-18, Hua XXXIII, Text Nr. 22).

2. “Das Bewußtsein und seine Form der immanenten Zeit” (= HA L 118/1-4, Hua XXXIII, Beil. XXI).


4. Some parts from “Akte als Gegenstände der phänomenologischen Zeit” (= HA L I 1311-14, Hua XXXIII, Text Nr. 6).

5. Some pages from “Eidetische Gestalt der seelischen Innerlichkeit” (about hyletic data and their time) (= HA L I 17/3-6, from which are taken the pages 5-6 in Hua XXXIII, Beil. XV).
2. Section:

1. “Auffassung und Auffassungsinhalt” (= HA LI 12/11-19, Hua XXXIII, pp. 153-163 and Beil. IV; HA LI 19/1-12, Hua XXXIII, Text Nr. 9).

2. “Zeit und Zeitmodalitäten” (= HA LI 21/4-21, Hua XXXIII, Text Nr. 10 and Beil. V).


4. “Objektivität der Zeitmodalitäten” (EFA B-II 64a-73b = HA LI 5/1-15, Hua XXXIII, Text Nr. 5).

5. “Das Ineinander von Retention und Protention” (= HA LI 16/1-13, Hua XXXIII, Text Nr. 1 and Beil. I).

6. “Wichtige Ausführungen über Retention und Vergegenwärtigung” (= HA LI 14, of which only page nr. 8 has been published in Hua XXXIII, Beil. III).

7. “Retentionale Modifikation und kontinuierliche Modifikation überhaupt” (=Transcription by Edith Stein, HA LI 4/2-9, Hua XXXIII, Text Nr. 3).


3. Section:

1. “Neuer Versuch der Aufklärung der Strukturen des Zeitgegenständlichkeit-konstituierenden Bewußtseins” (= HA LI 15/3-38, Hua XXXIII, Text Nr. 2, 11 and Beil. VI)

2. “Das Ego und die subjektive Zeit” (= HA B II 10/3-8, Hua IX, S. 415-418; HA B II 10/13-

3. 14; HA B II 10/17-21, all not from Bernau)

4. “Eidetische Gestalt” (= HA L I 117/9-13, Hua XXXIII, Text Nr.15)

5. “Der Erlebnisstrom und das Ich” (= HA L I 20/2-6, Hua XXXIII, Text Nr. 14)
References


Id. (1991a). *On the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time (1893-1917)*.